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Abstract 
There has been an increasing interest in the finance literature regarding the impact of 
transactions costs on US equity markets. The US empirical evidence indicates that transactions 
costs influence both trading volume (Atkins and Dyl (1997)) and asset returns (Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986)). Additionally, the theoretical finance literature also indicates that 
transactions costs affect equilibrium asset returns (Fisher (1994)). 
In this thesis we assess the impact of transactions costs on the UK equity markets, from four 
aspects. Firstly, we provide empirical support to the hypothesis that transactions costs affect 
the "holding period" of an asset in the portfolio of an investor. Secondly, we provide robust 
results showing that transactions costs affect equilibrium asset returns. Thirdly, we explain the 
variability of transactions costs with the use of information asymmetry, proxied by the 
variance of analysts' forecasts, in the spirit of Kim and Verrecchia (1994,2001). Finally, we 
find that stock price and trading volume reaction to changes in the FTSE 100 list can be 
explained by liquidity effects, as proxied by the bid-ask spread. 
We provide overwhelming evidence, suggesting that transactions costs are important in UK 
equity markets. 
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Introduction 
Transactions costs are an important aspect of security trading, and may have several 
effects, on prices and investor portfolios, some of which are not intuitively obvious. 
Essentially, transactions costs in stock markets fall into two categories, direct trading costs 
and indirect trading costs. The direct trading costs include the market makers bid-ask 
spread, the brokerage fees, and any transaction taxes, such as stamp duty. The indirect 
costs include the costs of acquiring and processing information about share values, 
companies, market movements and any other information which may be relevant to the 
decision to trade. 
In this thesis we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of transactions 
costs, proxied by the bid-ask spread in the UK stock market, by looking at transactions 
costs from four different empirical aspects. Eventhough, transactions costs are a 
fundamental aspect of trading, the research into this area is relatively limited. The reason 
for this is that the availability of transaction data was very limited for a number of years. 
However, in more recent years transaction data has become more readily available and we 
can therefore provide more insight into the influence of transactions costs in stock markets. 
The aim of the work is to look at transactions costs from various empirical perspectives. 
This will provide us with the evidence required to determine the importance of transactions 
costs in the UK stock market. 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 presents a review of the existing literature on 
transactions costs. In this literature review, we begin by looking at the different types of 
transactions costs and the importance of transactions costs with respect to the UK stock 
market. We then focus the review upon the bid-ask spread. The reason for this is that the 
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other measures of transactions costs are either heterogeneous (brokerage fees), difficult to 
measure (opportunity costs), or are only relevant to large trades (price impacts). We go on 
and review the literature on the bid-ask spread, the relationship between the bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, information asymmetry and finally estimates of the bid-ask spread in 
different equity markets. The review of the literature gives the reader an insight of the 
current status of the transactions costs literature and gives a flavour of the research that the 
thesis entails. 
Chapter 2 looks at the relationship between the holding period of a common stock and 
transactions costs. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Constantinides (1986) and Wilcox 
(1993) provide a theoretical basis for the proposition that assets with higher transactions 
costs are held by investors for longer holding periods as they are traded less frequently. 
Atkins and Dyl (1997) bring empirical support to this hypothesis by documenting a 
positive relationship between transactions costs and holding periods for common stocks in 
the NYSE and the NASDAQ. We provide some explicit theoretical rationale for the 
postulated relationship and following Atkins and Dyl (1997) we test the same hypothesis in 
the context of the FTSE All Share common stocks between 1990 and 2000. We extend the 
econometric model by the inclusion of the skewness of returns, to approximate any non- 
linearity present in the specification. We find that there is overwhelming evidence to 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between transactions costs and holding periods 
for common stocks in the UK stock market. 
Chapter 3 looks at transactions costs with respect to asset pricing. Generally speaking the 
asset pricing literature tends to not incorporate transactions costs in their models. A 
possible reason for this could be that Constantinides (1986) argued that proportional 
transactions costs can only have a small impact on asset prices. However, the problem with 
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his equilibrium model is the infrequent trading that implies for agents. Calibrating this 
model may understate the effect of transactions costs on asset prices given the much higher 
levels of trading that we observe empirically. 
Following this, in Chapter 3 we test for the inclusion of the bid-ask spread in the 
consumption CAPM, in the UK stock market over the time period of 1980-2000. Two 
econometric models are used; first, Fisher's (1994) asset pricing model is estimated by 
GMM, and second, the VAR approach proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988a) is 
extended to include the bid-ask spread. Overall the statistical tests are unable to reject the 
bid-ask spread as an independent explanatory variable in the C-CAPM. This leads to the 
conclusion that transactions costs should be included in asset pricing models. 
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between the bid-ask spread and information 
asymmetry. In estimating functions that determine the bid-ask spread in the US equity 
market, Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988) include measures of the 
volatility of returns in their set of explanatory variables to proxy the risk of adverse 
selection to which the market maker is exposed. They find that volatility is significant in 
explaining the spread. 
We suggest that an augmented model of the spread should include additional variables and 
more specifically the reported disagreement amongst market analysts regarding the firms' 
earnings. Such variability will lead to increases in the bid-ask spread as it leaves market 
makers at an additional informational disadvantage with respect to informed traders (Kim 
and Verrecchia, 1994,2001). 
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We find that both the volatility of returns and disagreement amongst analysts are 
significant (with the hypothesised signs) in explaining FTSE 100 company spreads, 
rendering strong empirical support to the hypotheses proposed by Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994,2001). The influence of the variability of analysts' forecasts is significant over short 
horizons and thereafter tapers off. The volatility of returns exerts a significant and positive 
influence on the spread over all horizons. This modelling approach confirms that one of the 
major determinants of the bid-ask spread is information asymmetry. 
In Chapter 5 we attempt to explain stock price and trading volume reaction in the status of 
the company as a participant in the FTSE 100, with the use of "liquidity effects", as 
proxied by the bid-as spread. The chapter examines the effect on the returns of firms that 
have been included to and deleted from the FTSE 100 over the time period of 1984-2001. 
Like the S&P 500 listing studies, we find that the price and trading volume of newly listed 
(deleted) firms increases (decreases). The evidence is consistent with the information 
cost/liquidity explanation. This is because investors hold stocks with more (less) available 
information, consequently implying that they have lower (higher) trading costs. This 
explains the increase (decrease) in the stock price and trading volume of newly listed 
(deleted) stocks to (from) the FTSE 100 list. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review On Transactions Costs 
1.1 Introduction 
Transactions costs have immediate practical value for investors, portfolio managers, 
exchange officials, and regulators. These groups have considerable interest in the 
relationship between the structure of security markets and transactions costs. ' Indeed the 
growth of alternative trading systems may be linked to efforts by large traders to reduce 
their transactions costs. 
The increased interest in these issues has stimulated rapid growth in the literature on 
transactions costs, over the past ten years. The problem with transactions costs literature is 
that the data sets required to analyze many points of interest are difficult to obtain. In 
particular, publicly available databases do not indicate whether a trade was a buy or sell or 
whether a trade represented all or part of the desired order quantity. Furthermore, 
identifying the trades of institutional investors is difficult to impossible with publicly 
available data. 
Recently however, detailed trading data from institutional traders has become available, 
which greatly expands researchers' understanding of the trading process and costs. The 
objective of this literature review is to summarize the findings of the recent literature on 
equity transactions costs. 
1 Christie et al (1994) find evidence that NASDAQ dealers engage in "implicit collusion" to keep spreads 
above competitive levels. 
J 
1.2 Measuring Transactions Costs 
Evidence shows that execution costs can be large, often enough to substantially reduce or 
even eliminate the notional return on an investment strategy. 2 This means that it is 
important to measure, analyze and control transactions costs. The key is to distinguish 
between the major components of transactions costs. There are two major components of 
transactions costs, explicit and implicit transactions costs. 
Explicit costs mainly comprise of commissions charged by brokers. However, they do also 
include fees, stamp duties and so on, for which there is an explicit accounting charge. 
Commissions vary, averaging 0.2% of trade value overall, and have been declining. They 
vary by price, market mechanism and broker type. For example, crossing networks (where 
natural buyers and sellers are matched at predetermined prices without intervention by a 
market maker) charge as little as 2% per share, whereas commissions on difficult trades 
executed by specialist brokers may be as high as 10-15% per share. 3 Trades are also liable 
to implicit costs, which are more difficult to measure. They consist of three major 
components, price impacts, opportunity costs and the bid-ask spread. We will now briefly 
look at each of them in turn. 
1.2.1 Price Impacts 
Institutions make large trades and demand increasing liquidity from markets. As a result, 
their trades often move prices in the direction of the trade, resulting in "market impact" or 
"price impact". The price impact of large trades varies with trade size and market 
capitalisation. Madhaven and Chang (1997) examine US data and find that the market 
2 For more details see Keim and Madhaven (1998). 
3 We provide evidence of commission charges from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
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impact of large (block) transactions for illiquid stocks in the smallest 20% of market 
capitalisation range from 3.04% for the smallest blocks to 6.21% for the largest blocks. 
In contrast, Keim and Madhaven (1996) produce a study of block trades in very liquid 
Dow Jones Industrial stocks and over an average of 30 stocks they find relatively small 
price impacts, ranging from 0.15% to 0.18%. Finally, costs vary by time of day. Some 
studies document systematically higher costs at the close, a period when imbalances are 
often large and dealers are reluctant to carry inventories overnight. 
1.2.2 Opportunity Costs 
Opportunity costs are associated with missed trading opportunities. Trades are often 
motivated by information whose value decays over time. Opportunity cost is incurred 
when an order is only partially filled or is not executed at all, as well as when an order is 
executed with a delay, during which the price moves against the trader. 
These costs are difficult to measure and depend on the discretion that a trader has to 
execute orders. One accepted method computes opportunity cost by measuring the 
difference in performance between a portfolio based on actual trades and a hypothetical 
portfolio whose returns are computed with the assumption that transactions were executed 
at prices observed at the time of the trading decision. The difference is called "performance 
shortfall". 
1.2.3 Bid-Ask Spreads 
One of the most important characteristics that investors look for in an organized 
financial 
market is liquidity. Liquidity is the ability to buy or sell significant quantities of a security 
quickly, anonymously, and with relatively little price 
impact. To maintain liquidity, many 
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organized exchanges use market makers, which are individuals who stand ready to buy or 
sell whenever the public wishes to buy or sell. In return for providing liquidity, market 
makers are granted monopoly rights by the exchange to post different prices for purchases 
and sales. They buy at the bid price, Pb and sells at a higher ask price Pa ,,. 
Thability to 
buy low and sell high is the market makers' primary source of compensation for providing 
liquidity. Their compensation is defined as PQ - Pb , which is intern defined as the bid-ask 
spread. 
The bid-ask spread varies depending on the stocks' liquidity. Quoted spreads vary widely, 
from less then 0.3% for the most liquid (largest market capitalization) stocks to 4-6% for 
the least liquid (smallest market capitalization) stocks. 4 
There is however a problem with quoted spreads in that they often overstate true bid-ask 
spreads because trades are often executed inside the quoted spread, especially for 
exchange-listed stocks, by traders on the exchange floor. Also, bid and ask prices tend to 
rise after a buy order (or fall after a sell order). To eliminate the effect of these biases, 
researchers study actual transaction prices to measure effective bid-ask spreads that 
approximate the true spread more closely. Studies such as Lee (1993) confirm that 
effective spreads are, on average, lower then quoted spreads. 
Demsetz (1968) provides the first formal definition of the bid-ask spread. He says that 
transaction costs may be defined as the cost of exchanging ownership titles. In the specific 
case of the FTSE, it is the cost of exchanging titles to money and to shares of stock. It is 
possible to increase or decrease this cost by a more or less inclusive definition of which 
activities are to be counted as transaction activities. From one viewpoint the cost of 
4 See Loeb (1983), Keim (1989) and Hong and Stoll (1996) for further details. 
8 
producing assets is necessary to the exchange of assets, whereas, from another viewpoint, 
only titles to assets need be produced for exchange to take place, the production of the 
assets themselves can be postponed indefinitely. One could also include in transaction cost 
the cost of being informed about the general nature of the market, the cost of making 
phone calls to one's broker or of reading the financial pages. Transaction cost is defined 
narrowly as the cost of using the FTSE to accomplish a quick exchange of stock for 
money. Broader interpretations lead to extremely difficult empirical and conceptual 
problems. 
Given that titles to assets exist, given that decisions to exchange these titles have been 
made, and given that brokers or sales representatives have been informed of these 
decisions, what are the costs to buyers and sellers of using the FTSE to contract with each 
other. These remaining costs comprise transaction cost as the term that is used in this 
literature review. On the FTSE, two elements comprise almost all of transaction costs, 
brokerage fees and bid-ask spreads. Transfer taxes could be included, but it is expedient to 
concentrate our attention on the two major components. 
The inclusion of the bid-ask spread in transaction costs can be understood best by 
considering the neglected problem of "immediacy" in supply and demand analysis. 
Predictable immediacy is a rarity in human actions, and to approximate it requires that 
costs be borne by persons who specialize in standing ready and waiting to trade with the 
incoming orders of those who demand immediate servicing of their orders. 
The bid-ask spread is the markup that is paid for predictable immediacy of exchange in 
organized markets; in other markets, it is the inventory markup of retailer or wholesaler. 
9 
A person who plays an important role in these submarkets in the FTSE is the specialist. 
The specialist earns his income in two ways: by managing orders and by assuming risk. 
The former role is to manage orders left with him by traders who desire to move to other 
positions on the floor of the exchange. In this role, the specialist acts as a broker; he 
matches buy and sell orders. If he matches an order left to his care with an order that is 
subsequently presented to him by another floor trader, the specialist shares in the 
commission charged to the customer by the floor trader. This is the specialist's first source 
of income and in earning this income he serves as an information repository. 
In his second role, the specialist may step in to match the order left with him by trading for 
his own account. If he does so, he acts as a trader and receives no part of the commission 
charged to the customer. Thus, if the first trader presents an order to sell (or buy) and the 
specialist buys (or sells) for his own account to match the trader's order, he does not earn 
any share of commissions on the exchange. However, such an operation can generate 
income for the specialist from other sources. He can engage in an opposite trading action at 
a preferential price differential later. If he buys for his own account, he can hope to resell 
later at a higher price than he paid; if he sells for his own account, he can expect to 
repurchase later at a lower price than he paid. 
The specialist earns income through buying and selling for his own account by standing 
ready to step in during periods when bid-ask quotations, submitted by outsiders are too far 
apart to keep trade active without wide jumps in price. The specialist can increase the 
rapidity of exchange with narrower price movements during such periods by offering a 
narrower bid-ask spread than outsiders are currently submitting. 
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This role of the specialist involves judgment, investment, and risk-taking; it is a role that is 
difficult to computerize completely, although computer programs conceivably could aid 
the specialist in playing this role. The investment involved is common to that made by 
other inventory specialists such as retailers and wholesalers of commodities. It is the 
willingness to invest in inventory and to stand ready to exchange in order to offer quicker 
exchange at given cost to ultimate buyers and sellers. What makes the specialist important 
in this process is that he is obligated to fellow members of the exchange to make a market 
for the securities in which he specializes. If there exists no quotation from outsiders that is 
"reasonably" narrow, he must offer one of his own to facilitate trading. The specialist 
hopes, of course, to realize a profit on inventory turnover. Specialists in all types of 
markets perform essentially these same functions. All would like to acquire inventory at 
low prices and resell at high prices and to do so very rapidly, but competitive forces, to be 
discussed later, are at work in varying degrees in these markets and the stronger are these 
forces the closer will these markups be to the cost of waiting and carrying inventory. 
It is apparent from the discussion that under competitive conditions the bid-ask spread, or 
markup will measure the cost of making transactions without delay. A person who has just 
purchased a security and who desires immediately to resell it will, on the average, be 
forced to suffer a markdown equal to the spread found in the market place. This markdown 
(plus brokerage commissions) measures the cost of an immediate round-trip exchange. 
Under less competitive conditions, this spread may somewhat exaggerate the underlying 
cost to those who stand ready and waiting of quick round-trip transactions, but, for any 
given degree of competition (since brokerage commissions do not vary with the time taken 
to complete a transaction), differences in spread will indicate differences in the cost of 
quick exchange. The typical spread for one security may be twice the percentage of price 
that it is for another; this can be taken to indicate that the cost of quick exchange per dollar 
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invested in the first security is greater than it is for the second, and, perhaps, approximately 
twice as great. The spread, of course, can be thought of as measuring twice the cost of a 
one-way transaction; the last transaction price may be $40 and the currently quoted spread 
may ask $40.5 and bid $39.5, so that a market order pays a half point penalty relative to the 
last transaction price. 
If the cost of quick exchange is higher for one asset than it is for another, we may assume 
that the cost of exchanging with any given time delay will be higher also, although not 
necessarily proportionately higher. The forces at work in determining the cost of quick 
exchange, we shall see, are not such that they can be expected to work in opposite 
directions if we increase the time interval during which an exchange is concluded. Hence, 
the analysis, which follows can be, expected to determine the identity of variables and to 
measure the direction of their effect on the cost of making transactions in highly organized 
markets whatever the time allowed to conclude an exchange. The magnitude of the effects 
measured, however, can be associated with quick exchange only. 
The bid-ask spread and the commission brokerage are determined by different procedures 
and institutional arrangements. Generally, commission brokerage depends only on the 
price of a share and is independent of whether or not the executed order is a market or limit 
order. The relationship of commissions to prices is established collectively by members of 
the FTSE. The spread is determined by persons acting individually, by specialists, by floor- 
traders or by outsiders submitting market or limit orders. The spread component of 
transaction cost will vary according to several aspects of the market for a security. The 
structural requirements for competition are more clearly in evidence in determining the 
spread than they are in determining brokerage commissions. 
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1.3 The Importance of Transactions Costs in Equity Markets 
The diminutive size of typical spreads also belies their potential importance in determining 
the time-series properties of asset returns. For example, Phillips and Smith (1980) show 
that most of the abnormal returns associated with particular options trading strategies are 
eliminated when the costs associated with the bid-ask spread are included. Blume and 
Stambaugh (1983) argue that the bid-ask spread creates a significant upward bias in mean 
returns calculated with transaction prices. More recently, Keim (1989) shows that a 
significant portion of the January effect (the fact that smaller capitalisation stocks seem to 
outperform larger capitalisation stocks over the few days surrounding the turn of the year), 
may be attributable to closing prices recorded at the bid price at the end of December and 
closing prices recorded at the ask price at the beginning of January. 
Even if the bid-ask spread remains unchanged during this period, the movement from bid 
to ask is enough to yield large portfolio returns, especially for lower-priced stocks for 
which the percentage bid-ask spread is larger. Since low-priced stocks also tend to be low- 
capitalisation stocks, Keim's (1989) results do offer a partial explanation for the January 
effect. Empirically, Atkins and Dyl (1990) discover that stocks that exhibit a large price 
decline (losers) subsequently earn significant abnormal returns. They also find evidence 
that stocks that exhibit a large price increase (winners) subsequently earn negative 
abnormal returns. However when they incorporate the bid ask spread in their analysis, they 
conclude that traders could not profit from the price reversals that they observe. 
This 
implies that the Efficient Market Hypothesis remains intact once transactions costs have 
been accounted for. 
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Demsetz (1968) presents statistical evidence, which suggests that the bid-ask spread and 
the price of a security are positively related. This implies that when transaction costs 
increase the price of a security increases and vice versa. This is logical and intuitive. This 
gives strong empirical evidence that transactions costs are important with respect to 
security valuation. 
Constanitindes (1986) took the Demestz (1968) analysis a step further by developing a 
two-asset intertemporal model to assess the importance of transactions costs. Initially in 
the model there were no transactions costs and the investor resulted in an isoelastic utility 
of consumption. The implication of this is that the optimal investment policy is the ratio of 
the two asset values in the portfolio. When the model is modified to introduce proportional 
transactions costs a simple investment policy is determined by a region of no transactions, 
which is an interval on the real line: an investor refrains from transacting as long as the 
ratio of asset values lies in this interval. The region of no transactions is wide, and, 
therefore, an investor's demand for the assets is sensitive to the current composition of the 
portfolio. 
Constantinides (1986) also discovers that the demand for one of the two assets over time, 
which is subject to transactions costs, is substantially reduced. This is due to the fact that 
investors accommodate large transactions costs by drastically reducing the frequency and 
volume of trade. In addition he finds that transactions costs have only a second-order effect 
on equilibrium asset returns. This is because investors' expected utility of the future 
consumption stream is insensitive to deviations of the asset proportions that are optimal in 
the absence of transactions costs. This suggests that a small liquidity premium is sufficient 
to compensate an investor for deviating significantly from the target portfolio proportions. 
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Two very important conclusions arise from the Constantinides (1986) study. First, 
transactions costs have only a second-order effect on equilibrium asset returns. This means 
that they can be ignored in the real asset pricing theory since they have only second-order 
effects on the theory's empirically testable implications. 
Second, transactions costs have a first-order effect on the assets' demand, which implies 
that they effect the trading strategy of an investor. 5 This is because if they affect assets' 
demand then they directly effect the holding period of the asset. Therefore, from this 
analysis we can conclude that transactions costs are a relevant factor in explaining the 
holding period of a common stock, but are irrelevant in asset pricing. 
The presence of the bid-ask spread complicates matters in several ways. Instead of one 
price for each security, there are now three: the bid price, the ask price, and the transaction 
price which need not be either the bid or the ask (although in some cases it is), nor need it 
lie in between the two (although in most cases it does). How should returns be calculated, 
from bid-to-bid, ask-to-bid, etc.? Moreover, as random buys and sells arrive at the market, 
prices can bounce back and forth between the ask and the bid prices, creating spurious 
volatility and serial correlation in returns, even if the economic value of the security is 
unchanged. 
1.3.1 The Bid-Ask Bounce 
To account for the impact of the bid-ask spread on the time-series properties of asset 
returns, Roll (1984) proposes the following simple model. Denote by P* the fundamental 
value of a security in a frictionless economy at time t, and denote by S the bid-ask spread 
5 Trading strategy is defined as the holding period of a common stock. 
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(see Glosten and Milgrom [1985], for example). Then the observed market price P, can be 
written as: 
Pt =Pt *+Its (1.1) 2 
= +1 with probability 
1 
(buyer-initiated) 
It IID 2 
1 
(1.2) 
= -1 with probability 2 (seller-initiated) 
where It is an order-type indicator variable, indicating whether the transaction at time t is 
at the ask (buyer-initiated) or at the bid (seller-initiated) price. The assumption that P *, is 
the fundamental value of the security implies that E [Ij = 0, hence 
Pr (It = 1) = Pr (Ir = -1) =1. Assume for the moment that there are no changes in the 2 
fundamentals of the security; hence P*=P* is fixed through time. Then the process for 
price changes AP, is given by 
OP =0P+(I, -I, -, 
) -It-I, 22 
(1.3) 
given that It is assumed to be IID the variance, covariance, and autocorrelation of OP 
can be easily computed as follows: 
S2 
Var[AP] =2 
s2 
Cov[OP_,, OP] =4 
Cov[OP_kIAP]=0 k r1 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
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Corr [AP_, 
, OP 
]- -1 1. , 
Despite the fact that fundamental value P*, is fixed, A/ exhibits volatility and negativ e 
serial correlation as the result of bid-ask bounce. The intuition behind this is the following: 
If P* is fixed so that prices take on only two values, the bid and the ask, and if the current 
price is the ask, then the price change between the current price and the previous price 
must be either 0 or S and the price change between the next price and the current price 
must be either 0 or -S. The same argument applies if the current price is the bid; hence 
the serial correlation between adjacent price changes is non-positive. From the above 
equations we can see that the larger the spread S, the higher the volatility and the first- 
order autocovariance, both increasing proportionally so that the first-order autocorrelation 
remains constant at -2. We can see from (1.6) that the bid-ask spread does not induce any 
higher-order serial correlation. 
Now let the fundamental value P* change through time, but suppose that its increments 
are serially uncorrelated and independent of It .6 Then 
(1.5) still applies, but the first-order 
autocorrelation (1.7) is no longer -1 because of the additional variance of AP,, *, in the 2 
denominator. Specifically if a'2 (AP *) is the variance of AJ *, then 
Corr[ OP_,, OP] = 
S2/4 
< 0. 
(S212 +62 (OP*) 
(1.8) 
6 Roll (1984) argues that price changes must not be serially correlated in an 
informationally efficient market. 
However, Leroy (1973) and Lucas (1978) show that this need not be the case. 
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Although (1.5) shows that a given spread S implies a first-order autocovariance of 
-S2 /4, the logic may be reversed so that a given autocovariance coefficient and value of 
p imply a particular value for S. Solving for S in (1.5) gives the following solution 
S=2 -Cov [ AP ,, OP 
], 
hence S may be easily estimated from the sample autocovariances of price changes. 
(1.9) 
Estimating the bid-ask spread may seem meaningless given the fact that bid-ask quotes are 
observable. However, Roll (1984) argues that the quoted spread may often differ from the 
effective spread, i. e., the spread between the actual market prices of a sell order and a buy 
order. In many instances, transactions occur at prices within the bid-ask spread, perhaps 
because market makers do not always update their quotes in a timely fashion, or because 
they wish to rebalance their own inventory and are willing to "better" their quotes 
momentarily to achieve this goal, or because they are willing to provide discounts to 
customers that are trading for reasons other than private information. 7 Roll's (1984) model 
is one measure of this effective spread, and is also a means for accounting the effects of the 
bid-ask spread on the time-series properties of asset returns. 
1.4 Components of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Although Roll's (1984) model of the bid-ask spread captures one important aspect of its 
effect on transaction prices, it is by no means a complete theory of the economic 
determinants and the dynamics of the bid-ask spread. In particular, Roll (1984) takes S as 
given, but in practice the size of the spread is the single most 
important quantity that 
market makers control in their strategic interactions with other market participants. 
In fact, 
7 See Eikeboom (1993), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Goldstein (1993) for further details. 
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Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue convincingly that S is determined endogenously and is 
unlikely to be independent of P* as we have assumed so far in our literature review. 
Other theories of the market making process have decomposed the spread into more 
fundamental components, and these components often behave in different ways through 
time and across securities. Estimating the separate components of the bid-ask spread is 
critical for properly implementing these theories with transactions data. In this section of 
the literature review we shall turn to some of the econometric issues surrounding this task. 
There are three primary economic sources for the bid-ask spread: order processing costs, 
inventory costs, and adverse-selection costs. The first two consist of the basic setup and 
operating costs of trading and recordkeeping, and the carrying of undesired inventory 
subject to risk. 
1.4.1 Inventory and Order Processing Cost Component of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Garman (1976) was the first study to review Inventory and Order Processing costs of the 
bid-ask spread. In Garman's (1976) model there is a single, monopolistic market maker 
that sets prices, receives all orders, and clears trades. The dealer's objective is to maximise 
expected profit per unit of time, subject to the avoidance of bankruptcy or failure. Failure 
arises in this model whenever the dealer runs out of inventory or cash. The market maker's 
only decision is to set the ask price, P, at which he will fill orders wishing to buy the 
stock, and a bid price, Pb , at which 
he will fill the orders wishing to sell the stock. 
The dealer has an infinite horizon, but only selects the bid and ask prices once, at the 
beginning of time. The uncertainty in this model arises from the arrival of the buy and sell 
orders. These orders are represented as independent stochastic processes, where the 
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arrivals of buy and sell orders are assumed to be Poisson distributed, with stationarity' 
arrival rate functions A,, (p) and Ab (p). Buy (or sell) orders follow a Poisson process if 
the waiting time between arrivals of buy (sell) orders is exponentially distributed. More 
formally, letting t be the time of the last buy order, the probability of a buy order arriving 
in the interval [t, t+ At] is approximately AaAt for small At. Representing orders as 
Poisson processes allows the model to capture the randomness of the order arrival over 
time in a tactable manner. 
At time period 0, the market maker is assumed to hold I, (0) units of cash and IS (0) units 
of stock. Let I, (t) and IS (t) be the units of cash and the stock at time period t. Let 
Na (t) be the cumulative number of shares that have been sold to traders up to time period 
t (these are the executed buy orders), and let Nb (t) be the cumulative number of shares 
that have been bought from traders at time period t (these are executed sell orders). Then 
inventories are governed by 
Iý (t) - I, (0) + Pa NQ (t) - PbNb (t) (1.10) 
and 
I, (t)=1s(0)+Nb(t)_NQ(t). (1.11) 
The model states that no matter what price the dealer sets, there is no guarantee that he will 
not fail. Of perhaps more interest is that under certain conditions the dealer 
fails with 
probability one. In order for the market maker to avoid certain failure, 
he must set P and 
Pb so that they simultaneously satisfy 
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FX(P)ý- Výb (p (1.12) 
and 
Pb)ýIla(I )' (1.13) 
provided that this is possible. 
These conditions dictate that a single market maker sets a lower price when he buys stock 
and a higher price when he sells. This results in a spread developing, and it implies the 
spread has an inherent property of this exchange market structure. This spread protects the 
market maker from certain failure. What determines the size and placement of this spread 
is not obvious. Since both the market maker's inventory and cash positions have positive 
drift, characterizing price behaviour or the market maker's inventory position is complex. 
To investigate the problem further requires limiting the scope of uncertainty. Garman 
(1976) first simplifies the problem by assuming that the dealer pursues a zero-drift 
inventory policy. 
Given this assumption, the dealer's pricing strategy has some interesting properties. First, 
by assumption, the dealer sets prices to equate the order arrival rates. There are multiple 
pricing strategies that satisfy this condition, however where the dealer sets his prices 
depends on factors other then inventory. Given the dealer's objective, the exact prices he 
sets are those which maximize the dealer's expected profit. An important property of these 
prices is that the dealer does not set a single market clearing price p* 
but rather sets 
different buying and selling prices, P and Pb , respectively. 
This allows the dealer to 
extract large rents while still maintaining the zero-drift 
inventory requirement. As is 
typically optimal for a monopolist, this pricing strategy results 
in volume at the optimal 
prices being less then would occur 
in competitive prices. 
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This pricing strategy is reminiscent of that suggested by Demsetz (1968). Where the 
analyses differ is that the Demsetz (1968) model did not incorporate the intertemporal 
nature of the dealer's problem; nor, for that matter, did it include a dealer. To address the 
dealer's intertemporal inventory problem, Garman (1976) considers a second 
simplification in which the profit maximization assumption is relaxed. Here, the dealer is 
assumed to set a single market-clearing price p *. With the dealer's pricing strategy 
specified, the effect of inventory on the dealer can be isolated. The problem is that if we 
pursue this simple pricing strategy, there will come a point when the dealer will fail with 
certainty. The reason for this is that the market maker fails if he runs out of inventory or 
cash. Since inventories follow a random walk, sooner or latter a sequence of trades will 
force either his stock position or his cash position to their boundary. When this happens, 
the process meets an "absorbing barrier" and failure occurs. 
Garman's (1976) model of the market-making process is simplistic but provocative. While 
the behaviour of prices and inventories in this model is too mechanistic to be realistic, the 
demonstration of the dual complexity the dealer faces and its implications for market 
viability is insightful. As his analysis demonstrates, inventory determines the dealer's 
viability. Yet in his model, inventory plays no role in the dealer's decision problem since 
by assumption the dealer is allowed to set prices only at the beginning of trading. This 
restriction severely limits the applicability of this model to actual market settings in which 
prices continually evolve, and so the model's influence lies largely in its initial 
contribution. 
A more realistic approach to the underlying problem is to consider how the 
dealer's price 
changes as his inventory position varies over time. This is the approach taken 
by Amihud 
and Mendelson (1980), who reformulate Garman's 
(1976) analysis to explicitly 
incorporate inventory into the dealer's pricing problem. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) 
show that the dealer's position can be viewed as a Semi-Markov process in wti-hich the 
inventory is the state variable. The dealer's decision variables, again his bid and ask prices, 
depend on the level of the state variable and thus change over time depending on the level 
of the dealer's inventory position. The Amihud and Mendelson (1980) model yields three 
main results. 
First, the optimal bid and ask prices are monotone decreasing functions of the dealer's 
inventory position. As the dealer's inventory position increases, he lowers both bid and ask 
prices, and conversely he raises both prices as inventory falls. Second, the model implies 
that the dealer has a preferred inventory position. As the dealer finds his inventory 
departing from his preferred position, he moves his prices to bring his position back. Third, 
as was also the case in Garman (1976), the optimal bid and ask prices exhibit a positive 
spread. 
Results two and three raise interesting questions about the behaviour of security prices 
and, by, extension, about the appropriateness of the model. Whereas in Garman (1976) the 
spread arose partially because of the need to reduce failure probabilities, the spread here 
reflects the dealer's efforts to maximize profit. Since the dealer is assumed to be risk 
neutral and a monopolist, the spread reflects the dealer's market power. In this model, 
however, if the dealer faces competition, then the spread falls to zero. Consequently, the 
spread plays no role in the viability of the market but acts essentially as a transaction cost. 
Similarly, the dealer's preferred inventory position arises because of the nature of the 
order arrival processes. The underlying asset value 
is irrelevant. Hence, regardless of what 
is expected to happen to the value of the stock, the 
dealer holds the same preferred 
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position. This may be an accurate depiction of the dealer's problem, but it seems likely that 
the preferred inventory position depends on factors other then the order arrival rates. 
Analysing the dealer's decision problem requires specifying the dealer's objectives and 
constraints in more detail. Of paramount importance is the need to delineate the risks the 
dealer faces and how these risks affects his decision making. One way to characterize this 
approach is to recognize that the dealer must be rewarded for providing specialist's 
services, in the same way that any intermediary must be compensated. By focusing on the 
supply of intermediary services, the dealer's decision problem reduces to determining the 
appropriate compensation to offset the costs the dealer faces in providing such services. 
This is the notion of the dealer as a supplier of immediacy. Stoll (1978) first undertook a 
formal analysis of this dimension of the dealer's problem. Stoll (1978) considers a two- 
date model in which the dealer maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth, where 
this wealth is a function of the dealer's initial wealth and his subsequent market-making 
positions. 
The dealer's problem is to set prices for one transaction in which he will buy or sell the 
asset at time 1, with liquidation of the asset occurring at time 2. The dealer finances his 
inventory by borrowing at the risk free rate, Rf9 and conversely can lend excess funds at 
Rf. As the time period considered is short and his borrowing ability is unlimited, the 
market maker's risk of bankruptcy is zero. Stoll (1978) then goes on to derive the optimal 
bid price Pb , and the optimal ask price 
Pa that maximise his wealth. There are several 
interesting features of these prices to consider. The model documents a linear positive 
relationship between the spread and trade size. Also the spread does not change in response 
to the dealer's trades. Where the dealer's inventory matters is in affecting the placement of 
the bid and ask prices. A large (positive) inventory causes the dealer to face a higher cost 
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for absorbing more inventory, and this increased cost lowers both bid and ask prices by the 
same amount. A negative inventory moves prices in the opposite direction. 
While this analysis characterizes the effects of the dealer's portfolio exposure on trading 
prices, there can be other costs affecting prices as well. Stoll (1978) extends the analysis to 
include order-processing costs, which are assumed to be a fixed fee per transaction. Such a 
fee structure results in a decreasing cost function with respect to order size. With portfolio 
costs increasing in trade size while processing costs decrease in trade size, the total dealer 
cost function becomes U shaped. This has the implication that there is an optimal cost 
minimizing scale, or preferred trade size, for the dealer. In this model, inventory matters 
largely because of the dealer's inability to hedge his inventory exposure. This risk aversion 
based spread contrasts with the market power role of the spread developed by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980) or the defence against bankruptcy role described by Garman (1976). 
The simplicity of the Stoll (1978) model however raises concerns about its generality. The 
fundamental difficulty is that the model minimizes the intertemporal dimension of the 
dealer's problem by assuming that the stock is liquidated at time 2. In this sense, it is a one 
trade one period model because the dealer faces no uncertainty over how long he must hold 
his inventory position. If the order flow is random however, this length of exposure may be 
an important dimension to the problem. The other problem with the model is the assumed 
exogeneity of variables such as the stock's true price and the portfolio's return which 
further restricts the risk the dealer faces, because his ultimate return is not a random 
variable. Therefore, the generality of the results of the Stoll (1978) model are not apparent. 
Ho and Stoll (1981) extend the Stoll (1978) model to a multiperiod framework in which 
both order flow and portfolio returns are stochastic. As in Garman (1976), buy and sell 
orders are represented by stochastic processes, whose order arrival rates 
depend on the 
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dealer's pricing strategy. In this model, however, a monopolistic dealer is assumed to 
maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth, and consequently the dealer's attitude 
towards risk will affect the solution. This establishes a significant difference from the risk 
neutral intertemporal models of Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980). The 
model employs a finite horizon (T period) dynamic programming approach to 
characterize the dealer's optimal pricing policy. The dealer's optimal pricing strategy is 
actually a function that specifies bid and ask prices, Pb and P, given the level of those 
variables which affect the dealer's future utility. In this model, these state variables are the 
dealer's cash, inventory, and base wealth positions. Since this is a finite horizon model, the 
time period itself also affects the dealer's choice. 
The Ho and Stoll (1981) model demonstrates three important properties of the dealer's 
optimal pricing behaviour. First, the spread depends on the time horizon of the dealer. As 
the dealer nears the end of trading, the risks in acting as a dealer decrease since there is less 
time in which the dealer must bear any inventory or portfolio risk. For the limiting case 
where the time remaining is essentially zero, the dealer sets the risk neutral monopolistic 
spread. This spread depends on the elasticities of the supply and demand curves, with 
greater elasticity reducing the dealer's spread. As the time horizon lengthens, the spread 
increases to compensate the risk averse dealer for bearing inventory and portfolio risks. 
This demonstration that the spread can be decomposed into a risk neutral spread plus an 
adjustment for uncertainty. This is an important feature of this analysis. 
This risk adjustment depends on the dealer's coefficient of relative risk aversion, the size 
of the transaction, and the risk of the stock as measured by 
its instantaneous variance. 
These factors are the same as those determined by Stoll (1978) in the one period model. 
One interesting finding in this model is that transactions uncertainty does not effect the 
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spread. Although such uncertainty enters indirectly into the time horizon effects noted 
above, one might have expected a direct risk adjustment based on the variability of the 
order arrival processes. 
Ho and Stoll (1981) argue that this does not occur because transactions variability has no 
direct effect on the dealer but rather works indirectly through its effect on the dealer's 
overall portfolio position. Such a direct effect would arise for example, if the dealer faced 
operating cost, so that having fewer transactions would pose cash flow problems for the 
dealer. As there is no such assumed cost, transaction uncertainty does not enter the spread. 
The third property of this optimal pricing policy is that the spread is independent of the 
inventory level. This property, which was also a feature of Stoll's (1978) one period 
model, means that the spread is not affected by the dealer's inventory position or even his 
expected change in inventory (since transaction uncertainty also does not matter). 
Although individual prices depend on inventory, the dealer affects the order arrival 
processes by moving the placement of the spread relative to the true price rather then 
increasing or decreasing the spread itself. Thus if the true price is $40, the dealer may set 
first period prices of $38 and $42. If the next order is at the bid, then the dealer increases 
his inventory, and he shifts both prices down say to $37 and $41. How much the dealer 
shifts the prices is a function of his relative risk aversion, the risk of the stock, and his 
wealth. 
1.4.2 Adverse Selection Component of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Adverse selection costs arise because some investors are better informed about a security's 
value than the market maker, and trading with such investors will, on average, be a losing 
proposition for the market maker. Since market makers have no way to distinguish the 
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informed from the uninformed, they are forced to engage in these losing trades and must be 
rewarded accordingly. Therefore, a portion of the market maker's bid-ask spread may be 
viewed as compensation for taking the other side of potential information-based trades. 
Because this information component can have very different statistical properties from the 
order-processing and inventory components, it is critical to distinguish between them in 
empirical applications. To do so, Glosten (1987) provides a simple asymmetric- 
information model that captures the salient features of adverse selection for the 
components of the bid-ask spread, and we shall present an abbreviated version of his 
elegant analysis here. 8 
1.4.2.1 Glosten's Decomposition 
Denote by Pb and P the bid and ask prices, respectively, and let P be the "true" or 
common-information market price, the price that all investors without private information 
(uninformed investors) agree upon. Under risk-neutrality the common-information price is 
given by P=E [P */ Q] where Q represents the common or public information set and 
P* represents the price that would result if everyone had access to all information. The bid 
and ask prices may then be expressed as the following sums: 
Pb =P-Ab -Cb (1.14) 
P= P+AQ +CQ (1.15) 
S=P-Pb=(AQ-Ab)+(Ca+Cb), (1.16) 
8 See, also, Glosten and Hams (1988) and Stoll (1989). 
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where AQ + Ab is the adverse-selection component of the spread, to be determined below, 
and CQ + Cb includes the order-processing and inventory components which Glosten 
(1987) calls the gross profit component and takes as exogenous. If uninformed investors 
observe a purchase at the ask, then they will revise their valuation of the asset from P to 
P+ AQ to account for the possibility that the trade was information-motivated, and 
similarly, if a sale at the bid is observed, then P will be revised to P- Ab. But how are A 
and Ab determined? 
Glosten (1987) assumes that all potential market makers have access to common 
information only, and he defines their updating rule in response to transactions at various 
possible bid and ask prices as 
(1.17 ) a (x) =E 
[P */Qu{ investor buys at x} ] 
b (y) =E[P*/Qu {investor sells at y} 
]. (1.18) 
A and Ab are then given by the following relations: 
AQ =a(PQ)-P, Ab =P-b(P, ). (1.19) 
Under suitable restrictions for a (. ) and b (. ) , an equilibrium among competing market 
makers will determine bid and ask prices so that the expected profits from market making 
activities will cover all costs, including CQ + Cb and Aa + Ab; hence 
Pa =a(P)+CQ =P+(a(PQ)-P)+CQ =P+AQ+Ca 
(1.20) 
Pb =b(Pb)-Cb = P-(P-b(Pb))-Cb = 
P-Ab -Cb. (1.21) 
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An immediate implication of (1.20) and (1.21) is that only a portion of the total spread, 
Ca + Cb, covers the basic costs of market making, so that the quoted spread 
AQ + Ab + Ca + Cb can be larger than Stoll's (1985) "effective" spread (the spread between 
purchase and sale prices that occur strictly within the quoted bid-ask spread) the difference 
being the adverse-selection component A,, + Ab. This links in well with the common 
practice of market makers giving certain customers a better price than the quoted bid or ask 
on certain occasions, presumably because these customers are perceived to be trading for 
reasons other than private information, e. g., liquidity needs, index-portfolio rebalancing, 
etc. 
1.4.2.2 Implications for Transaction Prices 
To derive the impact of these two components on transaction prices, denote by P the price 
at which the nth transaction is consummated, and let 
Pn = PQIQ + Pblb, 
(1.22) 
where Ia (Ib) is an indicator function that takes on the value one if the transaction occurs 
at the ask (bid) and zero otherwise. Substituting (1.20) and (1.21) 
into (1.22) then yields 
the following 
P, = E[P*/Q 4]Ia +E[P*I SZuB]Ib +CQIa 
+Cblb (1.23) 
(1.24) 
= Pn + CnQn 
Pn =E[P*/QvA]I"+E[P*IQLB]Ib 
(1.25) 
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_ 
CQ if buyer-initiated trade Cn 
(1.26) Cb if seller-initiated trade 
_ 
{+1 if buyer-initiated trade Qn 
-1 if seller-initiated trade 
(1.27) 
where A is the event in which the transaction occurs at the ask and B is the event in 
which the transaction occurs at the bid. P is the common information price after the nth 
transaction. 
Although (1.24) is a decomposition that is frequently used in this literature, Glosten's 
(1987) model adds an important new feature: correlation between P and Q,,. If P is the 
common information price before the nth transaction and P is the common information 
price afterwards, Glosten (1987) shows that 
Cov[pn, QQIP]=E[A/P] where A 
AQ if Qn _ +1 
Ab ifQn =-1. 
(1.28) 
P and Q must be correlated due to the existence of adverse selection. If Qn = +1, the 
possibility that the buyer-initiated trade is information-based will cause an upward revision 
in P, and for the same reason, Q = -1 will cause a downward revision in P. There is 
only one case in which Pn and Q,, are uncorrelated: when the adverse-selection component 
of the spread is zero. 
To derive implications for the dynamics of transaction prices, denote by e, the revisions in 
P 
_, 
due to the arrival of new public information between trades n -1 and n. If this is the 
case the nth transaction may be written as 
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P =P-1 +E +AnQn (1 29) 
Taking the first differences of (1.24) then gives us the following solution 
-P -1) 
+ (CnQn - 
cn-1Qn-1) (1.30) 
= fýnQn + cn + 
(CnQn 
- 
Cn-1Qn-1) 
11 
ý 1.3 1 
which shows that the transaction price changes are comprised of a gross-profit component 
which, exhibits reversals, 9 and an adverse-selection component that tends to be permanent. 
This leads us to conclude that Glosten's (1987) attribution of the effective spread to the 
gross-profits component is not coincidental, but well-motivated by the fact that it is this 
component that induces negative serial correlation in returns, not the adverse-selection 
component. 
Glosten (1987) provides alternative relations between spreads and return covariances, 
which incorporate this distinction between the adverse-selection and gross-profits 
components. In particular, under certain simplifying assumptions Glosten (1987) shows 
that'° 
S2 
(1.32) I= -yP 1 E[Rk] =R(1+y/3), CovCJ rk-I, rk 4 
where 
p- pC S2 P/4 (1.33) 
/4l , 
SP b (P 
+P)l2' C+A' -(S2P / ab 
9 The reversals discussed are very similar to the Roll (1984) model. 
10 He makes the following three mains assumptions. (1) True returns are 
independent of all past history. (2) 
The spread is symmetric about the true price. (3) The gross-profit component does not cause conditional 
drift 
in prices. 
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and where Rk , R, are the per-period market and true returns, respectively, and rk is the 
continuously compounded per-period market return. These relations show that the presence 
of adverse-selection (y --< 1) has an additional impact on means and covariances of returns 
that is not captured by other models of the bid-ask spread. Therefore, the Glosten (1987) 
model shows that adverse selection can have very different implications for those statistical 
properties of transactions data than other components of the bid-ask spread. 
In spite of this theoretical and analytical literature, a number of empirical studies tend to 
estimate only two components of the spread. Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988), 
George et al (1991) and Kim and Ogden (1996) use models which decompose spreads into 
a combined inventory and order processing cost component - transitory costs, and an 
asymmetric information cost component. George et al (1991) and Kim and Ogden (1996), 
additionally argue that their estimate of the transitory cost should be interpreted as an 
estimate of order processing costs thus excluding inventory related costs. 
' l 
The only UK study to attempt a decomposition of realised spreads into asymmetric 
information and inventory costs components by Neuberger (1992) was unsuccessful, 
because his estimates were based on the Glosten and Harris (1988) model which implicitly 
assumes a zero inventory cost. Stoll (1989) on the other hand, decomposes the quoted 
spread into its three components. 
11 George et al's (1991, p 649) argument is based on their finding of a positive 
first order autocorrelation in 
bid-to-bid returns rather then the expected negative autocorrelation 
implied by the analytics of the problem. 
Kim and Ogden's (1996, p144, footnote 
2) conclusion is based on their claim of the empirical difficulty of 
separating order processing and 
inventory costs. 
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This is accomplished by using a covariance model to estimate the realised spread 
attributable to order processing and inventory holding cost from transaction and quote data. 
He then develops an analytical and empirical model for separating the order processing and 
inventory cost components. The asymmetric cost component is then calculated as one 
minus the realised spread. This approach is consistent with the theoretical model of 
Garman (1976) which demonstrates that spreads should be inventory-dependant if the 
market maker is to avoid failure. 
George et al (1991) criticised the Stoll (1989) estimator on the grounds that time variation 
in expected returns induces positive autocorrelation that leads to a downward bias in the 
estimation of the realised spread. They correct for this bias by using in their analysis, the 
difference between transaction returns and returns based on the bid-to-bid quotes which are 
unaffected by positive covariance generated by time varying expected returns. Kim and 
Ogden (1996), however, show that the George et al (1991) estimators are also biased 
because they assume that the spread is constant over time. They propose estimators that 
allow individual security spreads to vary over time. These modifications, therefore, relax 
the restrictive assumptions made in Stoll (1989). However, their estimates of the 
magnitude of asymmetric information costs are more in line with Stoll (1989) then the 
estimates of George et al (1991). This suggests that Stoll's (1989) assumptions only have a 
marginal impact on his empirical estimates and is consistent with the finding of Affleck- 
Graves et al (1994), that the magnitude of bias (about 4%) is small. Additionally, Brooks 
and Mason (1996) through simulations also conclude that the bias is only present in short 
time series and small sample cross-section estimates; it is immaterial in large cross-section 
and unbiased in a long time series. 
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Taking into account the above literature the cost components of the quoted spread should 
be estimated using the model proposed by Stoll (1989). Stoll's (1989) model which is 
based on the serial covariance of quoted prices (bid or ask) and transaction prices identifies 
all the three cost components in three steps. Firstly, the constants (a0 and 80 ) and the 
slope coefficients (a, and A) are estimated from equations (1.34) and (1.35): 
COVT = ao +a, S2 +, u, (1.34) 
and 
cov Q= 
80 +AS' + v, (1.35) 
where S is the quoted proportional spread, COVT is the covariance of transaction price 
changes, covQ is the serial covariance changes in ask (or bid) quotes, ,u and v are random 
error terms. 
Under the assumption of an efficient market, one expects ao = X30 = 0. Stoll (1989) then 
goes on to estimate ir, the probability of reversal in transaction (for instance, an ask 
transaction followed by a bid transaction), and (5, the size of the continuation in price as a 
fraction of the spread. 12 These parameters are calculated from equations (1.36) and (1.37) 
with the use of a, and ß, estimated from equations (1.34) and (1.35): 
al =82(1-27r)_7r2(1-2(5) (1.36) 
and 
ßý =621-2r) " 
(1.37) 
12 For instance, if a transaction at the ask price is followed by another transaction at the ask price (a 
continuation) the price change is given 
by -ss, where of the value of s remains between 0 and 1. 
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Under this model the realised spread is given by 2 (7r - S) S, which is the expected profit 
per trade (as a percentage of stock price) and covers only the order processing and 
inventory holding cost components. Finally, the cost components of the quoted spread 
could be estimated as: 
" Order processing costs: (1-28). 
9 Inventory holding costs: 2 (Tr - 0.5) . 
" Asymmetric information costs: (1-2(z_8)). 
In order to provide robustness of estimates with respect to model selection, we should re- 
estimate the components using the model proposed by George et al (1991) and improved 
by Kim and Ogden (1996). Their procedure for estimating the covariance overcomes the 
assumption of price independence implicit in Stoll's (1989) method. George et al's (1991) 
procedure estimates the realised spread as in equation (1.38) 
SBi =2- cov ( RDA t 
RD;, 
t_, 
), (1.38) 
where RD1 t 
is the difference between transaction returns RT1 and returns based on 
unobservable true prices RM ;t for security i at time t. 
The bid price subsequent to a 
transaction was used in the empirical estimates of the unobservable true price (RM ja). The 
spread components are then estimated as: 
SBi =ßo +ß1SQi+e1, ) 
(1.39) 
where ßßl is the cross-sectional estimate of order processing cost and 
1- /1 is the unbiased 
estimator of the asymmetric information cost component. 
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However, Kim and Ogden (1996) have pointed out that if the bid-ask spread changes over 
time, the bid returns would include a variable element which could affect the estimate of 
the unobservable component of the spread due to order processing. They address the 
problem by using the average of bid and offer quotes as a proxy for the unobservable true 
price in equation (1.38) to measure Si. The spread components (order processing and the 
asymmetric information) are then estimated in equation (1.40): 
SI =iß0+ß, SQ; +E. (1.40) 
Since the George et al (1991) and the Kim and Ogden (1996) estimators address some of 
the restrictive assumptions of Stoll (1989) in the calculation of realised spread, they should 
be applied to asses whether there are any qualitative changes to the components when 
alternative estimators are used. Although these methods do not split the spread into three 
components and assume that the inventory component is zero, they provide an opportunity 
to compare the estimates of asymmetric information costs with those obtained from the 
Stoll (1989) model. 
1.5 Information Asymmetry and Trading Volume 
In general, empirical research has identified a strong link between volume and the absolute 
value of price changes. 13 Empirical researchers have also established some asymmetric 
patterns to volume and the direction of price changes. 
14 While the empirical link between 
price movements and volume appears strong, it is not obvious why this should be so. In the 
accounting literature, numerous researchers (for example Verrecchia (1981) and Kim and 
13 For further details on the link between trading volume and the absolute value of price changes see Karpoff 
(1987) and Stickel and Verrecchia (1993). 
14 Karpoff (1987) finds that trading volume is larger when prices move up than when they move down. 
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Verrecchia (1991)) have modelled the link between public information announcements 
and volume. The concern here is to explain why volume appears to increase around the 
announcement of public information. In the Kim and Verrecchia (1991) analysis, this 
change in volume is proportional to the precision of the public information signal and is 
decreasing in the amount of preannouncement public and private information. 
In the microstructure literature in which private information is the concern, the price- 
volume link is less clear. In the Kyle (1985) model, for example, trading volume is not a 
factor in the price adjustment process. The reason is that the informed trader always adjusts 
his order amount to keep his relative fraction of trades the same. Consequently, the price 
path is independent of the scale of trading volume, and the empirical link between price 
movements and volume is not present. One reason as to why it is difficult to evaluate the 
link of price and volume is that it is not obvious what information volume, in itself, 
provides to the market. Just as traders can learn by watching prices, it seems likely they 
could learn by watching volume. In the extreme case, it is possible that volume alone could 
reveal underlying information, with prices playing a redundant information role. A more 
likely scenario is that the combination of price and volume could provide information to 
the market. 
Wang (1994) examines how factors such as dividend information and private investment 
opportunities affect the price-volume relation. In his model, some traders are better 
informed of a risky asset's dividend process and the returns on private investment 
opportunities. These latter opportunities allow trading for liquidity-based reasons, while 
the former capture the familiar information based motive. There are also the uniformed 
traders who receive a noisy signal of the dividend process and who are not allowed access 
to private investment opportunities. This latter restriction means that only the 
informed 
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traders face hedging needs, and it is these hedging-related trades that allow uninformed 
investors to trade without a certain loss. 
In this model, volume is decreasing in the amount of the informational asymmetry. If the 
risk of information-based trading is too high, then uniformed traders opt not to trade given 
that there is little chance of not losing to the informed traders. This risk of information- 
based trading also dictates that volume and the absolute value of excess returns are 
positively correlated, reflecting the price movement necessary to induce uninformed 
traders to take the other side of the trade. An interesting feature of this model is that 
volume is also positively correlated with the arrival of public information. 
Thus, as in Kim and Verrecchia (1991), public information stimulates trading. In the Wang 
(1994) model, this occurs because public information affects different investors in different 
ways. The greater the asymmetry between traders' information, the greater the trading 
volume. This provides one explanation for the puzzling increase in volume around 
predictable events such as earnings announcements. 
1.6 The Bid-Ask Spread in the London Stock Exchange 
The London equity market is a competitive dealership system, 15 similar to NASDAQ. Like 
NASDAQ, London Stock Exchange market makers quote bid and ask prices in order to 
attract order flow by posting their quotes and quantities on computer screens. 
16 In London, 
the quotes should be firm for a minimum quantity known as the normal market size 
15 On 20 October 1997, the London Stock Exchange introduced an electronic order driven system for trading 
stocks in the FTSE 100 Index. However, all the other stocks were still traded under the quote 
driven system 
at the time of writing. 
16 The best bid and ask quotes and their corresponding quantities appear on a section of the screen known as 
the yellow strip. 
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(NMS) 17 mandated by the Exchange. The normal market size is set for each stock at 2.5% 
of the average daily customer turnover in the preceding quarter and can involve a 
substantial number of shares for highly liquid stocks. 18 In contrast NASDAQ dealers have 
mandatory quote sizes which are small relative to those required by London Stock 
Exchange dealers. 19 Order flow on the London Stock Exchange like NASDAQ does not 
necessarily go to the dealer with the most competitive quotes because of preferencing and 
internalisation by brokers. Preferencing involves a broker directing an order to a market 
maker not posting the best price but has agreed in advance to execute the order at the best 
quoted price. Internalisation involves a broker routing the order flow to a dealer belonging 
to the same firm rather then the market maker with the best quote. 
It is evident from the foregoing that the mandated quote size as well as preferencing and 
internalisation on the London Stock Exchange may affect inventory and asymmetric 
information risks and hence the cost components of the spread. 
The relatively high mandatory quote size of the London Stock Exchange provides 
incentives to market makers to post wide spreads (especially for stocks with high NMS) to 
finance inventory carrying cost as well as those induced by temporary imbalances during 
trading. On the other hand, the liquidity of high NMS stocks encourages a narrower spread 
because positions can be unwound quickly to reduce inventory risks. Moreover, on the 
17 Market makers can also post quotes for quantities larger then the mandatory quote sizes. 
18 For instance the normal market size for BT in June 1995 was 100,000, which at a price of £3.92 per share 
involved a trade of £392,000. On the other hand, British Biotech had a normal market size of 2000 shares 
valued at £982.80 per transaction. 
19 The minimum quote size required of market makers used to be 100 shares. This has now been increased to 
the maximum of the Small Order Execution (SOES) trades which varies with the volume of trades but has an 
upper limit of 1000 shares for the most active shares of large companies. 
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London Stock Exchange, dealers have a variety of ways to reduce costs associated with 
inventory imbalances in dynamic trading conditions. Like, NASDAQ, this may involve 
public trades, trading with other market makers or trading through the inter-dealer 
brokerage (IDB) system anonymously with other market makers. Such trades involve 
quote revisions to induce trades to revert to desired inventory positions and minimise the 
costs associated with inventory imbalances. The structural models of Snell and Tonks 
(1995,1998) provide evidence consistent with the view that London Stock Exchange 
market makers are strongly influenced by inventory control considerations when revising 
their quotes during trading. Their finding is reinforced by Hansch et al (1998) who report 
that dealer inventories affect the quote placement and order flow execution. This means 
that, the relative inventory position of market makers is significantly related to their ability 
to execute large trades with the result that changes in quotes and inventories are strongly 
correlated. Additionally their finding that higher levels of inventories are associated with 
higher levels of IDB trades agrees with the results of Reiss and Werner (1998) that inter 
dealer trading is used extensively during periods of extreme inventory imbalances (when 
spreads widen) by market makers to share inventory risk. The above evidence highlights 
inventory risk as an important cost component which London Stock Exchange market 
makers should take into account when setting their spreads. The inventory cost element of 
spread is, however, likely to be small relative to the other cost components because of the 
variety of options, such as IDB trades open to dealers to share their risks. 
Preferencing and internalisation may affect inventory risks and costs of market makers to 
the extent that they may require dealers to buy (sell) when their inventory positions suggest 
that they should sell (buy). On the other hand since preferenced market makers receive a 
higher proportion of buy and sell orders they may be able to better manage their 
inventories then non-preferenced dealers. The potential effect of preferencing and 
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internalisation on the inventory cost component of spreads, is therefore an empirical issue. 
Hansch et al (1999) find that for the top 102 London Stock Exchange Stocks, effective 
spreads on preferenced trades are higher then those on non preferenced trades. On the other 
hand, internalised trades receive better execution then non-internalised trades. Such 
findings imply that preferencing leads to higher inventory risks and costs, which dealers 
recover through higher effective spreads. As pointed by Hansch et al (1999), however, it 
does not imply collusion by London Stock Exchange market makers to systematically 
charge high spreads but is consistent with "costly negotiation with heterogeneous dealers 
and customer-dealer trading relationship" because dealers do not systematically make 
higher profits on preferenced trades relative to non-preferenced trades. 
The relatively high minimum trade sizes on the London Stock Exchange also implies that 
dealer losses will be high in transactions with informed traders in contrast with NASDAQ 
where minimum trade sizes do not exceed 1000 shares. In such an environment, it can be 
argued that spreads will widen to enable market makers to cover their losses from informed 
traders with gains from liquidity traders to ensure normal profit to the market making 
function. Snell and Tonks (1995,1998) using data for only a two-week period, 
unsurprisingly, find very weak evidence of the impact of asymmetric information on the 
quote behaviour of London Stock Exchange dealers. Hansch et al (1999), on the other 
hand, find that dealers make profits on small trades, break even on large trades but lose on 
medium sized trades. 
This is consistent with the presence of asymmetric information cost on the London Stock 
Exchange and its concentration in medium sized transactions as predicted by the stealth 
trading hypothesis of Barclay and Warner (1993). It contradicts the evidence of Lee (1998, 
p. 171), that "almost all the traders think that there are very 
few informed traders". 
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On the other hand, the customer-dealer relationship reinforced through preferencing and 
internalisation suggests that such trades are likely to be liquidity rather then information 
motivated. Hence on the London Stock Exchange, like NASDAQ (see Huang and Stoll, 
1996), the asymmetric information cost component of such trades may be relatively 
smaller then those of auction markets. 
1.7 Estimates of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in Equity Markets 
Roll (1984) estimates the effective spreads of NYSE and AMEX stocks year by year using 
daily returns data from 1963 to 1982, and finds the overall effective spread to be 0.298% 
for NYSE stocks and 1.74% for AMEX stocks. 20 However, these figures should be 
interpreted with caution since 24,358 of the 47,414 estimated effective spreads were 
negative, suggesting that there are substantial specification errors. Additional evidence of 
these specification errors comes from the fact that estimates of the effective spread based 
on weekly data differ significantly from those based on a daily data. Nevertheless, the 
magnitudes of these effects are clearly important for empirical applications of research into 
transactions costs. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) refine and estimate Glosten's (1987) decomposition of the bid- 
ask spread using transactions data for 250 NYSE stocks and conclude that the permanent 
adverse-selection component is present in the data. Stoll (1989) develops a similar 
decomposition of the spread, and using transactions data for National Market System 
securities on the NASDAQ from October to December of 1984, he concludes that 43% of 
the quoted spread is due to adverse selection, 10% is due to inventory-holding costs, and 
the remaining 47% is due to order-processing costs. Menjah and Paudyal (2000) replicate 
the Stoll (1989) model for the UK stock market. They look at transaction data on the 
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London Stock Exchange between the time period of January 1995 to December 1995. They 
conclude that 47% of the quoted spread is due to adverse selection, 23% is due to 
inventory-holding costs, and the remaining 30% is due to order-processing costs. 
They go on to say that the high London Stock Exchange normal market size at which 
dealers have to offer firm quotes together with the practice of preferencing and 
internalisation generate relatively higher inventory costs and risks then the NASDAQ. 
George et al (1991) allow the expected return of the unobservable true price to vary 
through time and, and using both daily and weekly data for NYSE and AMEX stocks from 
1963 to 1985 and NASDAQ stocks from 1983 to 1987, they obtain a much smaller 
estimate for the portion of the spread attributable to adverse selection, from 8% to 13% 
with the remainder due to the order-processing costs, and no evidence of inventory costs. 
Huang and Stoll (1995a) propose a more general model that contains these other 
specifications as special cases and estimate the components of the spread to be 21 % 
adverse-selection costs, 14% inventory-holding costs, and 65% order-processing costs 
using 1992 transactions data for 19 of the 20 stocks in the Major Market Index. 
Trade costs are influenced by such factors as trade difficulty, or the availability of a 
particular stock and investment styles. Trade difficulty relates to how liquid a stock is and, 
consequently, how difficult it is to find ready buyers or sellers. At a basic level, trade 
difficulty can be represented by trade size and the market capitalisation of the stock being 
traded. Large orders demand more liquidity and so have higher trade costs than small 
orders. Averaged over all market capitalisation levels, the round-trip (purchase and sale) 
trade costs of exchange-listed shares were 2.32% for the largest trades and 0.64% for the 
20 AMEX stocks tend to be lower-priced; which means that they should have larger percentage spreads. 
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smallest . 
21 Trade costs are inversely related to market capitalisation, a proxy for liquidity. 
Keim and Madhaven (1998) found the average round-trip cost for the smallest market-cap 
quintile of exchange-listed stocks to be 3.81%. The same cost for the largest market-cap 
quintile was 0.57%. Transactions costs tend to be larger for NASDAQ stocks than for 
exchange-listed stocks, but differences have narrowed because of regulatory changes and 
competition from electronic communications networks. Allowing for trade difficulty is 
vital in assessing broker performance. For example, a full-service broker, who slowly 
"works" an order for an illiquid stock, may incur explicit costs of 0.9% and implicit costs 
of 2%. Compare this with a discount broker dealing with a highly liquid stock, who may 
incur explicit costs of 0.2% and implicit costs of 0.4%. 
Without allowing for trade difficulty, one cannot conclude that the broker with the higher 
total costs is a worse performer. What if the assignments were reversed? Using a full- 
service broker for a liquid stock might be as bad as using a discount broker for an illiquid 
stock. Investment style (such as active or passive, index or momentum) also affects 
transactions costs because it proxies for unobservable factors, such as the trader's time 
horizon or aggressiveness. Aggressive traders, such as those who chase short-run price 
movements and some indexers, have high expected costs because they demand (and pay 
for) immediacy. Less-aggressive traders, such as value managers whose strategies are 
based on fundamental analysis, have lower turnover and lower costs because their longer 
investment horizon allows them to trade patiently. 
Keim and Madhaven (1998) estimated round-trip costs of 0.45% for value traders, 1.09% 
for index traders and 2.04% for momentum (or technical) traders. Even within a particular 
investment style, differences in order-submission strategy may affect costs. For example, 
Z1 The figures quoted are from the NYSE. 
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two traders, both using value-based strategies, may have significant differences in the 
number of trades needed to fill an order, which may translate into cost differences. A study 
of 22,000 block trades in DJIA stocks found strong evidence that traders' reputation also 
affects transactions costs. 22 Traders who have a reputation for liquidity trading may be able 
to obtain better prices because the adverse-selection costs associated with their trades are 
likely to be minimal. This advantage is especially likely for trades that are negotiated away 
from the exchange floor, because this "upstairs" market is less anonymous than the 
exchange floors or NASDAQ. 
The fact that these estimates vary so much across studies makes it difficult to regard any 
single study as conclusive. The difference comes from two sources. First, different 
specifications for the dynamics of the bid-ask spread and secondly, the use of different 
datasets. 
There is clearly a need for a more detailed and comprehensive analysis in which all of 
these specifications are applied to a variety of datasets to test the explanatory power and 
the stability of each model. 
22 See Madhaven and Chang (1997). 
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Chapter 2 
Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks: 
Evidence from the UK 
2.1 Introduction 
Demsetz (1968) was the first to examine the importance of transactions costs and in 
particular the bid-ask spread, for investment decisions. Subsequently research in the area 
was focused on transactions costs as measured by the bid-ask spread. Studies focused on 
the determinants of the bid-ask spread23, its size in different markets24, the role of the 
spread in explaining stock market anomalies25, and its effect on pricing models for 
common stocks. 26 The accumulated empirical evidence suggested that the bid-ask spread 
caused "a clientele effect". That is, it affects the frequency with which investors trade 
securities and causes investors with longer expected holding periods to hold the assets with 
the higher transactions costs and vice versa. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) examine the effect of bid-ask spreads on investor's holding 
periods and present a formal proof of their proposition 1, which states on page 228 that 
"Assets with higher spreads are allocated in equilibrium to portfolios with (the same or) 
longer holding periods". This implies that in equilibrium a higher (lower) bid-ask spread 
results in the stock being held by the investor for a longer (shorter) period of time. 
23 Tinic (1972), Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978). 
24Branch and Freed (1977), Hamilton (1976), and Marsh and Rock (1986). 
25Stoll and Whaley (1983), Keim (1989), and Atkins and Dyl (1990). 
26Amihud and Mendelson (1986,1989), Constantinides (1986), Chen and Kan (1989), and 
Eleswarapu and 
Reinganum (1993). 
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In a similar line of argument Constantinides (1986) investigates the effect of transactions 
costs on capital market equilibrium and finds that investors accommodate transactions 
costs by reducing the frequency and the volume of trade (page 859). 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) provide empirical evidence consistent with their 
proposition 2, which states, " In equilibrium, the observed market (gross) return is an 
increasing and concave piecewise-linear function of the (relative) spread. " Their 
proposition 1 relating investors' holding periods and bid-ask spreads has been tested 
empirically by Atkins and Dyl (1997). They examine average holding periods and bid-ask 
spreads for NASDAQ stocks from 1983 through 1991 and for NYSE stocks from 1975 
through 1989 and find strong evidence that, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), the length of investors' holding periods is positively related to bid-ask spreads. 
Empirical evidence widely agrees with the basic proposition that the cost of transacting 
affects the volume of trade and therefore in turn affects investors' holding periods. For 
example, Bhide (1993) attributes the relatively short holding periods observed for common 
stocks in the USA to lower transactions costs in USA markets versus foreign stock 
markets. 27 Umlauf (1993) presents evidence that the imposition of the Securities 
Transactions Tax (STT) in Sweden reduces the rate of turnover in Swedish stock markets. 
Epps (1976) looks at transactions costs and trading volumes for a random sample of 20 
common stocks in 1968 and estimates that a 10% increase in the cost of transacting would 
lead to a decline in trading volume of 2.5%. Jarrell (1984) observes that average 
brokerage 
commissions fell by about 30% from 1975-1978 and that share turnover 
from 1975-1981 
was 30% higher then it was during the period of 1968-1975. 
27 Other studies that support this claim are Stiglitz 
(1989), Summers and Summers (1989), Grundfest and 
Shoven (1991), and Schwert and Seguin (1993). 
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Additional evidence of a relationship between transactions costs and trading volume can be 
found on the research done on bid-ask spreads. As previously mentioned Demsetz (1968) 
discovers that spreads are inversely related to trading volume, the number of transactions 
per day, and the number of shareholders. Demsetz (1968) goes on to conclude that trading 
costs decline as trading activity increases. In the same vein Tinic (1972) finds an inverse 
relationship between spreads and daily trading volume, and concludes that transactions 
costs are lower for stocks that are traded heavily and continuously and Benston and 
Hagerman (1974) conclude that there is evidence of economies of scale in trading. Finally 
Stoll (1978) also finds an inverse relationship between spreads and trading volume. 
The contribution of this study is that it provides empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship between the bid-ask spreads of common stocks and the average length of time 
that investors hold these stocks, for the U. K stock market. In addition, this study provides 
an alternative rationale for the postulated positive relationship between the bid-ask spread 
and the `holding period' in a simple optimizing framework. It also incorporates the 
skewness of returns in the model of the average holding period as well as more traditional 
variables such as the market value of firms and the variance of returns. In the following 
section, section 2.2, we discuss in some detail the rationale for the chosen specification. 
The data are discussed in section 2.3. The adopted econometric methodology and the 
results are presented in section 2.4. Finally section 2.5 contains our conclusions. 
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2.2 Theoretical Considerations 
Following Wilcox (1993), we abstract from risk consideration by postulating that each 
stock is drawn from a population of stocks of similar risk. The continuous rate of return 
expected is RP. To motivate trading, RP is augmented by a premium AO if the stock is 
actively traded. Thus the total return for a traded stock at time t once selected, is: 
Rt = Rp + Aoe-k` (2.1) 
Where Rt is the rate of return expected at time t after selection and the term e-k` denotes 
the rate of decay in A0, the premium to be acquired due to the information arrival that 
induces trade. Accordingly, k is a positive number that gives the time rate of decay in the 
active return Ao . 
When traded the stocks are subject to transactions costs denoted by C. The rate of growth 
of the value of the investor's portfolio is given by: 
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FRPt+A (1-e- )J eR0t =(I -C)e k (2.2) 
Expected active return decays until refreshed by selection of a new stock based on new 
information. As a result unless there is continuous trading at zero cost, the average return, 
equation (2.2), will be less than the sum of the passive return plus the 
initial active return. 
28 Define Aoe-kt =r, over the time interval (t, t+dt) the change in wealth (w) 
is given by dw1 = rýw, dt . 
t 
The rate of growth of wealth is 
log( w') = AO 
f 
e-ladt e-k`), therefore w1 = woe k. k wo 0 
l) 
The difference implies an opportunity cost that grows larger as the holding period 
lengthens. We will now attempt to derive implications of this model. 
From equation (2.2) we deduce that in the presence of transactions costs continuous trading 
is not optimal. To calculate the optimal holding period, first we take logs of (2.2) 
RQ =R +1n+ 
(`0/kt) 
pt (1_e-'t) (2.3) 
and set the derivative of (2.3) with respect to time equal to zero. The optimal holding 
period (t*) is given by 
(l+kt*) 
ekt* -1 
+ 
1n(1-C) 
(Ao /k) 
Where t* denotes the optimal holding period. 
(2.4) 
Equation (2.4) is non-linear in t* and thus the nature of the relationship between t* and C 
is ambiguous. Fortunately an approximate solution can be obtained with the use of the 
solution of a Lambert function. The analytical solution to this type of function is very 
complex, but a good approximation is given by: 29 
w(x) = 0.665 * (1+0.0195 *1n(x+l))*1n(x+1)+0.04 
w(x) = 1n(x - 4) - 1- 
1* 
ln(ln(x)) 
ln(x) 
: 0_<x<_500; (2.5a) 
:x >- 500. (2.5b) 
29 The derivation of the Lambert Function approximation was obtained by Ringwald and Schrempp (1999). 
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Where x measures the time period of the data set. For our data set x is equal to 1 since we 
have annual data. We can now attempt to calculate t* for different values of C. We let C 
vary from 0 to 3 since transactions costs above 3% are unrealistic in equity markets. Before 
we can solve for t* we assign fixed values to the variables AO and k. In this instance we 
use, AO = 5% and k=0.5. The results of these simulations can be seen in Table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1. Simulation Results for the Optimal Holding Period under Different 
Levels of Transactions Costs 
c t* 
o 0 
0.5 1.050125 
1.0 1.100503 
1.5 1.151136 
2.0 1.202027 
2.5 1.253178 
3.0 1.304592 
There is clear evidence from Table 2.1 that there is a positive relationship between holding 
periods and transactions costs. There is also evidence from Table 2.1, that for the chosen 
values of the parameters there is an almost linear relationship between the optimal holding 
period and the transactions costs3o 
In addition to the model above that links optimal holding periods and transactions costs 
Karpoff (1986) develops a model that combines trading volume, transactions costs and 
volatility. 
30 The almost linear specification between optimal holding periods and transactions costs remains when we 
assign different values for AO and 
k. A graphical representation of the results can be seen in figure A in the 
appendix. 
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To explain the model, denote i as a seller and j as a buyer. In equilibrium, the seller's 
demand price must exceed the buyer's demand price such that pi » p3. A trade will then 
occur in the next time period (t = 1) if the change in the buyer's demand price oý-, exceeds 
the change in the seller's demand price St by an amount sufficient to offset the demand 
price differential at t=0. Thus, a trade will occur in t =1 if: 
p11 ý pil 
or pjo + (5j, = P, o + 
S;, 
or 6j, - 6tß ? pi, - p, (,. (2.6) 
The net price change for a general investor (g) will appear as 6 (SQ, =äj, - (5, 
). If the 
revision in demand prices follows a stochastic process with mean u and variance a2, 
then: 
8Q1 = , uu + 6Eu 
(2.7) 
Where e is a zero-mean variable and is independent across investors such that 
E (EQEg) =0 for all 2#g. Thus, the net price revision has two components. First, there is 
a demand price revision incorporated in the mean , u,,. 
Second, there is an investor specific 
idiosyncratic term e,,, which captures changes in individual investor expectations and 
liquidity desires. In the absence of any new public information, , u,, is the expected return 
on the stock. Hence, for any pair of buyers and sellers: 
-n 
9=S -8, =(, ýj-, ui) +6(e -ei) 
, ue =E(O)=1u-, u. =, u; 
628 =E 
(8 
-, ue 
)2 
= 262 (2.8) 
Therefore, trades will occur because of movements in 4u0 or 62e or a combination of both. 
This model leads to a number of predictions, concerning the relationships between 
transactions costs, trading volume and volatility. First, transactions costs (including bid-ask 
spreads) reduce expected trading volume as the change in demand prices (5j, -S;, 
) must 
now exceed the original price difference (p, 0 -p jo) plus the transactions costs. 
Consequently this implies a positive relationship between the bid-ask spread and the 
average holding period. Second, if demand prices are revised by market agents (increase in 
volatility) in unpredictable ways trading volume will increase, and as a consequence the 
holding period will decrease as agents are trading more often. The intuition behind this is 
that, as information is interpreted differently by market agents, this adds to the normal 
"jumbling up" of demand prices that originates from investors' liquidity and speculative 
trading. This increases the variance of the demand-price revision, process, 62, and 
therefore increases 620. This suggests that as volatility increases, trading volume will 
also increase resulting in shorter holding periods. 
The market value of a firm is an important determinant of average holding periods because 
larger firms are assumed more likely to be considered investment grade than smaller firms, 
so we may observe longer holding periods for larger firms than for smaller firms. 
According to Karpoff (1986) volume is high when investors' expectations are diverse. 
Large firms are followed by more analysts, which ceteris paribus may reduce the 
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divergence of investors' expectations. This results in less trading and hence longer holding 
periods. In addition, studies have shown that larger firms are generally less risky then 
smaller firms, which may affect holding periods. 31 The stocks of large firms may also have 
greater stability in the parameters of their return distributions. If so, investors need to do 
less portfolio rebalancing with large firms' stocks, and the average holding periods will be 
longer. 
Hong and Stein (2000) suggest that the skewness of returns may be a determinant of the 
average holding period of a common stock. They argue that investor heterogeneity is 
central to this explanation. The Hong-Stein (2000) model rests on two key assumptions: 
First, there are differences in opinion among investors as to fundamental value; and second 
some, though not all, investors face short-sales constraints. The constrained investors can 
be thought of as mutual funds, whose charters typically prohibit them from taking short 
positions; the unconstrained investors can be thought of as hedge funds or other 
arbitrageurs. 32 When differences of opinion are initially large, those bearish investors who 
are subject to the short-sales constraint will be forced to a corner solution, in which they 
sell all of their shares and just sit out of the market. As a consequence of being in a corner, 
their information is not fully incorporated into prices. However, if this information is 
hidden, other, previously more bullish investors have a change of heart and bail out of the 
market, the originally more bearish group may become the marginal "support 
buyers" and 
hence more will be learnt about their signals. Thus accumulated hidden 
information tends 
31 Stoll and Whaley (1983) document that both total risk, measured as the standard 
deviation of stock returns, 
and systematic risk, measured by beta, are a 
decreasing function of a firm's size. 
32 Brown et al (1999) document that roughly 
70% of mutual funds explicitly state that they are not permitted 
to sell short. This is obviously a lower 
bound on the fraction of funds that never take short positions. 
55 
to come out during market declines, which is another way of saying that returns are 
negatively skewed. 
With this focus on differences of opinion, the Hong-Stein (2000) model has distinct 
empirical implications that are not shared by the representative-investor theories. In 
particular, the Hong-Stein (2000) model predicts that negative skewness in returns will be 
most pronounced after periods of heavy trading volume. This is because like in many 
models with differences of opinion, trading volume proxies for the intensity of 
disagreement. 33 When disagreement (and hence trading volume) is high, it is more likely 
that bearish investors will be at a corner, with their information incompletely revealed in 
prices. It is precisely this hiding of information that sets the stage for negative skewness in 
subsequent periods, when the arrival of bad news to other, previously more bullish 
investors can force the hidden information to come out. This therefore suggests that 
investors' will have a longer average holding period for positively skewed stocks. 34 
A dummy is also incorporated in our model, to capture the possible effect of time-specific 
events on average holding periods. In order to do this we include a separate dummy 
variable in our regression model denoting each year in our estimation period. 
Based on the above arguments the regression model to be estimated will be: 
HldPer. T ßßl +ý32SpreadiT +, 
ß3MktVal. 
T +, 
ß4VarRetiT +ß5Skew. T + 
(2.9) 
15 
ßýDT +EiT 
j=6 
33 See Varian (1989), Harris and Reviv (1993), Kendel and Pearson (1995) and Odean (1998a) for other 
models with this feature. 
34 A Theoretical discussion of the importance of skewness with respect to the risk premium can be seen in 
appendix A. 
56 
Where, HldPerT is the average length of time that investors hold the stock for firm i during 
year T. Spread;,. is an estimate of the average percentage bid-ask spread on firm i's shares 
during year T, and is positively related to the holding period. Mktval;,. is the average 
market value of firm i's shares during year T, and is positively related to the holding 
period. Var Re týT is the variance of return of firm i's daily stock returns during year T, and 
is negatively related to the holding period. SkewiT is the skewness of return of firm is 
daily stock returns during year T, and is positively related to the holding period. The DTS 
are 0,1 dummy variables denoting year T, (3's are parameters of the model, and e; T is an 
error term. 
2.3 Data Definition and Collection 
In this study we collect annual data for all the firms that are listed on the FTSE All Share 
Index from the time period of 1990-1999, with the use of Datastream. We will now show 
the procedure used to obtain all the variables displayed in equation (2.9). 
The average holding period, HldPer 
We calculate the average holding period as 
Holding Period; T = 
Shares outstanding in year T 
Trading volume in year T 
(2.10) 
Thus the average holding period of each firm's investors for each year is computed by 
dividing the number of outstanding shares in the firm by the firm's annual trading volume. 
This average holding period, observed ex post, is a proxy for the average investors' ex ante 
investment horizon. The computation of investors' average holding period is only a crude 
approximation of investors' time horizons, because a particular firm's investors are 
unlikely to hold the firm's shares for the same length of time. Although Amihud and 
Mendelson's (1986) proposition is stated in terms of investors holding periods, 
Constantinides' (1986) result is simply that higher transactions costs result in lower trading 
volume. Since trading volume appears in the denominator of equation (2.10), our 
investigation of the relationship between holding periods and spreads also provides 
evidence regarding the proposition by Constantinides (1986). 
The bid-ask spread, Spread 
Datastream provides the bid and ask quotes originally used to compute the bid-ask spread 
for our data set. The average annual bid-ask spread for each stock in the data set is 
estimated by averaging the two observations of bid-ask spreads surrounding each year. 
That is, the average spread for each stock i for each year T is computed as follows: 35 
S read 
Aski,. - Bid; T + 
Ask, T_, - Bid, T_, 
1/2 
p `T - [(AskT + BidET )12 (Ask; T_, + Bid,. T_1)/2] 
(2.11) 
Where Ask; T and Bid; T are the ask and 
bid prices for the ith stock on the last trading day 
in year T. 
Market Value, MktVal 
The market values for all the firms that are listed on the FTSE All Share Index from the 
time period of 1990-1999 are obtained with the use of Datastream. 
The Variance Of Returns, Var Re t 
Daily prices of all the firms that are listed on the FTSE All Share Index 
from the time 
period of 1990-1999 are obtained with the use of Datastream. 
We then calculate the 
35 We use the formula proposed by Atkins and 
Dyl (1997) to calculate average annual bid-ask spreads for our 
data set. 
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variance of the returns during the year of all the firms that are listed on the FTSE All Share 
Index from the time period of 1990-1999. 
The Skewness of Returns, Skew 
We calculate the skewness of returns for all the firms that are listed on the FTSE All Share 
Index from the time period of 1990-1999 using the same methodology, as the variance of 
returns. 
The descriptive statistics for Spread, MktVal, Var Re t and Skew for all the firms that are 
listed on the FTSE All Share Index from 1990 through 1999 are given in Table 2.2. One 
noticeable aspect of the Table is the presence of excess skewness and excess kurtosis in 
the Spread, MktVal, Var Re t and Skew variables. Our approach is to take natural logs of 
the variables in the regressions to minimize the impact of these features. Therefore, we 
estimate our empirical model in logs. 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for the bid-ask spread (Spread), the market value of 
firms (MktVal), variance of returns (Var Re t), and the skewness of returns (Skew), for 
all the firms listed on the FTSE All Share Index from 1990 through 1999 
Spread MktVal Var Re t Skew 
Mean 1.13 8048 6.78 5.64 
Standard Deviation 0.0017 753.23 14.53 0.043 
Minimum 1 2371 1.13 1.21 
Maximum 2.08 97644 10.87 9.54 
Skewness 5.75* 9.482* 4.63* 9.48* 
Kurtosis 22.56* 21.16* 22.76* 22.01* 
No of observations 7240 7240 7240 7240 
Notes: 
The descriptive statistics for the 
MktVal variable are expressed in millions, whereas the descriptive statistics for all the other 
variables are expressed in percentages. 
* Indicates that the test of the null hypothesis of no skewness and no kurtosis is rejected at the 5% level of significance. The tests used 
for skewness and kurtosis are those proposed by Jacque and Bera (1980). 
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2.4 Econometric Methods and Results 
Following Atkins and Dyl (1997) who find that the investors' holding period and the bid- 
ask spread for each stock are simultaneously determined and adopt an IV estimator we 
need to determine the appropriate estimator for this model. To this purpose we use the 
Hausman (1978) test statistic to establish the choice of the estimator. The inappropriate use 
of Instrumental Variables (IV) will result in severe loss of efficiency compared to the least 
squares estimator. The test statistic is based on the difference between the two estimators 
that are consistent under the null hypothesis but only one of them, the IV estimator is 
consistent under the alternative. The test statistic is given by : 
-1 
H =(blv -bjsý. 1(xv)-(XX)-i (b1 -b )/ s2 (2.12) 
Where X denotes the matrix of regressors where the `endogenous' variables have been 
instrumented, X the original matrix of regressors and s2 the variance estimate. This 
Wald statistic follows the chi-square distribution with P, the number of instrumented 
variables, degrees of freedom. Using as additional instruments current and lagged returns 
and lagged spread, the resulting value of the statistics was 2.89. We were therefore unable 
to reject the null hypothesis that both estimators were consistent, and given that the 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimator is efficient we proceed to estimate the model by 
Ordinary Least Squares. The results can be seen in Table 2.3.36 
36 Since we are estimating a Panel regression we have to either estimate a 
fixed effects or random effects 
model. Our choice is based on the 
Hausmann (1978) test. When we apply this test we obtain a test statistic of 
4.74 with a corresponding p value of 
0.3149. This leads us to conclude that the random effects model is the 
optimal econometric model. 
We therefore proceed and estimate the random effects model. 
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Table 2.3. Holding Period Panel Estimation 
This Table shows the relationship between average holding periods, bid-ask spreads, market values, 
variances and skewness for FTSE All Share common stocks for the time period of 1990-1999. The results are 
from the following Panel Estimation. 
HldPer. 
T = 
ß1 + ß2Spread iT + ýß3MktVal. T +ß 4 VarRe tlT + ß5Skew 
15 
iT +ßj DT + LIT 
j=6 
Period Nßß ß3 
18a 
#s -2 
1990-1999 7240 0.324 0.52 0.140 -0.231 0.112 0.334 
(16.41)* (2.14)* (2.24)* (-2.46)* (1.11) 
Notes: 
The t statistics are shown in brackets and * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
All the variables in the above equation are expressed as natural logarithms. 
Diagnostic Results 
Heteroscedasticity Serial Correlation Normality Functional Form 
Test Statistic 0.644 1.641* 1.821 1.367 
Notes: 
All the diagnostic statistics that are reported are based on the Lagrange Multiplier statistic. 
The heteroscedasticity test is based on a regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values. The test used was the one proposed by 
White (1980). 
The serial correlation test is based on the Durbin Watson test (1950,1951), * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation of the errors at the 5% level of significance. 
The normality test is based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of the residuals. The test we used is the one proposed by Jacque and Bera 
(1987). 
The functional form test is a test to see whether the model is linear or not. The test used is Ramsey's 1969 reset test, which uses the 
square of the fitted values. 
The problem with the results in Table 2.3 is that our panel data regression model suffers 
from serial correlation. This results in inconsistently estimated standard errors. Driscoll 
and Kraay (1998) present conditions under which a simple extension of common 
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nonparametric covariance matrix estimation techniques yields standard error estimates that 
are robust to very general forms of serial correlation in panel data estimations. In their 
study they proved the following result: 
Result 1 (page 552): Suppose that t 
(M) 
It=1 . """""", T i_1........ ý , N(T), is an a mixing 
random field of size r /(r -1), r>1. Then 
N(T) 
h, (M)= 1 h, 
1(M) N(T) ; _, 
(2.13) 
is an a mixing sequence of the same size as h,, (M) for any N(T). Moreover, it is 
immediate that if EL /h1 1'5 ]<D, for finite constants S and D, then 
E[ 1h, 1'5 ] 
Based on this result, they apply the standard Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation consistent covariance estimator, to the sequence of cross-sectional 
averages of the h1 (M). We apply the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) correction to our data set 
in order to give us robust standard errors in the presence of serial correlation. The results 
are presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Robust Estimation of the Holding Period Panel Estimation 
This Table shows the relationship between average holding periods, bid-ask spreads, market values, 
variances and skewness for FTSE All Share common stocks for the time period of 1990-1999. The results are 
from the following Panel Estimation. 
HldPer. T ßßl + , 
ß2SpreadiT +, ß3MktValiT +'84Var Re tiT +'65Skew1T + 
15 
1 ßjDT+siT 
j=6 
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Period N /ý1 
182 183 P84 
#5 
R2 
1990-1999 7240 0.424 0.72 0.156 -0.239 0.222 0.376 (16.71)* (5.16)* (5.19)* (-6.89)* (2.11)* 
Notes: 
The t statistics are shown in brackets and * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
All the variables in the above equation are expressed as natural logarithms. 
The coefficient on the bid-ask spread variable is positive and significant at all levels of 
significance with a t-statistic of 5.16. This finding provides strong support for the 
hypothesis that investors' holding periods for common stocks are related to the level of 
transactions costs in the manner predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
Constantinides (1986) and Wilcox (1993). The regression coefficients on firm size and the 
return variance also have the expected signs and are highly significant. Longer holding 
periods are associated with larger firms, and shorter holding periods are associated with 
more volatile firms. Our results for the FTSE All Share common stocks are consistent with 
the NYSE and the NASDAQ stock exchanges37. The regression coefficient on the return 
skewness also has the expected sign and is significant. Longer holding periods are also 
associated with positively skewed stocks. The coefficients (not reported) on eight of the ten 
-2 
dummy coefficients denoting the particular years are also significant. The R of the 
regression is 0.376, indicating that a substantial portion of the variation in investors' 
holding periods for FTSE All Share common stocks is explained by the explanatory 
variables in the regression. 
37 Atkins and Dyl (1997) find the same empirical relationship between annual holding periods and annual 
bid-ask spreads for the NYSE and the NASDAQ stock exchanges. 
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As documented earlier our results are consistent with the NYSE and with the NASDAQ 
since we document the same empirical findings as Atkins and Dyl (1997). We do however 
have some notable differences with the results in Atkins and Dyl (1997). Both the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficient associated with Spread ;T is lower for 
FTSE All Share stocks than it is for NASDAQ and for NYSE stocks. These differences 
between the relationships found for FTSE All Share, NASDAQ and NYSE firms are not 
surprising, given the levels of bid-ask spreads in the three markets. Atkins and Dyl (1997) 
found the mean of the bid-ask spread for the stocks in the NASDAQ sample to be 5.14%, 
and they found the mean of the bid-ask spread for the stocks in the NYSE sample to be 
1.38%. We found the mean of the bid-ask spread for the stocks in the FTSE All Share 
sample to be 1.13%. Transactions costs do not have as great an influence on investors' 
behaviour when transactions costs are relatively low. 
To test whether the relationship between investors' holding periods and bid-ask spreads 
has been stable over time, we also estimate equation (2.9) for each year. These results are 
shown in Table 2.5. The coefficient on the bid-ask spread variable has the expected sign 
and is significant in each year. The coefficients on MktVal; T , Var 
Re t; T and Skew, T are 
also of consistent sign and significant from year to year. The R2 's range from 0.108 in 
1991 to 0.592 in 1996.38 
38 The diagnostic results of the annual holding period regressions can also be seen in Table 2.5. 
The 
regressions do not suffer from any diagnostic problems at any point 
in time. The regression coefficients are 
also stable throughout the entire time period that 
is estimated. This means that the regression model is well 
specified, which leads us to conclude that the results concerning the regression coefficients are robust. 
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Table 2.5. Annual Holding Period Regressions 
This Table shows the relationship between average holding periods, bid-ask spreads, market values, 
variances and skewness for FTSE All Share common stocks for the time period of 1990-1999, for each 
individual year. The results are from the following least squares regression. 
HldPer = ß, + /ß2Spread, + ß3MktVal, + ß4Var Re t1 + ß5Skew; + ei 
Period N A P2 83 ß4 ß(j5 RZ 
1990 724 0.358 0.48 0.148 -0.383 0.173 0.264 
(6.45)* (3.39)* (2.73)* (-2.49)* (2.01)* 
1991 724 0.399 0.475 0.137 -0.312 0.114 0.108 
(2.96)* (2.47)* (2.85)* (-2.21)* (2.07)* 
1992 724 0.3 0.89 0.113 -0.256 0.106 0.167 
(3.21)* (2.02)* (2.06)* (-2.62)* (2.63)* 
1993 724 0.385 0.64 0.138 -0.237 0.103 0.250 
(4.38)* (2.71)* (2.55)* (-2.99)* (2.57)* 
1994 724 0.395 0.67 0.149 -0.293 0.189 0.271 
(4.36)* (2.74)* (2.72)* (-2.29)* (2.31)* 
1995 724 0.447 0.46 0.161 -0.231 0.144 0.334 
(4.74)* (2.48)* (2.29)* (-2.93) (2.64)* 
1996 724 0.237 0.27 0.141 -0.241 0.188 0.592 
(2.86)* (2.33)* (2.36)* (-2.63)* (2.45)* 
1997 724 0.327 0.21 0.150 -0.225 0.195 0.126 
(3.59)* (2.37)* (2.42)* (-2.11)* (2.42)* 
1998 724 0.238 0.88 0.143 -0.217 0.095 0.279 
(3.72)* (2.10)* (2.28)* (-2.95)* (2.77)* 
1999 724 0.368 0.58 0.141 -0.217 0.121 0.276 
(2.75)* (2.09)* (2.02)* (-2.94)* (2.32)* 
Notes: 
The t statistics are shown in brackets and * indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
All the variables in the above equation are expressed as natural 
logarithms. 
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Diagnostic Results 
Period Functional Form Test Heteroscedasticity 
Test 
Normality 
Test 
Stability 
Test 
1990 2.77 0.017 2.40 1.03 
1991 2.65 0.907 2.42 1.06 
1992 0.627 0.391 3.50 0.96 
1993 0.044 0.855 0.818 0.87 
1994 2.45 0.048 0.03 1.04 
1995 1.32 0.181 2.31 1.12 
1996 1.22 0.972 3.85 0.85 
1997 0.466 0.632 3.00 0.94 
1998 2.28 0.425 0.420 1.08 
1999 0.185 0.189 0.434 0.84 
Notes: 
All the diagnostic statistics that are reported are based on the Lagrange Multiplier statistic. 
The heteroscedasticity test is based on a regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values. The test used was the one proposed by 
White (1980). 
The normality test is based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of the residuals. The test we used is the one proposed by Jacque and Bera 
(1987). 
The functional form test is a test to see whether the model is linear or not. The test used is Ramsey's 1969 reset test, which uses the 
square of the fitted values. 
The stability test is a test for the stability of the regression coefficients in the model through time. The test is based on the Chow (1960) 
test. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Constantinides (1986) and Wilcox (1993) provide a 
theoretical basis for the proposition that, in equilibrium, assets with higher transactions 
costs will be held by investors with longer holding periods and vice versa. Atkins and Dyl 
(1997) examine average holding periods and bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ stocks from 
1983 through 1991 and for NYSE stocks from 1975 through 1989 and find strong support 
for this proposition. 
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In this chapter we look at two aspects concerning the holding period and transactions costs 
for common stocks for the UK. First, we look at the theoretical relationship between the 
optimal holding period and transactions costs of a common stock. We do this by 
optimising the holding period of a stock under transactions costs with the use of a Lambert 
function. We find a positive, and an approximately linear relationship between the optimal 
holding period and transactions costs. 
Second, we estimate a specification similar to the one tested by Atkins and Dyl (1997) 
whilst augmenting it with higher order moments of stock returns. In addition we estimated 
the model both in panel form and repeated cross-section. We find that investors on the 
FTSE All Share who buy high-spread common stocks exhibit, on average, longer 
investment time horizons than investors who buy low spread stocks. The relationship is 
weaker than the one estimated for the US, in the low spread environment of the FTSE All 
Share than in the high spread environment of NASDAQ and NYSE. The panel estimation 
inferences are robust to mis-specification and the obtained coefficient estimates consistent 
with the predictions of the theory as both the variance and the skewness of returns are 
entering the specification with the correct sign and are statistically significant. 
Using the repeated cross sectional regressions we established that the positive relationship 
between the two variables is stable over the ten-year period, and we also find that the 
regression results are robust since none of the regressions suffer 
from diagnostic problems. 
The results provide additional econometric evidence on the 
importance of transactions 
costs on investor behaviour and portfolio construction. It is remarkable that 
in the presence 
of stock return characteristics (such as volatility, skewness, size, etc) 
the bid-ask spread has 
an independent and consistently significant influence on the 
holding period of stocks 
traded in the London Stock Exchange. 
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This clearly provides evidence that transactions costs may be a factor, which determine 
asset prices as they affect the frequency of trades necessitated by information. An obvious 
extension of the work would be to investigate whether there is evidence that transactions 
costs are incorporated in equilibrium asset pricing models. 
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Chapter 3 
Transactions Costs and Asset Pricin : 
Evidence from the UK 
3.1 Introduction 
The first formal asset pricing model was the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which 
was developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). They suggested that we should price 
assets in the following way. 
E(R; ) =Rf+ [E(RM) -Rf ]ßl (3.1) 
Where: E(R; ) is the expected return on the portfolio i 
Rf is the return on the risk free asset 
, ß; is the covariance of returns on portfolio i relative to the risk on the market. 
According to the basic CAPM model the single most important factor that drives returns is 
the level of risk The higher the level of risk, the greater the reward for taking the risk and 
the higher the expected return on the portfolio, and vice versa. 
Black (1972) relaxes the assumption of a risk-free asset. This leads to the following model 
E(RI) = E(RZ)+[E(RM)-Rf]ß; (3.2) 
where E(RZ) is the return on a zero-beta portfolio. This zero-beta portfolio is a minimum 
variance portfolio chosen to be uncorrelated with the market portfolio. In this model 8 is 
still the appropriate measure of risk and the model is still linear. 
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In 1973 Merton produced a significant development in the theory of the CAPM1. He 
derived the CAPM in continuous time. This model became known as the Intertemporal 
CAPM (ICAPM). Under a non-stochastic interest rate the ICAPM is the same model as the 
Sharpe (1964) model. This implies that the model is the same in continuous time. 
However, the nonstochastic interest rate is a very unrealistic assumption. This is because 
we are assuming that there is no random effect in the interest rate. We are assuming that 
the interest rate is the same as the risk free rate in the economy. In reality this is not the 
case. Merton realised this and he derived the following ICAPM model with a stochastic 
interest rate. 
E(R; ) = E(RZ) + [E(RM) - Rf ]Yl, + [E(RN -Rfl Y2i (3.3) 
Under the ICAPM the investor faces another source of risk. Since we have continuous time 
there is a risk of shifts in the investment opportunity set that the investor faces. Therefore 
as we can see from equation (3.3), there are now three funds that are used to price assets. 
The risk-free asset, the market portfolio, and a portfolio that has perfect negative 
correlation with the risk-free asset. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1986) extended the CAPM to be able to include nonmarketable 
assets such as human capital. They found that when investors hold nonmarketable risky 
assets such as human capital (which may be a risky component of wealth) we 
have the 
following model. 
E(Ri) = Rf +2[VMaiM +aHC1 
(3.4) 
Where A is the covariance between the market and human capital 
VM is the value of marketable assets 
HC denotes human capital which is a nonmarketable asset. 
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In 1976 Ross developed an alternative asset pricing model to the CAPM which was called 
the Arbitrage Pricing model (APT). Ross's reason for the use of the APT model rather then 
the CAPM was the following. 
The CAPM is a single index model. We can see this in the following equation. 
R, 
1 = al + 
b; RM( + v1: (3.5) 
We are assuming that an investor holds portfolio i at time period t. The return on his 
portfolio depends on a single factor, which is the return on the market. So it is a single 
index model. 
Ross's argument is that the return of the portfolio depends on more then one factor. In fact, 
he claims that the return on the portfolio depends on k factors, which are many factors. So 
he proposes that assets should be priced using the following k factor model. 
Rit = ai +bi Fit +bi2Flt +.... +bikFkt +eit 
Where Fk is the K th common factor affecting returns; 
bik is the sensitivity (, ß) of returns to Fk ; 
e; is idiosyncratic risk. 
(3.6) 
The APT model is essentially a k-factor model and is very similar to the above k-factor 
model. Ross's APT model states that the expected return can be written as 
k 
E(R1) =20 +bijAj 
; _l 
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or 
E(R) " A0i+A Ak 
where: ' is the return on the risk-free asset 
i is the Nx1 vector of one's 
Ak is the Kx1 vector of prices of risk. 
(3.7) 
The central idea of the APT model is the following. In equilibrium, all portfolios that use 
no wealth (this can be achieved by selling some assets and using the proceeds to buy 
others) and have no risk must on average earn no return. 
Such portfolios are called arbitrage portfolios. Therefore, the model implies that if assets 
are not priced correctly, arbitrage occurs in the market until they are priced correctly. A 
further implication of the APT theory is that the prices of risk (A) are the same for all 
securities. The only thing that differs across securities is their sensitivity to the k factors. 
This means that the b differs across assets. 
During the 1960's and the 1970's the CAPM and the APT models were used as the asset 
pricing models. However in the 1980's more sophisticated models were considered, so the 
obvious question is why were these models considered? They were considered because the 
static models considered so far have the following problems. 
" Consumption is ignored. 
" Preferences are defined over wealth one period in the future. 
" Investors consume all their wealth after one period. 
9 Defining preferences over wealth is the same as defining them over consumption. 
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Therefore the solution is to consider multi-period consumption based asset pricing 
models. Before, we can go into the use of these models we have to look at the stochastic 
discount factor of any general asset pricing model. 
According to Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997) virtually all asset pricing models imply 
the following: 
E< (Mt+, Rar+I) =1 
if returns are defined as R; t+, _ 
Pý+ý + D«+, 
It 
where: Et is the conditional expectations operator 
Mt+, is a stochastic discount factor 
(3.8) 
The next question that must be asked is why is the stochastic discount factor important? It 
is important for the following reasons: 
0 Mt+1 gives the general asset pricing expression economic content. 
" If 3 Mt+, that satisfies Et (Mt+l R1, +1) =1 then all assets with the same payoff 
have the 
same price (the law of one price). 
" If M,, is a strictly positive random variable then Er (M, +1 
R; 
t+, 
) =1 is equivalent to a 
no arbitrage condition 
- all portfolios of assets with payoffs that cannot 
be negative but are positive with 
positive probability must have positive prices. 
- if markets are complete, this no arbitrage condition 
identifies M, +, uniquely: 
it is 
the ratio of state prices divided by state probabilities. 
I? 
" the form of Mt+, gives Er (M,, R«+1) =1 empirical content. 
9 in an equilibrium asset pricing model , Et (Mt+1 R«+, ) =1 arises as a first order 
condition for a representative consumer-investor's intertemporal optimization problem 
Mr+1, defined by the model. 
The agent faces the following maximization problem 
max Et [I a' U (Ct+j)] 
j=o 
subject to a budget constraint 
U(. ) the utility function 
Cl consumption at time t 
a discount factor 
(3.9) 
The next question we have to ask is what links equation (3.9) to Et (Mt+1 R;, +, 
) = 1. There 
is a first order condition known as an Euler equation that links consumption and portfolio 
choice for this problem, which is the following 
U '(ce )= aEý [R1U 'pc )] 
t+, 
This equation can be rearranged to give 
Et (Ri, I)a 
U ý(Ct+l) 
=1. U (Ct ) 
Defining Mt+, 
U'(Ct+l) 
=a U'(Ct ) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
yields EI (Mt+, Rit+, ) =l. In this case, M, +, 
is the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS). 
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The next step is to define the utility function. The literature tends to assume a power utility 
function because it gives us a constant relative risk aversion. Therefore we assume the 
following utility function: 
U(C) = 
cl v-1 
1-Y (3.12) 
Where y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This implies that the marginal utility is: 
U'(Ct) = C, -y (3.13) 
By substitution we get the following consumption- based asset pricing model. 
Et Ri, lä 
Ct+l _Y 
=1 (3.14) ct 
The asset pricing model displayed in equation (3.14) can be extended in the following way. 
Assuming that a random variable, X, is conditionally lognormal and conditionally 
homoscedastic, we can define rZ, = log(l + Rir) where 
P+D. 
R. = it it - 1. We can write the asset pricing model as. Pt-i 
_Y 
Eý (1 + Rtr+, )a 
Ct+ý 
=1 Cr 
(3.15) 
Assuming returns and consumption are jointly conditionally lognormal, take natural logs 
of the asset pricing model to give. 
Er(rte+ý)+1oga-yEt(ACt+j)+ (62i +y2a2ý -2y6,, )=0 (3.16) 2 
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The asset pricing model above implies the following about the risk premium for real 
excess returns. 
I+ Rl,, 
_ log Er 1+R -Y6" 
+l 
(3.17) 
Equation (3.17) is known as the equity premium. Given observed average stock returns, 
risk-free rate returns, consumption growth, and the covariance of stock returns with 
consumption growth, according to Mehra and Prescott (1985) the value of y required to fit 
the equity premium is too high. This is known as the " Equity Premium Puzzle ". 
This chapter explores the impact on the equity premium of a financial sector which 
charges a bid-ask spread on individual agents' asset trades. This is done by analyzing the 
Fisher (1994) asset pricing model where agents are restricted from trading securities 
directly with each other and instead are required to conduct their investment activities 
through a "mutual fund" operated by an external financial sector. Agents are permitted to 
trade riskless bonds at zero cost or invest in a portfolio of stocks through the financial 
sector as disparate bid and ask prices. 
A crucial distinction is drawn in the transaction environment between the gross returns 
agents appear to earn in financial markets verses the net returns an agent actually receives 
for consumption. The chapter argues that, if asset trading is costly, then agents must be 
fairly compensated in the form of higher expected gross returns. It is argued that the equity 
premium should consist of two components, a risk component and compensation for 
trading costs. 
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This chapter investigates whether market frictions should be included in asset pricing 
models in the UK stock market. The investigation adopts a three-stage research strategy. 
First, we discuss the simple equilibrium transaction cost asset pricing model that was 
derived by Fisher (1994). Second, the equilibrium asset pricing relations from the model 
are formally tested using Hansen's (1982) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation technique with historic returns and transactions costs data for the UK stock 
market using monthly data for the time period 1980 to 2000. Third, we estimate the 
C-CAPM that incorporates transactions costs using the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
approach proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988a). Two models are estimated using 
different measures of transactions costs in order to establish the robustness of the 
econometric evidence. 
It was shown (Hansen, 1982) that expanding the set of variables that included in the 
orthogonality condition cannot increase the covariance matrix of the estimator, but it is 
important to note that this is an asymptotic result. Tauchen (1986) has investigated the 
small sample properties of the GMM estimator with a different number of instruments. The 
overall conclusion is that the best performance of the GMM estimator is obtained with a 
limited number of instruments. Even if the quality of the instruments appears to be 
statistically satisfactory within the sample, we still have the problem of the fact that GMM 
estimation deals with unconditional moments in the model. So a long time series is 
required to deliver consistent estimates. Restricting the model to small samples will affect 
the precision of the estimates and tests of the overidentifying restrictions on the model. 
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Therefore, in order to establish that the influence of transactions costs is not model 
dependent and that the results are robust, we also estimate the C-CAPM with transactions 
costs using the VAR methodology proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988a) and compare 
the results. 
The chapter is organized in the following way. Section 3.2 discusses the Fisher (1994) 
asset pricing model. Section 3.3 presents the empirical tests of the Fisher (1994) model 
using GMM estimation. Section 3.4 extends the C-CAPM model proposed by Campbell 
and Shiller (1988a) to include transactions costs and presents empirical tests of the 
extended model using a VAR methodology. Section 3.5 provides a summary and 
conclusion of our main findings. 
3.2 The Fisher Equilibrium Model of Expected Returns with a Bid-Ask Spread 
An agent in an economy is assumed to maximize expected utility over random 
consumption paths of an infinite time horizon i. e. 
MaxCrSrb 
r 
E0,8tu(ct) 
t=O 
Subject to: 
ct + Pa, xt + grbt _< st_, 
dt + Qtsr_, Pbt + br_1 + Ft for all t 
st =(1-)s_1+ xt for all t 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
Where ct is per capita consumption, st are per capita share holdings at date t, b, are per 
capita bond holdings at date t, ,ß is the subjective discount rate and 
Eo the expectations 
operator at date 0. d, is a stochastic dividend stream accruing to stock 
holders and the 
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risk-less bond holdings, b, , denotes the payoff of one unit of consumption one period 
ahead. R is the proportion of an agent's stock portfolio liquidated in the financial sector 
and x, represents the re-investment of funds in the mutual fund. qt , Pb, , and P°, 
represent the frictionless bond price, the bid price, and the ask price for the share portfolio 
which are announced by the financial sector, with p"1 > Pbt . F, denotes the lump sum 
per capita transfer payment from the financial sector. 
The budget constraint presented in equation (3.19) restricts the agent to the following 
behaviour. The agent enters the period with st-1 shares of stock and instantly collects his 
dividend, d, , plus his bond payoffs. The cash flow from the liquidation of an agent's 
stock portfolio by the financial sector at the bid price is given as Q, st_1P6t . The right- 
hand side of the constraint represents the agent's free cash flow consisting of dividends, 
the liquidated value of his share portfolio, bond receipts, and the transfer from the 
financial sector, F, The agent next considers how to allocate his wealth between 
consumption, new riskless bond issues, and rebalancing his mutual fund holdings. New 
shares must be purchased at the ask price, Par , while 
bonds can be purchased at q, . 
Equation (3.20) specifies the law of motion governing mutual fund holdings. Since Qts, _, 
units of stock are liquidated within the financial sector, (1- Sit )sr_1 units remain untraded 
in the agent's portfolio. The desired level of stock holdings to carry forward into the next 
period, st , is attainable with the re-investment of x, units 
in the fund. 
Equations (3.18) to (3.20) describe the agent's maximisation problem. The agent must 
choose consumption, bond holdings, and share holdings to maximise expected utility 
subject to his budget constraint in each period. Calculating efficiency conditions with 
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respect to ct , br , and s1 , optimal asset choice in this economy can be shown to result in 
the following system. 
ßEtu'(ct+, ) - u'(ct )q, =0 
ßEtu9(ct+l){R+l Pbt+l + (1- Rr+l )Pat+l + d: +l 
}- u'(ct )Pat =0 
bt_, + st_ldl + s, _, 
Pbt +F, - gtb1 - ct - s, Pat =0 for all t 
(3.21a) 
(3.21b) 
(3.21c) 
The determination of the bid and ask prices takes place in the financial sector. It is 
assumed that the financial sector calculates the bid and ask prices by applying a 
proportional transaction cost to equity trades. This per transaction service charge is added 
or subtracted from the market price so that the bid and ask prices can be represented as: 
pb1 =P (1- a) (3.22a) 
Pay =P (1 + a) (3.22b) 
Where a is the proportional transaction costs. To close the model the financial sector is 
constrained to rebate its earnings to agents each period and so obeys the following budget 
constraint. 39 
F =Pa t _Q t St-I 
Pbt (3.23) 
39 This assumption has two purposes: (1) it ensures the existence of a suboptimal competitive equilibrium 
and (2) it simplifies the solution method used to simulate the model. Alternative rebating schemes will 
not 
affect the equilibrium provided they are not related to the investment decision. 
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The right-hand side of equation (3.23) represents the net per capita cash flows of the 
financial sector generated in the stock and bond markets from the agents' trading activity. 
The objective of this model is to derive expressions determining expected gross returns. 
Accordingly, substituting equations (3.22a), (3.22b) and (3.23) into equations (3.21a)- 
(3.21c) and imposing the asset market-clearing conditions that 
br_1 = bt =0 provides an equilibrium pricing relation of the form. 
u'(ct )qt = 
u'(c, )P, = ßEtu '(ct+, ) 
dt+l 
+1 
2a52,, 
P+l 
1+a 1+a 
ct = dt 
s_1=S, =I and 
(3.21 a' ) 
(3.21b') 
(3.21c') 
Equation (3.21 a') is the familiar pricing equation for a security, which pays off one unit of 
consumption one period ahead under uncertainty. Equation (3.21c') ensures that, 
consistent with equilibrium in an endowment economy, output is consumed each period. 
Equation (3.21b') deserves careful consideration. This expresses the equilibrium pricing 
relation in terms of the market price of the stock portfolio P,. From the agents point of 
view this pricing equation has two crucial features. First, the capital gains and the dividend 
components of the expected gross return on the share portfolio are treated differently by 
the agent. To receive an additional unit of income in the form of dividends one period 
ahead an agent must purchase shares at the ' ask price'. However, since future dividends 
are paid to the shareholder directly, there are no transaction costs incurred on receiving a 
security's payoffs in this form. Equation (3.21b') shows that dividend income is 
discounted by the factor (1 /1+ a) to adjust for the marginal transaction cost of share 
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purchases out of future dividends. The capital gains component of an agent's cash flow. 
alternatively, is earned by liquidating securities in the secondary market. 
From the agent's viewpoint, the possibility of future liquidations of stock by mutual fund 
managers is a cost of holding equity in addition to the marginal cost of purchasing shares. 
Whilst the non-liquidated proportion of a stock portfolio may be carried forward into 
future periods. Thus the capital gains component of share ownership is discounted by the 
factor 
1+a 
in equation (3.21b' ). 40 
In the same equation it is apparent that prices also depend upon the expected future 
turnover rate (Q1+, ) . This is unlike most asset pricing models that do exhibit such 
dependence upon a measure of turnover. The inclusion of this measure provides for the 
distinction between expected asset returns and implied asset trades. That is expected 
returns must reach a threshold for a trade to occur. Conventional models do not allow for 
this thus implying `too frequent' trading. 
Equation (3.21b') shows that when liquidating assets is costly, the proportion of a 
portfolio that is traded is an important determinant of the price of an asset in equilibrium. 
Expected returns should reflect the expected costs of trading assets. The pricing equation 
provides a link between turnover in financial markets and the price an optimizing agent is 
prepared to pay for an asset in the market. A model that breaks the separation between 
40 In the certainty case, capital gains are discounted at a higher rate than dividends when Q1+, >- 0.5. reflecting 
the high costs of liquidating claims each period. 
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asset prices and trading volume is appealing once it is recognized that portfolio 
reallocation is costly. Higher asset turnover must necessarily generate higher transaction 
costs which agents should expect to be compensated for in the form of higher expected 
returns. 
The effect of introducing the bid-ask spread and asset turnover into the agent's 
optimization problem will lead ceteris paribus to a higher expected return on risky equity 
to compare to the case of a zero bid-ask spread. The quantitative significance of the effects 
of these variables requires a formal estimation and this is the focus of the next section. 
3.3 Generalized Method Of Moments Estimation 
This section formally tests the Fisher (1994) model discussed is section 3.2 using the 
GMM technique set out in Hansen (1982). Section 3.3.1 expresses the gross equity 
premium as a function of the state variables and exogenous parameters in the model to 
deliver a reduced form amenable to testing the GMM. Section 3.3.2 describes the data 
employed to test the model. Section 3.3.3 presents the results of the tests. 
3.3.1 Calculating the Equity Premium 
Define Rt = (Pt+1 + d, +l) 
/ Pt and Rft= (1 / qt) . Then equations 
(3.21 a') and (3.21 c') 
combine to give: 
1=, ßEtu 
u( (d: 
+ßt) 
)R1 (3.24) 
Similarly, equations (3.21b') and (3.21c') result in the following expression. 
1+a= 8E, u'(dt+, 
) 
Rt + 8E, 
u'(dr+, ) Pt+, (a - 22+ I) 
(3.25) 
udt u(dt) P 
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We assume that agents' utility is given by a time-separable, constant relative risk aversion 
utility function of the form. 
c 
u(c, )= ` 
'1-7 
-r 
-1 y>- 0, :#1 
=logt, y=1 
The marginal rate of substitution can be represented as: 
u'(dt+, ) 
_ 
dt+l 
u'(dt) L dr 
Making this substitution and subtracting equation (3.24) from equation (3.25) gives the 
following solution: 
#Et 
dt+l -Y {(Rt_Rft)+(a_2t+i)'}_a=O 
(3.26) 
dt pt 
Equation (3.26) is a nonlinear stochastic Euler equation of the form 
Eth(xt+,,, Zo) =0 
Where: 
xt+l =dt pt t+j 
t 
is a vector of variables observed at date t +I, while 20 = 
[a, ß, y] is an unknown 
parameter vector to be estimated. E, is the expectations operator at date t conditioned on 
all variable information. 
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The estimation procedure described in Hansen and Singleton (1982) can be implemented 
in two steps using standard gradient methods for nonlinear least squares estimation. This is 
undertaken for the reduced form (3.26). 
3.3.2 Data Description 
Monthly data are collected for the FTSE All Share Index for the time period 1980-2000. -' 
Following Brown and Gibbons (1985), the variable d, +, - 
dl is proxied using the growth 
rate of private consumption. UK stock returns on the FTSE All Share Index and the returns 
on 3-month treasury bills are used to generate the series for R, - R. 
Following the methodology suggested by Fisher (1994) we obtain a measure of stock 
market price growth, Pl / P, , using the 
FTSE transportation and industrial indices from 
1980 to 2000. We calculate a composite FTSE Index by combining the transportation and 
industrial indices with weights calculated to reflect the number of stocks represented by 
each index. 42 
Finally the data used to calculate the turnover rate are taken as a proxy for Q, and R+, in 
x, j . We calculate the turnover rate using 
data from the FTSE All Share Index as 
Total number of shares traded, 
(Total number of shares outstanding), 
a1 The problem with monthly data is that it may suffer from seasonal effects. 
In order to overcome this 
problem we collect seasonally adjusted data. 
42 Nominal stock prices and consumption are deflated by the implicit consumption 
deflator. 
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Theoretically, an infinite number of potential instruments are contained in individuals' 
information sets but these are not specified by the theory. This study follows Hansen and 
Singleton (1982) by using a constant, c, and lagged values of the state vector, so that 
zý _ [c, x1, xt_, ,........., xt_n+l 
] for n lags. 43 In practice the lag length is set at n=1,2, and 
4.44 The sensitivity of these results to the choice of instruments is investigated using the 
methods recommended by Pagan and Jung (1993) and Staiger and Stock (1993). 45 
3.3.3 Results 
For the optimization algorithm to converge it is necessary to restrict one of the parameters. 
Since the subjective discount factor is the parameter of least interest in the present study, it 
is restricted to assume the value 8=0.99 in line with economically acceptable values for 
this parameter. 46 The results therefore report estimates for Ao conditional on one element 
being fixed. Restricting 8 places restrictions on other aspects of the model. Equation 
(3.21a') shows, for instance, that 6 is a major determinant of the level of the risk-free rate. 
Table 3.1 shows the parameter estimates of the following model for the entire samples 
from 1980 to 2000. 
ßE, 
dt+l 
(Rr-Rft)+(a-2 t+, 
)Pt+l _a=0 dt pt 
43 The turnover rate is differenced in the instrument vector to ensure stationarity so that 
SZ, and R- appear 
in the Zt vector as 2,. - Qf_l . 
"This is the lag length that was suggested by Fisher (1994). 
45 We collect all the data with the use of Datastream. 
46 Mehra and Prescott (1985) calculate the discount rate to be equal to 0.99 using 
US historical data from 
1900-1985. 
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Table 3.1 is arranged to report the values of a and y together with the chi-square statistic 
testing the overidentifying restrictions of the model and its p-value. The null for this test is 
that the overidentifying orthogonality restrictions are satisfied. 
TABLE 3.1. GMM estimates for the period 1980-2000 
NLAG NOBS a Degrees of freedom p-value y 
1 239 0.013 2.79 2.61 30 106a (2.10)* . (2.62)* 
2 238 0.022 2.997 4.33 70 227a (2.09)* . (2.89)* 
4 236 0.076 3.86 4.96 15 0 664 a (2.42)* . (2.49)* 
Notes: 
y is the estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
ä is the estimate of the coefficient of transactions costs. 
The subjective discount factor is restricted to assume the value of ß=0.99. 
White consistent adjusted t-statistics shown in brackets () and * indicates significance at 5% level. 
Instrumental variables used are [ zt = constant, x1...... xi_n+1 ] for n=n lag and 
x= 
dt+l 
R -Rf 
pt+' 
52 -52 tdt t' pt t-1 
tt 
representing, respectively, output growth, the equity premium, FTSE price index growth, and the difference of the FTSE turnover rate 
and its lag. 
e Do not reject the hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are orthogonal to the errors at the 5% level of significance. 
For the full sample Table 3.1 reports estimates of a which range between 0.0 13 and 0.076 
depending upon the number of instruments selected. This corresponds to an estimated 
bid- 
ask spread of 1.3% to 7.6%. Estimates of the risk aversion parameter lie between 
2.79 and 
3.86. 
The Wald test of the overidentifying restrictions of the model never rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. The exact impact of the transactions costs 
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embedded in the null hypothesis depends on the lag structure of the chosen instrument set. 
The test for the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected at conventional levels of 
significance for the chosen information structures. 
When the instrument set is reduced to the first lag, the first row of the Table reports 
estimates of a=0.013 and y=2.79. This implies a bid-ask spread of 1.3%, which seems 
low compared to Fisher's (1994) estimate of 9.4% and Stoll and Whaley's (1983) estimate 
of 2.79%. 47 The effect of adding more instruments is inconclusive. If two lags of the 
instrument set are employed, the p-value is 0.227, while the value of a= 0.022, which 
implies a bid-ask spread of 2.2%. If four lags of the information are used, the estimate 
a=0.076 implies an implausibly large value of the bid-ask spread of 7.6%. 
On the whole our results are realistic when we compare them to other studies. According 
to Stoll and Whaley (1983) the estimate for the bid-ask spread should be around 2.9%. 
The most important result in our study are the significance of the transactions costs in the 
estimated equation. The parameter a is significantly different from zero based on t- 
statistics, indicating that transactions costs are important in asset pricing. We also find that 
y is significantly different from zero irrespective of the chosen instrument set. Our 
estimates of the parameter appear very reasonable in terms of economic theory and close to 
ones estimated by Fisher (1994) for the US. The stability, the estimates, (vis-a-vis the 
information set) and statistical significance indicate that risk aversion is important and 
must be included in asset pricing. The results are suggestive of strong support of the 
hypothesis that transactions costs are important determinants in asset pricing. 
47 Stoll and Whaley (1983) estimate the bid-ask spread on the NYSE between the time period of 
1961-1981. 
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Since the GMM results are based on an instrumental variables estimation procedure, the 
credibility of the results depend on the quality of the instruments that are used. Pagan and 
Jung (1993) point out instances where the performance of the GMM estimator in small 
samples is poor due to poor instruments, and suggest diagnostic tests to evaluate the 
efficiency of the procedure. In the present context, the tests of the overidentifyin` 
restrictions and the parameter estimates reported in Table 3.1 might be misleading if the 
instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous components of the stochastic Euler 
equations comprising the restrictions from the model. 
Pagan and Jung (1993) suggest that (1) calculating the R-squared from regressing the 
derivatives of the Euler equations with respect to the estimated parameters against the 
instrument set and (2) an examination of the cross-correlations of these derivatives provide 
a check on the likely performance of the GMM estimator. 
48 The results of these diagnostics 
are reported in Table 3.2 for the derivatives of the moment conditions with respect to a 
and y for each set of instruments. 
48 In applied work such as this, Pagan and Jung (1993) recommend 
that the derivatives be evaluated using 
the point estimates from the GMM estimator. In addition, the correlations 
of the derivatives with respect to 
each parameter will influence the performance of the estimator. 
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TABLE 3.2. Diagnostic tests examining the efficiency of the instruments employed in the GMM estimates of the model 
Notes: 
Instrument set i2 ah, äh, 
NLAG Ra Ry CO aa, ay 
1 0.049 0.007 -0.69 2 0.016 0.042 -0.71 4 0.011 0.002 -0.77 
2 ah Ra denotes the R-squared from the regression of =ä, against the instrument set. 
2 ah 
t denotes the R-squared from the regression of t, against the instrument set. 
Y 
Lt 
Con 
ah 
as ,ý) 
is the correlation of the partial derivatives evaluated at the point estimates from each instrument set. Y 
Denoting Ra 2 and Rye as the R-squared from the regression of the derivatives against the 
bid-ask spread and the risk aversion parameter respectively, Rae peaks at 0.049 with 1 lag 
of the instrument set while Rye peaks at 0.042 with 2 lags of the instrument set. The 
correlations of the partial derivatives reported in the final column of Table 3.2 are quite 
strong at around an average of -0.72, so that it is difficult to make independent statements 
about the efficiency of each parameter estimate. 
Based on the results of Table 3.2, the instrument sets employed in the GMM estimation do 
not diminish confidence in the estimation procedure. The diagnostics do suggest, however, 
that the estimate of the bid-ask spread parameter is relatively more efficient then that of the 
risk-aversion parameter. 
The results so far are indicate that as we vary the instrument lag structure the estimates of 
the parameters (especially those of a) change. The resulting test statistics cannot provide 
us with an unambiguous choice of a. It appears to us the estimate of 2.2% 
is the one most 
consistent with observation. 
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3.4 Present Value Tests of the CCAPM including Transactions Costs 
In the presence of the problem that was discussed above, Lund and Engsted (1996) suggest 
that the only way to obtain robust results of the C-CAPM is to estimate the model using 
both the GMM methodology and the VAR methodology proposed by Campbell and Shiller 
(1988a). The difference between the two methodologies is that the GMM methodology is 
based on the orthogonality condition given by the first order condition of the inter- 
temporal optimization problem (the Euler equation). The VAR approach is based on the 
linearised present value model that can be derived from the Euler equation. In other words, 
the difference between the two methodologies is the following. 
The GMM uses information in order to derive an estimate of the bid-ask spread. From this 
estimate a t-statistic is calculated and the significance of the bid-ask spread in asset pricing 
models is evaluated. The GMM has two shortcomings; first, the results depend on the 
quality of the instruments that are used to proxy for the information, and second, the 
coefficient and the significance of the bid-ask spread variable are sensitive to the lag 
structure of the instruments. 
However, the VAR approach differs from the GMM because it uses actual data on the bid- 
ask spread to calculate a test statistic to evaluate the significance of the bid-ask spread in 
asset pricing models. The VAR approach estimates the C-CAPM with the bid-ask spread 
included as an additional explanatory variable. The bid-ask spread is then tested for 
significance. The VAR approach provides further corroborative evidence, to the GMM 
based model, as the econometric results do not depend on instruments, as they are not 
required for the estimation. 
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In the next section of this chapter we extend the VAR approach proposed by Campbell and 
Shiller (1988a) to include the bid-ask spread as an explanatory variable in the CCAPM. 
We then perform statistical tests to determine whether the bid-ask spread should be 
included in the CCAPM. 
3.4.1 The Model 
Following Lucas (1978) we assume the existence of a representative investor who chooses 
to consume and invest in a single asset (a stock index) so that at each time t she 
maximizes expected lifetime utility 
MaxEt ßTU (Ct+T (3.27) 
IT=0 
Subject to the budget constraint 
Ct+Sur =RSrW1_l; Rt = 
(P, +DI)' (3.28) 
Pt-I 
Where: 
W, is the wealth invested in the stock index, at time period t. 
Ct is the real consumption, at time period t. 
P is the ex-dividend real stock price, at time period t. 
Dt is the real dividend received between time t -1 and t. 
St is the bid-ask spread at time period t . 
49 
a9 Transactions costs are proxied by the bid-ask spread. Transactions costs are included as a single variable 
because both the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (1981) and the Phillips Peron (PP) test 
(1988) suggest 
that the ask price minus the bid price follows a stationary process. 
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We include transactions costs in the budget constraint of the investor. In this set-up the 
investor now has two budget constraints, the usual wealth constraint and the transactions 
costs that are incurred whenever she decides to trade the asset. 
The first-order condition in this maximization problem is the stochastic Euler equation 
(Lucas, 1978). 
-1 =0 Er ßU'(C+) U'(C) 
Rt+l St+l (3.29) 
Lucas (1978) considers a pure exchange economy with one perishable consumption good. 
This implies that we can ignore consumption decisions because by definition the 
representative investor must consume the entire income. However, with the utility function 
used below the equation above also obtains in the general production economy of Breeden 
(1979) and Cox et al (1985) where consumption and investment decisions are made jointly. 
In order to obtain testable implications we must specify a utility function for the 
representative investor. As in most other studies Campbell and Shiller (1988a) use the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function: We can now go on and test the 
C-CAPM under transactions costs using the present value test suggested by Campbell and 
Shiller (1988a). 
We begin by defining hl, as the logarithm of the utility-adjusted return, which is expressed 
by the following equation50: 
U9 (C") Pj +Dj_ Sr+j 
+ a, 
Cr+1 
(3.30) 
= log u9C, 
Rt+ý sý+ý) =log psC 
t) tt 
50 The derivation of the utility adjusted return can be seen in appendix B. 
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= log (exp (S1- (5t+1) + exp ((51)) + Ad, j- OST+I + aAc1+> , 
Where 8t = log 
D' 
, 
d, = log (D, ) , St = log(S1) and c= log C Pý ýý 
Next, we linearize (3.30) around the point 8t = 5, =S: 
kt = S, - Pst, l + Ad, +, - 
OSt+l + aAc, +, +K= 
ýI't 
" (3.31) 
Here, p=1; while K is an inessential constant from the linearization. (1 + exp(8)) 
Define variable ý,, by the sum of ý, t we 
have 
pjj ,, r+j = (Sr - p'sr+i + pJ 
(Odr+j+l 
- OSr+j+l + aAcj+1 +1pK. (3.32) 
J=0 J=0 1-p 
We assume that Et (') is equal to a constant c for all j >_ 0. In equation (3.30) we 
expect Et (&+) to be close to - log(, ß), so the linearisation is a good approximation of 
(3.30). Given that this holds, we take conditional expectations on both sides of (3.32) and 
whilst we allow i -> oo. After some manipulations we obtain the following equation. 
00 
NSt = -ý pj EE 
(Ad++, 
- OSt+ j+i + Gadc j+i) + 
j=0 
c-K 
1-p 
(3.33) 
Since lim p` Et ((5,, i 
)=0 as i -> co (otherwise o5r is non-stationary with an explosive root 
indicating that stock prices are driven by a rational bubble). 5' 
5' Note that by letting the VAR model be formulated in terms of changes in dividends and consumption in 
terms of the dividend-price ratio instead of stock prices themselves, the results are robust to possible 
nonstationarity of p, dt, St and ct. 
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With the use of equation (3.33) we can perform a statistical test to discover whether 
transactions costs should be incorporated in the C-CAPM. If transactions costs should be 
included, then the coefficient associated with AS, will be statistically significant in the 
VAR model. We can employ this test by testing the cross-equation restrictions implied by 
the underlying theory on a VAR model. We define a limited information set H containing t 4-: ) 
past and present values of x, = (5, Ad, Ac, AS, ), and assume that expectations conditional 
on Hr are linear projections on the information set. 
This corresponds to the VAR (p) specification: 
zt+, = Azt + ut+l (3.34) 
Where z. = (xt -E(x),..., xt_p+l -E(x)) is a 4px1 vector and A is the 
4p x 4p companion matrix of the VAR (p) system. See Campbell and Shiller (1987, 
1988a) for details. 
3.4.2 Data Description 
For this application we are using monthly seasonally adjusted aggregate consumption 
expenditure data for the UK. For the dividend to price ratio we collect data on the price 
and dividend yield of the FIFSE All Share Index. The bid-ask spread is calculated 
by 
collecting data on the bid price and the ask price on the FTSE All Share Index. Nominal 
stock prices, dividends and consumption are deflated by the implicit consumption 
deflator. 
The time period of the data is between 1980-2000. All the data are collected 
from 
Datastream. 
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3.4.3 Results 
We can test if transactions costs are statistically significant in the C-CAPM by employing 
the Granger-Causality tests proposed by Lund and Engsted (1996). 52 If past values of the 
changes in the bid-ask spread predict the dividend-price ratio, one can say that bid-ask 
spreads "Granger-cause" dividend yield. This would imply that transactions costs are 
statistically significant in the C-CAPM, which would therefore suggest that transactions 
costs are important in asset pricing models. We test this hypothesis in the context of the 
following regression: 
22 
St -1 akZt-k -I /"kASt-k + ut (3.35) 
k=1 k=1 
where Z denotes all other information 
Where k represents the number of months each variable is lagged and the variables are as 
defined earlier and test the restriction: 
1 ßk = 0, Vk 
In this case the lags of both Z and AS are equal to 2 53 . The test results 
in an F-statistic of 
5.04 with a p-value of 0.02. The null hypothesis is rejected, implying that past values of 
the change in bid-ask spreads do affect the dividend yield. This leads us to conclude that 
transactions costs should be included in the C-CAPM. 
54 
52 For more details on Granger-Causality tests see Granger (1969). 
53 Both the Akaike information criterion and the Schwartz Bayesian criterion suggest that the optimal lag 
for 
Z and AS is equal to 2. 
54 The estimation of the entire equation (3.35) accompanied with diagnostic tests can 
be seen in Table 3.3, 
which can be found in appendix C. 
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We can obtain a measure of transactions costs by solving equation (3.35) for the 
expectation of (5 with respect to AS , given the fact that AS is stationary. 
From equation (3.35) we find that when S is equal to 4.02% p. a. (the sample mean), 
transactions costs are equal to 2.64% p. a.. This estimate mimics closely our previously 
obtained value of 2.2% (under GMM with two lags). 
It is very encouraging that using two different methodologies result in almost identical 
estimates regarding the importance of transactions costs in the UK equity market. 
Transactions costs were shown to have an independent influence in the presence of other 
market information and their inclusion in the pricing model does not depend neither upon 
the chosen functional form nor the chosen estimator. 
3.5 Discussions and Conclusions 
In this chapter we tested if transactions costs should be included in asset pricing models. 
We tested this hypothesis by using two different methodologies. First, we apply the 
equilibrium asset pricing model proposed by Fisher (1994). The Fisher (1994) model is 
unique from other asset pricing models because it includes the bid-ask spread as a variable 
that influences excess returns, whereas the more traditional asset pricing models include 
only the level of risk as the factor that influences excess returns. 
We estimate the Fisher (1994) model with the GMM estimation technique of Hansen 
(1982) using seasonally adjusted monthly data for the UK stock market over the time 
period of 1980-2000. The formal GMM tests of the model yield economically plausible 
values of the unknown parameters, and tests of the overidentifying restrictions of the 
model could not be rejected. 
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The model appears to perform relatively well when confronted with data. The parameter 
associated with our chosen proxy for the bid-ask spread as well as the fisk-aversion 
parameter was found to be significant for all the different instrument sets that we tested. 
This lead us to conclude that both transactions costs and risk should be included in asset 
pricing models, due to our evidence from the UK stock market. Fisher (1994) has also 
found similar evidence of the importance of transactions costs in asset pricing with respect 
to the US stock market. 
As the GMM estimation procedure relies heavily on the quality of the instruments, we 
therefore tested the quality of the instruments of our model using the diagnostic tests 
proposed by Pagan and Jung (1993). We found the instruments to be adequate, a result that 
for our estimation period and sample overcame a fundamental problem with the GMM 
estimation technique. In order to establish the robustness of our results we tested the same 
hypothesis in the context of the C-CAPM under transactions costs using a different 
methodology that does not suffer from the problems of the GMM. 
We provide further evidence of the relationship between the dividend to price ratio and the 
bid-ask spread. We found that when transactions costs are equal to 2.64%. pa. the resulting 
dividend yield equals to 4.02% pa. (for any given total return). 
Our findings would appear to have important implications for the many empirical studies 
that use some version of the CAPM to adjust for risk. Databases such as those compiled by 
the Center of Research in Security Prices only report gross returns on a daily, monthly or 
annual basis. This means that researchers using gross returns data to adjust for risk without 
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specifying structural assumptions on the transactions technology may bias their results. We 
very rarely see such assumptions being stated explicitly. 55 
The many studies that document anomalies in financial markets as well as the many that 
are consistent with market efficiency may have been predicted upon data that do not fit the 
specifications of the hypotheses being tested. The empirical findings in this chapter give 
evidence to suggest that this criticism cannot be dismissed. 
alies. 55 Deechow (1990) makes this point with reference to the detection of accounting 
anom 
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Chapter 4 
Information Asymmetry and the Bid-Ask Spread: 
Evidence from the UK 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the most important characteristics that investors look for in an organized financial 
market is liquidity. Liquidity is the ability to buy or sell significant quantities of a security 
quickly, anonymously, and with relatively little price impact. To maintain liquidity, many 
organized exchanges use market makers, who are individuals who stand ready to buy or 
sell whenever the public wishes to buy or sell. In return for providing liquidity, market 
makers are granted monopoly rights by the exchange to post different prices for purchases 
and sales. They buy at the bid price, Pb and sell at a higher ask price Fý. This ability to 
buy low and sell high is the market makers' primary source of compensation for providing 
liquidity. Their compensation is defined as P, - Pb , which is defined as the bid-ask spread. 
The quoted spread covers the costs of order processing, holding the inventory and adverse 
information costs. Empirical studies, Stoll (1989), Glosten and Harris (1988) and more 
recently, Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Menyah and Paudyal (2000) relate the spread or the 
change in the spread to a vector of characteristics that are associated with the individual 
securities such as trading volume, the risk of the security (normally approximated by the 
standard deviation of returns over a given period), the stock price and the firm's market 
value. This set of characteristics is augmented by the addition of factors that relate to the 
specific market where the stocks are traded. 
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The influence of new, firm specific, information on market liquidity (the bid-ask spread) 
and volume is examined in two papers by Kim and Verrecchia (1994,2001). In their first 
paper they show that just prior to earnings disclosure by firms, the spread increases as 
market makers protect themselves from the informed traders. When firms defer reporting 
of performance, this is perceived as evidence of 'extreme' results, that will endow 
informed traders with additional informational advantage they will try to exploit. Faced 
with this situation market makers will attempt to infer the appropriate signals from the 
trading volume, and discourage trading by reducing liquidity. 
The relevant literature suggests a variety of determinants of the bid-ask spread in equity 
markets. These include volume and some measure of risk associated with the returns of the 
particular share. In this study we argue for the formulation of a model that incorporates in 
addition to volume and risk, the range of analysts' forecasts as proxies for the uncertainty 
surrounding the performance of the shares beyond the year-end, related to the probability 
of disclosure deferral. Daley, Senkow and Vigeland (1988) find that the implied volatility 
in option prices is associated with the variance of analysts' forecasts. This suggests that 
investor's find that the disagreement among analysts is a useful indicator of the market's 
uncertainty. Such uncertainty may be interpreted by investors as meaning that the company 
will report poorer than expected performance, and also that there could be some delay in 
disclosing the year end results. 
Whittred and Zimmer (1984) find that the reporting of results is significantly 
delayed by 
companies with poor performance. Therefore analysts' disagreement may 
be interpreted by 
market makers as information about the likelihood of a deferred report which would 
heighten adverse selection as suggested by Kim and Verrecchia (2001). 
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The contribution of this study is the robust estimation of a spread equation for the UK 
FIFSE-100 stocks that incorporates the variance of analysts' forecasts over different 
horizons and the firm's market value, in addition to the more traditional variables such as 
volume and the variance of returns. In the following section, section 4.2, we discuss in 
some detail the rationale for the chosen specification. The data are discussed in section 4.3. 
The adopted econometric methodology and the results are presented in section 4.4. Finally 
section 4.5 contains our conclusions. 
4.2 Theoretical Considerations 
Atkins and Dyl (1997) model the bid-ask spread as a linear function of the market value of 
the firm and the volatility of returns: 
Spreadi '81 + 
82MktVali +A Var Re ti + ei (4.1) 
Where Spreadi is the average percentage bid-ask spread of firm i over a given period, 
Mktvali is the average market value of firm i over the period, Var Re tj is the variance of 
firm i's daily stock returns over the period, and ej is an error term. All of the variables are 
expressed as natural logarithms. 
The market value of the firm is an important determinant of the spread since it reflects the 
depth of the demand for the stock. Traditionally high value firms enjoy deep markets for 
their stock. Their equity is traded frequently by a large number of agents, performance is 
closely monitored by analysts reducing the incidence of potential information asymmetry. 
These stocks are therefore highly liquid, as market makers need not expose their portfolios 
to the risk of adverse selection and unwanted inventory. We therefore expect that the 
equity of large firms will enjoy lower spreads. 
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The link between the spread and the variance of a firm's daily stock returns can be seen bY 
the following simple model in Roll (1984). Denote by Pt * the time t fundamental value 
of a security in a frictionless economy (an economy with no transactions costs i. e. no bid- 
ask spread), and denote by S the bid-ask spread. Then the observed market price P, may 
be written as: 
P=P* +J 
2 
It = IID56 (4.3) 
(4.2) 
Where It is an order-type indicator variable, indicating whether the transaction at time 
period t is at the ask (buyer-initiated) or at the bid (seller-initiated) price. We assume that 
the probability of the transaction occurring at either price is equal, which implies that each 
outcome has probability of 
I. 
If the transaction occurs at the buyer-initiated price then the 2 
value of It will be equal to 1. If however, the transaction occurs at the seller- i niti ated price 
then the value of I, will be equal to -1. The assumption that P, * is the fundamental value 
I 
of the security implies that E[I, 0, hence Pr(I, = 1) = Pr(I, = -1) 2. 
If there are no 
changes in the fundamentals of the security; hence P, *=P* is fixed through time, then 
the process for price change AP, is given by. 
AP =AP *+(It -I -ý)S =(It -It-, 
) S 
22 
(4.4) 
Under the assumption that I, is IID the variance of A-P, can be readily computed as. 
56 IID means independent and identical distribution. 
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s2 Var[AP 
2 (4.5) 
Equation (4.5) provides the positive link between volatility and the bid-ask spread. 
In this study we suggest to enrich the model by including an information asymmetry 
variable. A theoretical motivation for this extension is suggested by Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994). In essence the variance of returns captures the price risk associated with holding Z-ý 
the stock, but it does not capture the information asymmetry between traders and market 
makers. In their model the market participants differ in their ability to process information 
regarding the performance of the firm. The market maker is unable to identify the type of 
agent that she is dealing with. She uses the total demand order to make inferences 
regarding the potential private information content residing in her total demand: 
Proposition 1 states: 
"The market is less liquid at the earnings announcement date than at nonearnings 
announcement dates. Moreover, market liquidity (the spread is lower) is increasing in the 
precision of public information, decreasing (the spread is higher) in the diversity of opinion 
among information processors and increasing in the number of non-discretionary liquidity 
traders... " (Kim and Verrecchia 1994, p. 53) 
When there is disagreement amongst market participants, then market makers are unlikely 
to have an information advantage over those traders who follow the stock closely. 
Therefore the market makers will increase the spread in order to protect themselves against 
those with an information advantage. Although this behaviour is predicted in the context of 
earnings announcements the rationale is also applicable at other times. 
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Further motivation for the inclusion of a similar variable is given in Scherbina (2001). She 
finds that stocks about which there is high disagreement amongst analysts earn lower 
returns (than otherwise similar stocks) in view of the need to resolve the uncertainty. If this 
is the case. ) then market makers will increase the spread to compensate for this reduction in 
return. 
In order to measure the exposure, we include the extent of disagreement amongst analysts 
about the stock, following Daley, Senkow and Vigeland (1988) that find that the variance 
of analysts' forecasts is a proxy for the level of uncertainty surrounding the stock. 
In the presence of asymmetric information market makers use also volume signals to 
predict future returns and thus the direction of trade that they are likely to experience. The 
relationship between expected returns and trading volume in the context of non-disclosure 
is examined by Kim and Verrecchia (2001). They derive rules that a rational market maker 
will employ in using volume information to minimise her potential loses. 
Based on the above arguments the model to be estimated will be. 
Spreadi f (Var Ret, VarF, MrkVl, Vol) (4.6) 
Therefore, in this model, the spread is influenced positively by (i) the expected volatility, 
that is proxied by the ex post volatility of the stock over the forecast horizon (VarRet); 
the likely exposure of market makers to the superior information of some traders, which is 
proxied by the divergence of beliefs amongst analysts concerning the next earnings 
announcement (VarF). The firm's market value (MktVal) and trading volume (Vol) exert a 
negative influence on the spread thus increasing liquidity. 
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4.3 Data Definition and Collection 
The companies and the years for which the required data are available are listed in 
appendix D. 
4.3.1 The Variance of Analysts' Forecasts, Var 
The forecasts used are from the I/B/E/S Detail file, which gives information on company 
forecasts for the period 1990 and 1999. For these years, forecasts for 26 of the FIFSE 100 
companies are available for at least one year during the period. A total of 203 company- 
year observations were available, each having at least 3 forecasts at all the horizons 
investigated (h = 2,4,6,8,10 and 12 months before the year end). 
The variance of the forecasts for each company-year observation (VarF) is calculated from 
all the forecasts available during the month, the end of which is h months prior to the year 
end. At each horizon, for all of the company-year observations, at least 3 forecasts were 
available for the construction of the variance. 
4.3.2 The Bid-Ask Spread, S 
The bid-ask spread is calculated using the bid and the ask prices from Datastream. For all 
of the 203 company year combinations, the monthly bid and ask price was collected for the 
month, the end of which is h months prior to the year end. 
4.3.3 Market Value, MktVal 
The market value is calculated from Datastream. For all of the 203 company-year 
combinations, the monthly market value was collected for the month, the end of which 
is h 
months prior to the year end. 
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4.3.4 Trading Volume, Vol 
The trading volume data are calculated from Datastream. For all of the 203 company-year 
combinations, the monthly trading volume was collected for the month, the end of which is 
h months prior to the year end. 
4.3.5 The Variance of Retum, VarRet 
The variance of return is calculated from prices collected from Datastream. For all of the 
203 company year combinations, the variance of return was estimated over the current 
month (the month for which all the other variables were collected) and the horizon h to the 
year end. 
The descriptive statistics for VarRet and VarF and the other regressors for the sample of 
203 company year observations taken from the FTSE 100 companies are given in Table 
4.1. One noticeable aspect of the Table is the presence of skewness and kurtosis in both 
VarF and VarRet. Our approach to this is problem is to take natural logs of the variables in 
the regressions to minimise the impact of these features. 
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TABLE 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory Variables for horizons of 2,4, 6,8,10, and 12 months 
Statistic Horizon 
- - - VarF 2 months 4 mo nths ý months -ý-m-onths 10 months 12 months 
Mean 2.51 5.83 3.71 3.54 3.21 3.13 
Standard Deviation 8.51 13.20 11.87 1162 1151 11.46 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 67.72 108.82 81.10 64.24 65.67 66.78 
Skewness 5.42* 4.30* 4.42* 4.75* 4.23* 4.64* 
Kurtosis 31.60* 23.19* 22.42* 23.76* 21.12* 19.82* 
No of observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 
VarRet 2 months 4 months 6 months 8 months 10 months 12 months 
Mean 5.64 6.78 6.26 7.67 7.51 7.62 
Standard Deviation 12.76 14.53 13.80 16.39 14.67 16.04 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Maximum 99.21 83.87 95.29 99.44 119.08 95.68 
Skewness 4.73* 4.63* 4.43* 4.82* 4.65* 4.68* 
Kurtosis 23.23* 22.76* 21.54* 22.20* 24.78* 19.32* 
No of observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Horizon 
MtkVal 2 months 4 months 6 months 8 months 10 months 12 months 
Mean 8048.293 8069.331 8800.68 8900.16 89600.76 9901.21 
Standard Deviation 754.45 799.69 811.01 832.46 843.23 873.43 
Minimum 2371.1 2381.39 2400.12 2432.89 2554.32 2764.76 
Maximum 97644.13 93354.18 95544.12 99233.65 120032.21 131032.21 
Skewness 0.83 -0.60 0.72 0.65 -0.54 0.82 
Kurtosis -0.68 -0.044 0.58 0.28 -0.067 0.70 
No of observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Vol 2 months 4 months 6 months 8 months 10 months 12 months 
Mean 622572 732570 742679 753565 777433 876231 
Standard Deviation 215480 226440 237480 246540 278340 288231 
Minimum 446920 446920 446920 446920 446920 446920 
Maximum 899630 999630 999687 1096300 1145300 1165542 
Skewness 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.65 0.76 0.82 
Kurtosis -0.79 -0.69 -0.65 -0.86 -0.45 -0.99 
No of observations 203 203 1 203 1 203 1 203 1 
203 1 
Notes: 
* indicates that the test of the null hypothesis of no skewness and no kurtosis is rejected at the 
5% level of significance. The tests used 
for skewness and kurtosis are those proposed by Jacque and Bera (1980). 
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4.4 Econometric Methods and Results 
Our adopted linear specification is of the form: 
V- +, 63Var Re t MktVal +e (4.7) Lipreadih = 181 
+ 
182Var'ý*h ih 
+)64 
ih 
+)65VOlih 
ih 
Where: 
C_ 
Spreadih is the bid-ask spread for stock i at horizon h before the year end. 
Var'ý'h is the variance of analysts forecasts for stock i at horizon h before the year end. 
Var Retih is the expost variance of monthly returns for stock i, at horizon h before the year end. 
MktValih is the market value of firm i at horizon h before the year end. 
Volih is the trading volume of stock i at horizon h before the year end. 
Given the previous analysis we expect that 
84,85 
--< 0 and 82,, 83 >-O. The possible 
endogeneity of trading volume requires the Hausman (1978) test statistic to establish the 
choice of a consistent estimator. The inappropriate use of Instrumental Variables (IV) will 
result in severe loss of efficiency compared to the least squares estimator. The test statistic 
is based on the difference between the two estimators that are consistent under the null 
hypothesis but only one of them, the IV estimator is consistent under the alternative. The 
test statistic is given by: 
H=(bjv-bLs)" (4.8) 
Where X denotes the matrix of regressors where the 'enclogenous' variables have been 
instrumented, X the original matrix of regressors and s2 the variance estimate. This Wald 
statistic follows the chi-square distribution with K, the number of 
instrumented variables, 
degrees of freedom. Using as additional instruments current and 
lagged returns and lagged 
spread, following the methodology of Atkins and Dyl 
(1997), the resulting value of the 
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statistics was 2.34. We were therefore unable to reject the null hypothesis that both 
estimators were consistent, and given that the Least Squares Estimator (LS) is efficient we 
proceed to estimate the model by LS. The results of our model for horizons 2,4,6,8,10, 
and 12 are given in Table 4.2. For horizons 2,4 &6 all the variables are significant and 
have the correct a priori sign. 
TABLE 4.2. OLS Estimates of the Exposure Model of Bid-Ask Spread 
Spread ': - + #3Var Retih + fl4MktValih + AVolih +6ih ih '-A+ i62VarFih 
Horizon A 05 R2 N 
2 
0.52(0.08) 0.14(0.03) 0.18(0 
, 
07) -5.24(2.31) -0.62(0.23) 
6.5* 4.67* 2.57* -2.27* -2.70* 
0.153 203 
4 
0.51(0.08) 0.15(0.06) 0.17(0.03) -3.97(l. 91) -0.51(0.23) 0 185 203 6.34* 2.50* 5.85* -2.08* -2.22* . 
6 
0.53(0.08) 0.15(0.06) 0.19(0.03) -3.58(l. 71) 0.57(0.24) 0 190 203 6.63* 2.50* 6.33* -2.09* -2.38* . 
8 
0.46(0.08) 0.06(0.05) 0.17(0.07) -4.47(2.14) -0.71(0.34) 0.149 203 
5.75* 1.20 2.43* -2.09* -2.09* 
10 
1.89(0.37) 0.24(0.17) 0.39(0.08) -3.79(l. 72) -0.77(0.31) 0.147 203 
5.11* 1.41 4.78* -2.20* -2.48* 
12 
0.53(0.08) 0.05(0.03) 0.16(0.07) -3.78(l. 85) -0.76(0.34) 0.10 203 
6.63* 1.50 2.29* -2.04* -2.24* 
Notes: 
The standard errors are shown in brackets. 
The t statistics are shown in bold, * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
All the variables are expressed as natural logarithms. 
Diagnostic Results 
Horizon Heteroscedasticity Test Normality Test Functional Form Test 
2 1.02 33.43* 0.71 
4 1.02 54.91 * 1.27 
6 0.67 141.40* 1.28 
8 1.20 5.24 0.60 
10 1.72 15.8 1 0.65 
12 1.38 3.38 0.15 
Notes: 
All the diagnostic statistics that are reported are based on the F statistic. 
The normality test is based on the test proposed by Jacque and 
Bera (1987) * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of 
normality at the 5% level of significance. 
The heteroscedasticity test is based on the test proposed by White (1980). 
The functional form test is based on the Ramsey (1969) test. 
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Consistent with Atkins and Dyl (1997), the coefficient on market value, Afk-tl al, is 
negative, indicating that larger companies have a smaller spread, and the coefficient on ex 
post volatility, VarRet, is positive, indicating that market makers anticipate the relatiVe 
volatility's of stocks and use this information in setting their spreads. It is of interest that 
the elasticity with respect to MktVal is large, indicating that size variations are important 
even within the FTSE 100. 
In addition to the market value, the trading volume, Vol, is significant and negative L- 
indicating that a larger volume of trade is associated with a smaller spread. There is 
support for this in Glosten and Harris (1988). They also find that the spread reacts to 
volume as market makers adjust it to maintain their inventory targets. 
The variance of analysts' forecast VarF which is intended to capture the disagreement 
amongst traders about the future of the stock, is also significant and positive. This suggests 
that as disagreement rises, market makers increase the spread to protect themselves against 
any temporary information advantage which investors may have. This provides strong 
support for the hypothesis of the Kim and Verrecchia (1994) model of how market makers 
respond to disagreement. 
However, VarF is not significant for horizons of 6 months or more. Why is this? One 
possibility is that market makers do not believe that they will provide liquidity beyond this 
period. Another relates to a well known characteristic of analysts' forecasts identified by 
Brown and Rozeff (1978), Dimson and Marsh (1984) and Stickel (1989), that any superior 
information held by analysts relates to the short term (i. e. the next few months). ThIs 
means that for long horizons the market maker does not infer information from the 
disagreement amongst analysts. 
Table 4.2 also reports diagnostic statistics. There are no signs of heteroscedasticitN, or non I 
linearity, but there is evidence of non normality in the residuals (for horizons 2,4,6 & 10). 
Non normality in the residuals may mean that the distribution is "fat-tailed" or contains 
outliers. 
In the general linear model 
yj = Xjj8 + ui (4.9) 
when the errors are not normally distributed the least squares estimator b is no longer tý 
efficient or asymptotically efficient although it is still consistent. As the respective 
distribution of b and (T - K) 
&2 
are no longer normal and chi-square respectively, the 
(T 
usual F and t-tests on 8 are not necessarily valid in small samples, as they may suffer loss 
of power due to severe deviation from normality. This has led to the adoption of a class of 
estimators that are more robust than least squares in the sense that maintain their efficiency 
irrespectively of the underlying error distribution (Judge et al 1988 p836). In general these 
estimators obtain an estimate of 8 by solving the asymmetric least absolute deviations 
T 
min T-'j lp I yj - P"Xi (4.10) 
i=l 
where p denotes the pth conditional quantile of yj given Xi =x and 
1, (u)=[P-Iju-<O)]juj, for p=0.5 we obtain the function shown in equation (4.10). 
A solution to the above is called the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) or median 
regression estimate. It can be shown that 
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[b ( -5) -, B] --> N 
(0, t2f (O)l -2 Q_j 
where Q= T-'(X'X) and 12f (0)) -2 denotes the asymptotic variance of the sample 
median, this class of estimator will be more efficient than the least squares estimators in 
distributions where 'outliers' are prevalent. 
Given that the exact form is unknown we use the LAD regression to obtain robust results 
for horizons 2,4,6 and I O. These results are given in Table 4.3. 
TABLE 4.3. Robust (Least Absolute Deviation) Estimation of the Exposure Model of 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Spreadih =A+ 182VarFih + #3Var 
Retih + fl4MktValih + )65VOlih + 6ih 
Horizon 81 182 183 185 R2 
N 
2 
0.37(0.06) 0.14(0.02) 0.28(0.05) -1.41(0.68) -0.35(0.13) 0.183 203 
6.17* 7.00* 5.6* -2.27* -2.69* 
4 
0.47(0.06) 0.16(0.02) 0.26(0.05) -2.29(0.91) -0.65(0.23) 0.195 203 
7.83* 2.50* 5.20* -2.52* -2.83* 
6 0.45(0.06) 
0.16(0.02) 0.25(0.05) -2.60(0.94) -0.67(0.24) 0.206 203 
7.50* 8.00* 5.00* -2.77* -2.79* 
10 
1.29(0.27) 0.62(0.75) 0.20(0.08) -2.07(0.72) -0.69(0.28) 0.150 203 
4.81 * 0.83 2.50* -2.88* -2.46* 
Notes: 
The standard errors are shown in brackets. 
The t statistics are shown in bold, * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
All the variables are expressed as natural logarithms. 
By and large the results presented in Table 4.2 hold. There is a modest increase 
in the 
equations' explanatory power, but the size and standard errors of the estimated coefficients 
remain unaltered. One noticeable difference is that the coefficient on 
"MktVal" is 
considerably reduced. As no other form of mi s- specification has been 
detected in these 
results we can conclude that the results are robust to non-normality and that 
the model's 
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explanatory power although modest is not due to outliers or particular features of the 
sample. 
4.5 Discussions and Conclusions 
In this study we have estimated by robust methods a linear equation that explains the bid- 
ask spread in the UK equity market for a number of FT'SEIOO companies over a period of 
10-years (1990-1999). Its contribution lies in the establishment of the statistical 
significance of the variance of the analysts' forecasts in the presence of other exogenous 
variables that are regularly included in similar studies. We postulate the inclusion of this 
variable in order to act as a proxy for the unobserved uncertainty surrounding asset retums 
beyond the year-end period driven by the increased probability of deferring the disclosure 
of performance. We find that published disagreement amongst analysts affects the 
behaviour of market makers and they act to prevent trade from informed traders by 
increasing the spread. This result provides strong support for proposition I in Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994). To our knowledge this is the first study that such a result has been 
obtained. 
In our estimated model we have extended the model of Atkins and Dyl (1997) where they 
find that both the volatility of returns variable reflects the risk to which the market maker is 
exposed and market size are important by adding trading volume and the disagreement 
among analysts regarding earnings. The role of volatility in explaining the spread is a dual 
one: first, disagreement leaves market makers at a disadvantage with respect to 
informed 
traders (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994) and secondly, high dispersion stocks earn lower 
returns whilst the uncertainty is being resolved (Scherbina, 2001) this 
is because these 
stocks have to be held for longer time periods thus reducing their liquidity. 
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We find that both volatility of returns and disagreement amongst analysts are significant 
(with the hypothesised signs) in explaining FIFSE 100 company spreads. The volatility 
captures information uncertainty concerning the current period to the year end. Since 
company returns are affected by the market in general, it is also likely that volatility 
reflects economy wide aspects of uncertainty. However, our results show that the 
disagreement amongst analysts is also significant. What interpretation should be placed on 
this? First, it is worth noting that disagreement is more likely to be related to firm specific 
issues in contrast to the volatility measure which is likely to be driven by market wide 
factors. As a consequence, we suggest that disagreement by investors is potentially related 
to the probability of poor results beyond the information contained in the volatility of 
returns. Such performance is well known to cause delays in reporting the year end results 
and causes additional information asymmetry between market makers and investors. The 
market makers in turn increase their spread in order to protect themselves as modelled in 
Kim and Verrecchia (2001). 
Extensions of the work along similar lines is to incorporate higher order moments of the 
analysts' forecasts in the context of a model that attempts to explain both volume and 
spread simultaneously taking into account 'bad' (profit warnings) and 'good news'. 
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Ch 
Liguidity Effects due to Information Costs from Chan! 
in the FTSE 100 List 
5.1 Introduction 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) predicts that security prices reflect all publiclY 
available information. Therefore, one corollary of the EMH is that "you can sell (or buy) 
large blocks of stock at close to the market price as long as you can convince other 
investors that you have no private information". 57 This statement assumes that securities 
are near perfect substitutes for each other. If so, the excess demand for a single security 
will be very elastic, and the sale or purchase of a large number of shares will have no 
impact on price. Therefore the prediction of this hypothesis is that quoted prices are 
independent of whether the stock is listed in some index or not and simply traded in the 
exchange. 
It has been observed that listed stocks tend to be traded more heavily and more frequently 
than non-listed ones. In contrast to the EMH, Scholes (1972), Kraus and Stoll (1972), Hess 
and Frost (1982) and others suggest that a large stock sale (purchase) will cause the price 
to decrease (increase) even if no new information is associated with the transaction. They 
attribute this effect to portfolio re-balancing as investors mimic the composition of the 
'important' index. An alternative explanation of this empirical regularity, t at is consistent 
with the EMH is that listing in the index attracts increased attention thus reducing the 
information disparitY between 'informed' and 'uninformed' traders that results in lower 
transactions costs, see for example (Kim and Verrecchia (1994)). 
57 Brealey and Myers (1984, p279). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether the inclusion or deletion of firm from 
the FFSElOO (the most frequently traded index in the UK) has a significant effect on both 
price and traded volume of the stock. In addition we investigate whether the effects if any 
can be attribute to the reasons mentioned above. 
The chapter is organised as follows; the theoretical background to the debate is presented 
in section 5.2 along with some discussion of the empirical evidence pertinent to the USA. 
Section 5.3 provides details of the data and methodology used to examine the changes in t-- 
the FTSE 100 list whilst section 5.4 presents the statistical evidence. We discuss the 
explanations for the empirical results in section 5.5. Finally, the conclusions of the study 
are in section 5.6. 
To our knowledge this is the first study that examines stock price and volume effects 
associated with changes in the composition of the FTSE 100 
jiSt58. 
5.2 Theoretical Backaround 
The explanations for the observed price-volume relationship as the 'status 
59, of the stock 
changes are falling into two broad categories. 
The imperfect substitutes hypothesis (ISH), Shleifer (1986), assumes that securities are not 
close substitutes for each other, and hence, that long-term demand 
is less than perfectly 
elastic. Under this hypothesis, equilibrium prices change when 
demand curves shift to 
eliminate excess demand. Price reversals are not expected 
because the new price reflects a 
new equilibrium distribution of security holders. 
58 By changes we are referring to additions (deletions) to 
(from) the FTSE 100 list. 
59 By 'status' we imply inclusion (deletion) to (from) the index. 
117 
The price pressure hypothesis (PPH), Harris and Gurel (1986), assumes that investors ýý ho 
accommodate demand shifts must be compensated for the transaction costs and portfolio 
risks that they bear when they agree to immediately buy or sell securities which they 
otherwise would not trade. These passive suppliers of liquidity are attracted by immediate 
price drop (rises) associated with large sales (purchases). They are compensated for their 
liquidity service when prices rise (drop) to their full information levels. The PPH like the 
EMH assumes that long run demand is perfectly elastic at the full information price. It 
differs from the ISH in that it recognizes that immediate information about non- 
information motivated demand shifts may be costly, and hence that short term demand 
curves may be less then perfectly elastic. 
Empirically both Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) present evidence for a 
strong positive stock price reaction to the announcement of listing in the Standard and 
Poor's 500 (S&P 500) Stock Index. Both studies indicate that the price increase is not due 
to the release of new information but rather to the increased demand resulting 
from index 
funds and others adding the stock to their portfolio. 
60 Consistent, with this Pruitt and Wei 
(1989) show that institutional holdings increase when listing occurs. 
60 The S&P's selection mechanism of the composition of their 
list does not depend on forecast secunty 
returns. Since changes are based only on publicly available 
information and on well-known criteria, they 
should not reveal new information about future return 
distributions. 
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Although Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) study the same phenomenon over 
roughly the same time period, their findings differ. Harris and Gurel (1986) argue that the 
evidence supports the PPH, which requires that the price go back down, ývhile Shleifer 
(1986) finds support of the ISH, in which long run demand is not perfectly elastic, so that 
the price change is permanent. 
In any event, these studies are an important challenge to the EMH. Dhillon and Johnson 
(1991) use both stock and option data and argue that their results are inconsistent with the 
price pressure hypothesis, but are consistent with the imperfect substitutes. 
Although Harris and Gurel (1986), and Shleifer (1986) both point out that the listing 
criteria are such that listing per se must be informationless, one can still make an argument 
that listing conveys information to the market. Harris and Gurel (1986) note that the 
"increased volume makes the added stock more liquid and the expectations of this benefit 
can account for the ... price rise" (p. 825). Alternatively, 
firms in the S&P may receive 
"closer scrutiny ... 
by analysts and investors" (Shleifer, 1986; p. 588), thereby lowering 
bid-ask spreads. Further evidence of this is provided by Arbel and Strebel (1982), and 
Barry and Brown (1984), who find that changes in information availability can lead to 
price changes by changing the costs borne by investors to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
information about a stock. Also, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), show that investors 
require higher expected returns for higher bid-ask spreads, and vice versa. If stocks are not 
held indefinitely (Amihud and Mendelson (1986) report that the average holding period for 
NYSE stocks is two years), trading costs represent a cost stream to shareholders. 
Empirically, Beneish and Gardner (1995) examine the stock market effect of changes in 
the composition of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Unlike the 
S&P 500 
findings, they find that the price and the trading volume of newly listed DJIA 
firms are 
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unaffected. They attribute this result to a lack of index fund rebalancing, since index 
trading is limited because index funds mimic the S&P 500, not the DJIA. They discover. 
however that firms removed from the index experience significant price declines. They 
explain this finding with the use of the information cost/liquidity explanation, which states 
that investors demand a premium for higher trading costs and for holding securities that 
have relatively less available information. 
5.3 Data and Methodolou 
The data for the additions (deletions) to (from) the FIFSE 100 list from the time period of 
1984-2001, were obtained from Datastream. The full list of all the additions and deletions 
of the list can be seen in appendix E. 61 We also collect daily stock price data and trading 
volume data from the same source. Data are collected for a 121-trading-day period around 
the date of change. 62 Daily returns are calculated and are adjusted for cash and stock 
dividends and one stock split. The stock price reaction to changes in the FTSE 100 list is 
estimated using market-adjusted prediction errors (PEý, )9 
PEýt = ]ý-t - R., 
where: 
(5.1) 
, ý-t = continuously compounded rate of return on 
the common stock of firm i on day t, 
and 
R. 
t =continuously compounded rate 
of return on the FIFSE 100 Index on day t. 
61 There were 258 additions (deletions) to (from) the FTSE 100 
list during the time period of 1984-2001. 
62 Beneish and Gardner (1995) recommend a 121 trading day period around 
the date of change since it is long 
enough to capture any type of pre or post announcement 
drift that may occur. 
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Following the methodology used in Beneish and Gardner (1995), for each sample 
observation, calendar time is converted to event time be defining the date on %ý hich the 
London Stock Exchange announces the FTSE 100 list change as event day 063. Prediction 
errors are estimated over a 121-day period that extends from event days -60 to +60. The 
prediction errors, PEý,, are averaged across the N firms in the sample on each day t to 
form an average prediction error, APE, - An estimate of the variance of this series (an 
equally- weighted portfolio variance), S' APE is calculated over 80 trading days (-61, -21 
and +21, +61). The variance estimate is 
s2 
1 80 
_-) 
2 
APE= -I 
(APEt APE 
79 j 
(5.2) 
where APE is the mean average prediction error for the 80-trading-day estimation period. 
We cumulate the average prediction errors over intervals of k days from t through t+k to 
obtain cumulative average prediction errors, 
CAPE,, 
t+k, where, 
t+k 
CAPEt, 
t+k 
APET. 
T=t 
(5.3) 
The t-statistic used to test whether cumulative average prediction errors differ significantly 
from zero is based on the time-series variance of portfolio average prediction errors, 
s2 
APE, 
for the 80-day estimation period, which has 79 degrees of freedom, and incorporates any 
cross-sectional dependence in the daily prediction errors. The t-statistic is calculated as: 
63 The event date is the date on which the London Stock Exchange announces the change and 
the date at 
which the change occurs. The two dates are the same since when the London 
Stock Exchange announces the 
change, the change occurs on that same date. 
121 
CAPE, t+k 
ks2 
APE 
]2 
5.4 Results 
(5.4) 
The discussion of the empirical results is divided into two sections. Section 5.4.1 presents 
tests of stock price effects associated with announcement of changes in the FrSE 100 list. 
Section 5.4.2 presents tests of trading volume effects associated with announcement of 
changes in the FTSE 100 list. 
5.4.1 Stock Price Response to Announcement of FTSE 100 List Changes 
We assess the stock price reaction to announcement of FTSE 100 list changes using 
individual firm estimations. 64 The results are surnmarised in Table 5.1. 
64We also form equally- weighted portfolios of all changes occurring on a given 
day and asses average 
abnormal performance at the portfolio level. This test is conducted because the prediction errors of 
firms 
sharing the same event date in calendar time are likely to be correlated, and the t-statistics on average 
abnormal performance are likely to be biased away from zero (see 
Beneish (1991)). The portfolio estimations 
confirm the individual firm estimations. The results of the portfolio estimations can 
be seen in Table 5.1 A in 
appendix F. 
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TABLE 5.1. Stock Price Reaction to Announcement of Changes in the FTSE 100 
List, between the time period of 1984-2001. Cumulative Average Prediction Errors 
(CAPE) and t-statistics are reported 
anel A. Additions 
Days Relative to CAPE t-statistic Event 
Panel B. Deletions 
Days Relative to CAPE (%) t-statistic Event 
-60, -2 1.27 0.32 -60, -2 -3.43 -0.61 
-60, -41 1.47 0.39 -60,41 -2.49 -0.37 
-40, -21 -2.23 -0.67 -40, -21 -1.63 -0.94 
-20, -Il 1.93 0.45 -20,41 -2.55 -1.12 
-10 -0.73 -0.98 -10 -0.52 -0.46 
-9 0.54 0.32 -9 1.09 0.97 
-8 2.23 1.23 -8 0.81 0.93 
-7 0.169 0.47 -7 1.17 0.70 
-6 -1.40 -1.23 -6 0.92 0.89 
-5 1.03 0.22 -5 0.65 0.59 
-4 2.68 1.08 -4 -0.27 -1.12 
-3 2.55 1.01 -3 -1.50 1.02 
-2 3.41 2.24* -2 -1.05 -2.01* 
-1 2.85 1.99* -1 -1.74 -2.74* 
0 1.26 2.44* 0 -2.33 -3.39* 
1 2.39 2.77* 1 -0.95 -2.18* 
2 1.09 2.22* 2 -1.35 -2.44* 
3 -0.46 -0.80 3 -0.76 -1.23 
4 2.06 1.34 4 -1.32 -1.01 
5 1.31 0.50 5 -1.09 -1.36 
6 -0.92 -0.24 6 -0.09 -1.49 
7 0.59 0.53 7 1.35 1.36 
8 -0.74 -0.99 8 -0.71 -1.02 
9 -0.26 -1.23 9 -0.98 -1.22 
10 -1.89 -1.07 10 -0.31 -1.34 
+11, +20 -2.87 -1.23 +11, +20 -1.56 -0.64 
+21, +40 -3.78 -1.34 +21, +40 1.25 1.30 
+41, +60 -3.89 -1.58 +41, +60 -3.86 -1.42 
+2, +60 -4.06 -1.60 +2, +60 -4.37 -1.58 
CAPE(-I, +1) 6.5 2.52* CAPE(- 1, + 1) -5.02 -2.63* 
Notes: 
Day 0 is the day on which the changes in the FTSE 100 list are announced on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
Panel A indicates that stock returns of firms added to the FTSE 100 list are affected 
by the 
inclusion. The CAPE from day -1 to +1 of 6.5 is distinguishable 
from zero with a t- 
statistic of 2.52.65 Moreover, the behaviour of stock prices one to three months subsequent 
65 We use a standard three-day period to assess abnormal performance. 
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to the announcement suggests that the price increase for FrSE 100 list additions is 
permanent. This is due to the fact that the CAPE for days +2 to +60 of -4.06 percent is not 
significant with a t-statistic of -1.60. 
Panel B indicates that stock returns of firms deleted from the FrSE 100 list are affected by 
the deletion. The CAPE from day -1 to +1 of -5.02 is distinguishable from zero with a t- 
statistic of -2.63. Moreover, the behaviour of stock prices one to three months subsequent 
to the announcement suggests that the price decline for FTSE 100 list deletions is 
permanent. This is due to the fact that the CAPE for days +2 to +60 of -4.37 percent is not 
significant with a t-statistic of -1.58. 
From our results we report significant positive stock price reactions to the announcement 
of new listings on the FTSE 100 list. This agrees with the literature on the S&P 500 since 
Shleifer (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) report significant 
positive stock price reactions to the announcement of new listings on the S&P 500. 
We also report significant negative stock price reactions to the announcement of new 
deletions from the FTSE 100 list. This agrees with the literature on the DRA since Beneish 
and Gardner (1995) report significant negative stock price reactions to the announcement 
of deletions from the DJIA. A further interesting observation from Table 5.1 is the 
asymmetry in the results. There is clear evidence of additions having a greater impact on 
prices around the announcement period than the deletions. Possible explanations 
for the 
asymmetric results are explained further on in the chapter. 
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5.4.2 Trading Volume Response to Announcement of FIFSE 100 List Changes 
To determine the possible presence of liquidity effects we proceed with the analysis of the 
impact of listing/de-listing on trading volume. The analysis of the trading volume permits 
66 us to establish whether the liquidity explanation can be supported . 
To assess whether trading activity changes when a firm is added (deleted) to (from) the 
67 FTSE 100 list, trading volumes, adjusted for market volume, are analyzed in event time. 
Cross-sectional means are computed using the Harris and Gurel (1986) estimation 
technique, and are as follows: 
MVRt =IIi vlýt. N 
Where 
(5.5) 
VRit = 
V" 
. 
V- 
(5.6) 
V. 
I 
Vi 
Where Vi, and 1ý, are the trading volumes of security i and of the total FrSE 100 Index in 
event-time period t, respectively, Vi and Vý are the average trading volumes of the 
security and of the total FTSE 100 Index in the 8 weeks preceding the announcement 
week. The volume ratio, VJý-, is a standarized measure of period t trading volume in 
security i, adjusted for market variation. The volume ratio has an expected value that is 
66 Beneish and Gardner (1995) first provided empirical evidence concerning the liquidity explanation for 
changes in trading volume. 
67 We collect the trading volume data with the use of Datastrearn. When a stock experiences a split, we divide 
all subsequent volume data by the split factor. 
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equal to 1, if there is no change in volume in event-period t relative to the prior 8 weeks. 
Results of tests of trading volume effects are presented in Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2. Trading Volume Reaction to Announcement of Changes in the FTSE 
100 List, between the time period of 1984-2001 
Notes: 
Panel A. Additions Panel B. Deletions 
MVR STD t-statistic MVR STD t-statistic 
1.21 0.78 3.62* -1.14 0.88 -2.74* 
We calculate the trading volume effects for days I to 5 after the announcement of the change on the London Stock Exchange. 
MVR stands for the mean volume ratio. 
STD stands for the sample standard deviation of the volume ratios. 
The t-statistics are testing whether the mean of the volume ratios is different to I (two-tailed test). 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
Panel A indicates that trading volume increases when firms are added to the FTSE 100 list. 
This is because on average, trading volume on the first day on which trading is possible 
after the announcement is 1.21 times as large as the daily mean volume ovef the 8 weeks 
prior to the announcement. Tests of whether these mean volume ratios are equal to I reject 
equality since we obtain a t-statistic of 3.62. Therefore this leads us to conclude that when 
firms are added to the FTSE 100 list, trading volume increases. 
Panel B indicates that trading volume decreases when firms are deleted from the Ff SE 100 
list. This is because on average, trading volume on the first day on which trading is 
possible after the announcement is 1.14 times smaller then the daily mean volume over the 
8 weeks prior to the announcement. Tests of whether these mean volume ratiQs are equal 
to 
I reject equality since we obtain a t-statistic of -2.74. Therefore this 
leads us to conclude 
that when firms are deleted from the FIFSE 100 list, trading volume 
decreases. 
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At this point in this study we have found the following empirical results. First, when firms 
are added to the FIFSE 100 list, the stock price and the trading volume for these firms 
increase. Second, when firms are deleted from the FTSE 100 list, the stock price and the 
trading volume for these firms decrease. In addition the impact of inclusion on the stock 
price is more pronounced (in proportional terms) than that of deletion, no such asymmetry 
was observed for trading volumes. 
5.5 Explanations of the Results 
5.5.1 Price-pressure hypothesis and the imperfect substitutes hypothesis 
Previous literature on the S&P 500 found that stock prices increased (decreased) when 
firms were added (deleted) to (from) the S&P 500. They also found that when firms were 
added (deleted) to (from) the list, that trading volume for these firms increased (decreased). 
A number of reasons (discussed in the beginning of the chapter) have been offered as a 
possible explanation to these results. In this section we discuss these possible explanations 
with reference to their applicability to our empirical results. 
Harris and Gurel (1986) argue in favour of the price-pressure hypothesis. They say that 
when a firm is added (deleted) the stock price goes up (down) accordingly. Once this initial 
trading has taken place the price goes back down (up) if a firm is added (deleted). 
In our results we find no evidence to suggest that the listings (deletions) to (from) the 
FTSE 100 list follow a price-pressure hypothesis. The reason for this is that we find the 
price increase (decrease) for the added (deleted) firms to be permanent. If there was 
evidence of the price-pressure hypothesis, we would expect the price 
for the added 
(deleted) firms to go back down (up) after the change had taken place. 
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Shleifer (1986) finds evidence of the imperfect substitutes hypothesis. He argues that 
investor's hold on to stocks that are on the FTSE 100 list and when a firm is deleted from 
the list they sell the stock in that firm and buy stock in a firm that is on the list. They 
therefore treat stocks as imperfect substitutes for each other. In the imperfect substitutes 
hypothesis the long-run demand is not perfectly elastic, implying that the price change is 
permanent. In our results we find that the price change is permanent, which brings support 
to the imperfect substitutes hypothesis. However, the problem with the imperfect 
substitutes hypothesis is that it is assuming that the listing (delisting) per se must be 
informationless. However, we can make an argument that listing (delisting) conveys 
information to the market. The reason as to why we can portray such an argument comes 
from our results with respect to trading volume. 
Recall that we find that when a firm is added (deleted) that trading volume increases 
(decreases). According to Harris and Gurel (1986) the increased (decreased) volume makes 
the added (deleted) stock more (less) liquid and the expectations of this benefit (loss) can 
account for the price rise (fall). Alternatively, firms in the FTSE 100 list may receive more 
attention by analysts and investors' resulting in lower bid-ask spreads. This also applies for 
deleted firms, since deleted firms will receive less attention by analysts and investors' 
resulting in higher bid-ask spreads. 68 This analysis leads us to propose an information 
cost/liquidity explanation for our empirical results. 
68 This line of argument comes from Schleifer (1986). The only difference is that he mentions the 
S&P 500 
instead of the FIFSE 100 list. We would expect the impact of both lists to be very similar since 
both lists are 
traded very frequently. 
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5.5.2 An Information Cost/Liquidity Explanation 
If inclusion in (exclusion from) the FIFSE 100 list is followed by increased (decreased) 
scrutiny by analysts, investors and institutions, the firm's information environment is 
richer (poorer) and the stock will be traded more (less) widely and become more (less) 
liquid. In this section of the chapter we discuss various aspects of this possible explanation, 
namely whether there are changes in the information environments and the liquidity of the 
added (deleted) FTSE 100 firms. 
If changes in the FTSE 100 list are associated with changes in information environment, 
stock price of FTSE 100 list change firms adjust to reflect changes in future levels of 
available information. 
Given evidence that information availability is priced (Arbel and Strebel (1982), Barry 
and Brown (1984)), changes in information availability can lead to price changes by 
changing the costs borne by investors to collect, analyze, and disseminate information 
about a stock. Our tests are based on the number of analysts following the stock . 
69Table 
5.3 presents the results of our analysis. 
69 We are grateful to I/B/E/S for access to their data of analysts' forecasts. 
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TABLE 5.3. Information Availability Pre and Post FTSE 100 List Changes 
Panel A. Additions Panel B. Deletions 
Mean No of Analysts' following the 5.92 5.92 
stoc. k.... P. T. e C. hange 
... .......... ........... .... .... ... ... I .... ..... ...... .... ........ ........ . ....... .. Mean No of Analysts' following the 7.24 3.26 
stock Post Change 
-.................... .... ............. .............. .-.................................................................... ........... ................ ..................... ....................... -- .................... .................. -- ............................ I .......... - ................. ............................................ I ............. t-test of Mean Differences 16.99* 18.26* 
Notes: 
By Pre change we mean 8 weeks before the announcement of the additions (deletions). 
By Post change we mean 8 weeks after the announcement of the additions (deletions). 
We use an 8 week time span to make sure that we capture any Pre or Post announcement drift that may occur. 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
In Panel A, we compare the average number of analysts' that follow the stocks before and 
after the additions take place. We find a significant increase in the number of analysts' that 
follow the firms once they are added to the FTSE 100 list. In Panel B, We compare the 
average number of analysts' that follow the stocks before and after the deletions take place. 
We find a significant decrease in the number of analysts' that follow the firms once they 
are deleted from the FTSE 100 list. This means that when firms are added to the list, they 
operate in a richer information environment. 
Following Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who show that investors require higher 
expected returns for higher bid-ask spreads, we examine whether changes in the 
composition of the FTSE 100 list are associated with changes in bid-ask spreads. 
Assessing whether spreads change requires the estimation of effective spreads pre and post 
changes in the FrSE 100 list. We can calculate the 'effective spread' using two types of 
methodology. The first method that we can use is the Roll (1984) serial covariance spread 
estimator. However, this method provides us with a problem because FFSE 100 list firms 
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are large and we observe negative spread estimates that are impossible to interpret. For this 
reason we calculate effective spreads by using the second method. 
The second method uses intraday data to obtain quoted bid-ask spreads. We then calculate 
estimates of effective spreads with the use of intraday data that is available from 
Datastrearn. We are able to collect data on all quotations by FTSE specialists from 
Datastream. Using quotation data from a period of 50 trading days before and 50 tradinc, Z-- 
days after the FTSE 100 list change announcement period, we compare actual spreads 
computed as the difference between ask and bid prices. The results can be seen in Table 
5.4. 
TABLE 5.4. Effective Bid-Ask Spreads Pre and Post FTSE 100 List Changes 
Panel A. Additions Panel B. Deletions 
Bid-Ask Spread Pre Change 0.31% 0.34% 
................ I ........ ........... . ............................... .............................. .................... ............................. ............................................................................... ........................... Bid-Ask Spread Post Ch4pge 0.2% 0.45% 
. .......... ....................... ......... ........................................................... .............. .............................................. ..................................................................................................................... .................. . .. - -------- -- ---------- t-test of Mean Differences 2.02* 2.01 * 
Notes: 
The bid-ask spread computed is the Mean Percentage Effective Spread. Mean spread is the mean spread (ask price - bid 
price) on all quotations by FTSE specialists in that day. The periods before and after refer to a maximum of 50 trading days 
before (after) and excluding the three-day FTSE 100 list change announcement period. Mean Percentage spread is computed 
as (ask price - bid price) / (ask price + bid price) /2 in the same period. 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
In Panel A, we compare the average effective bid-ask spread before and after the additions 
take place. We find a significant decrease in the bid-ask spread after the additions have 
taken place. This was to be expected, in the light of the discussion above as, when 
firms 
are added to the FIFSE 100 list they operate in a richer information environment. 
This new 
status increases the trade of these stocks, which results in them becoming more 
liquid 
(Harris and Gurel (1986)). 
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In Panel B, we compare the average effective bid-ask spread before and after the deletions 
take place. We find a significant increase in the bid-ask spread after the deletions have 
taken place. This is logical since when firms are deleted from the FTSE 100 list investors 
operate in an environment where information is relatively scarce. 
5.5.3 Cross-Sectional Test 
Our analysis would not be complete without a simultaneous consideration of all competing 
explanations. We specify a cross-sectional model with the event window performance as 
the dependent variable to simultaneously evaluate the potential competing explanations. 
Regressors are proxies for change in bid-ask spread (liquidity), abnormal volume 
(imperfect substitutes) and change in quantity of publicly available information 
(information costs). The model, similar in spirit to that of Beneish and Gardner (1995) is 
specified as follows, 
CPEý = ao + +aASPREADi + a2ABVOL, + a3 
(MV,, 
5 / MVI) + E, (5.7) 
Where 
CPE = Cumulative prediction error on days -1 to +1 relative to the date of the 
announcement of the FTSE 100 list change, 
ASPREAD = Change in the mean percentage effective bid-ask spread 
in the 50 
trading days surrounding and excluding the announcement of the FrSE 100 list 
change, 
ABVOL = Abnormal volume as defined in equation (5.5) 
for the three-day period 
from days -1 to +1 relative to the day of 
FTSE 100 list change, and 
13 -1 
MV, I MV, 
-, = ratio of market value (price multiplied by the number of common 
shares) at the end of year t+5 verses market value at the end of year t-I: used as 
a proxy for future growth. 70 
TABLE 5.5. A Cross-Section Regression Test of Alternative Explanations for the 
Stock Price Reaction to Changes in the FTSE 100 List 
CPEý = ao + +aASPREAIý, + a2ABVOL, + a3 (MVt+5 1 Mv t-1) + 
VaTiable 
ao a, a2 a3 R 
Coefficient Estimates -0.04 -0.0066 0.731 0.0097 10.28% 
(t-statistics) (-1.28) (-2.48)* (2.09)* (2.34)* 
Notes: 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
Diagnostic Results 
Heteroscedasticity Test Normality Test Functional Form Test 
1.04 3.42 0.74 
Notes: 
All the diagnostic statistics that are reported are based on the F statistic. 
The heteroscedasticity test is based on the test proposed by White (1980). 
The normality test is based on the test proposed by Jacque and Bera (1987). 
The functional form test is based on the Ramsey (1969) test. 
The results of the cross-sectional regression test can be seen in Table 5.5 along with the 
appropriate diagnostic tests. We can see that all the explanatory variables in the regression 
are statistically significant, and that the equation is well specified. These results clarify our 
previous findings in this chapter. 
70 We collect the data for the ratio of market value with the use of Datastream. 
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The variable ABVOL is positive and significant since abnormal trading volume explains 
stock price reaction to changes in the FTSE 100 list. There is evidence of this from Table 
5.2. We find that trading volume increases when firms are added to the FIFSE 100 list and 
we also find that trading volume decreases when firms are deleted from the FrSE 100 list. 
This result provides empirical evidence of the imperfect substitutes hypothesis proposed by 
Schleifer (1986). 
The variable MV is positive and significant since the amount of publicly t+5 
1 MVt-I 
available information, effects stock price reaction to changes in the FIFSE 100 list. There is 
evidence of this in Table 5.3. We found that when a firm is added (deleted) to (from) the 
FTSE 100 list that the number of analysts' that follow that stock significantly increases 
(decreases). The increase (decrease) in the publicly available information on the stock 
causes a positive (negative) stock price reaction to the announcement of the change. The 
finding that stock prices increase (decrease) when the quantity of available information 
increases (decreases) is consistent with evidence in Arbel and Strebel (1982), Barry and 
Brown (1984), and Merton (1987) that investors demand higher returns for holding stocks 
with less available information. 
The ASPREAD variable is negative and significant. There is evidence of this in Table 5.4. 
We found that spreads decreased (increased) when firms were added (deleted) to (from) 
the FTSE 100 list. This result is consistent with evidence in Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) that investors require higher expected returns for higher trading costs. 
Overall, the results suggest the positive (negative) stock price reaction to listings 
(deletions) to (from) the FTSE 100 list is consistent with a decrease (increase) in trading 
costs. The shareholder wealth gain (loss) represents the present value of 
the expected 
change in bid-ask spreads. 
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Therefore, from our analysis we find that trading costs provide a plausible explanation for 
the stock price reaction to listings (deletions) to (from) the AI 
FTSE 100 list. This provides an 
explanation for our empirical results. It does not, however, provide an explanation for the 
asymmetric results that we find in our analysis. It does not account for why additions to the 
FTSE 100 list have a greater stock price reaction than the deletions from the FTSE 100 list. 
A possible source for the asymmetric results will be sought within the specification of 
equation (5.7). We re-estimate equation (5.7) for the additions and for the deletions 
separate y 71 . The results can be seen in Table 5.6. 
TABLE 5.6. A Cross-Section Regression Test of Alternative Explanations for the 
Stock Price Reaction to Additions and Deletions in the FTSE 100 List 
CPEý = ao + +aASPREAEý, + a2ABVOL,, + a3 (MV, +5 
/ MV, 
-I) 
+ Ci I 
Coefficient Additions Deletions t-test of Mean 
Differences 
a, -0.022 -0.0011 2.21 * 
a2 1.24 0.64 2.04* 
a3 0.095 0.0032 2.17* 
Notes: 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
We can see from Table 5.6 that all the coefficients in equation (5.7) are significantly larger 
for the additions then they are for the deletions. This is because the additions carry more 
publicly available information than the deletions. Deleted firms up to their 
date of de- 
listing were the focus of attention of 'experts'. When de-listed the information about them 
71 We re-estimate equation (5.7) using a three day event window. The reason 
for this is that from Table 5.1 
we can see that the stock price reaction to the additions and to the deletions 
is only significant for the three 
day event window around the announcement date. 
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did not depreciate immediately, only gradually they lost their attractiveness to 'analý, sts'. 
So de-listing does not imply an immediate loss of information about the firm, but it acts as 
a signal that the attention of 'experts' will shift from it, and that informed traders will 
emerge. For newly listed firms, the opposite occurs as a new investment in information is 
expected and as a consequence of this increased liquidity, the reaction of the market is 
more pronounced. This results in the additions having a significantly larger stock price 
reaction then the deletions. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we find a significant gain (loss) to shareholders of firms added (deleted) to 
(from) the FTSE 100 list. This is due to the fact that when firms are added (deleted) to 
(from) the index the stock prices rise (fall) significantly. Furthermore we find that added 
(deleted) firms experience an increase (decrease) in trading volume, and an increase 
(decline) in the 'quantity' of available information after the FTSE 100 list change, 
suggesting a decrease (increase) in future trading costs. This finding does not support 
either the imperfect substitutes hypothesis, that postulates that the listing (de-listing) per se 
is informationless, or the price pressure hypothesis as an explanation of our results. Finally 
we provide evidence of an asymmetric price reaction, since there is clear indication of 
larger stock price reaction to the additions than to deletions, over a three-day event 
window. 
The evidence in this chapter is consistent with an information cost/liquidity explanation for 
the empirical results. Inclusion (exclusion) in (from) the FIFSE 100 list increases 
(decreases) the likelihood that they will be widely followed. 
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One implication for future research is that it may be more costly for a firm to borrow or 
issue capital after deletion. Another implication is that researchers should consider chanues tý 
in trading and holding costs as competing explanations for price reactions associated with 
changes in index list. 
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Summary and Implications of Empirical Findings 
In our research we studied the impact of transactions costs on the UK stock market from 
four different points of view. In this section we will briefly discuss the results and the 
implications of our main findings. 
In the second chapter we postulated a linear functional relationship between transactions 
costs and the holding period of a common stock. We performed a series of econometric 
tests using annual data for all the FTSE All Share companies and established that the 
empirical evidence agrees with the theoretical predictions. Higher transactions costs were 
increasing the -holding period" (and vice versa) in the presence of other explanatory 
variables that were related to the characteristics of the stock. 
In the third chapter we examined the effects of transactions costs on equilibrium asset 
pricing models. In the first part of the chapter we estimated the model proposed by Fisher 
(1994), by GMM using monthly data for the FTSE All Share. In addition we proposed and 
evaluated a model that assigns an independent role to transactions costs in asset pricing. 
We follow the Campbell and Shiller (1988a) VAR-type methodology and using the same 
data as previously, we confirmed the independent influence of transactions costs on equity 
pricing in the UK stock market. The results from both models are directly comparable 
despite the differences in the functional form of the final equation and the estimation 
procedures. Our finding adds further 'ammunition' to the idea that asset pricing models 
should incorporate transactions costs, as transactions costs possess an 
independent 
stochastic process. 
i 'i 
In our fourth chapter we attempt to provide an explanation for the variability of 
transactions costs across securities. Our main hypothesis postulates that transactions costs 
are a function of information asymmetry. The information asymmetry is captured by the 
variance in analysts' forecasts, (Kim and Verrecchia (1994,2001)). We discovered that 
this approximation is a useful mechanism for explaining transactions costs variability 
across stocks. For a horizon up to six months we found the inter-stock transactions costs 
variability was positively related to the variance of analysts' forecasts. The aim of this 
chapter was to assess the impact of information asymmetry on transactions costs, and not 
to analyse the stochastic process of transactions costs, over time. 
In the fifth chapter we found that the reaction of stock prices and trading volume to 
changes in the status of the company as a participant in the FIFSE 100, can be explained by 
"liquidity effects", as proxied by transactions costs. 
In conclusion this thesis provides strong evidence of the hypothesis that transactions costs 
as proxied by the bid-ask spread are a fundamental issue in finance, both in asset pricing 
models and in influencing investor behaviour. 
Further work could include using an alternative proxy for transactions costs, such as price 
impacts, opportunity costs and brokerage fees. However, as we mentioned earlier the data 
availability for these proxies are very difficult to obtain. 
139 
References 
Affleck-Graves, S. P. Hegde and. R. E. Miller. 1994. Trading mechanisms and the 
components of the bid-ask spread. Journal of Finance. 49.1471-1488. 
Aiyagari. S. R. and M. Gertler. 1991. Asset returns with transactions costs and 
uninsured individual risk. Journal of Monetary Economics. 27.311-33 1. 
Akaike. H. 1973. Information theory and an extension of the maximum likelihood 
principle. In: Petrov, B. N. Csaki. F. (Eds. ), 2nd international Symposium on 
Information Theory. Akademiai Kiado. Budapest. pp. 267-28 1. 
Amihud. Y. and H. Mendelson. 1980. Dealership Market: Market Making with 
Inventory. Journal of Financial Economics. 8.31-53. 
Amihud. Y. and H. Mendelson. 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Joumal of 
Financial Economics. 17.223-249. 
Amihud. Y. and H. Mendelson. 1989. The effects of beta, bid-ask spreads, residual risk, 
and size on stock returns. Journal of Finance. 44.479-486. 
Arbel. A. and P. Strebel. 1982. The Neglected and Small Firm Effects. The Financial 
Review. 17.201-218. 
Arditti. F. D. 1967. Risk and the Required Return on Equity. The Journal of Finance. 
22.19-36. 
Atkins. A. B. and E. A. Dyl. 1990. Price reversals, bid-ask spreads, and market 
efficiency. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 25.535-547. 
140 
Atkins. A. B. and E. A. Dyl. 1997. Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common 
Stocks. Journal of Finance. LIL 1.309-325. 
Balestra. P. and. M. Nerlove. 1966. Pooling cross-section and time-series data in the 
estimation of a dynamic model; the demand for natural gas. Econometrica. 
34.585-612. 
Ball. R. and P. Brown. 1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income 
Numbers. Journal of Accounting Research. 159-178. 
Baltagi. B. H. 1995. Econometric analysis of Panel Data. Wiley. 
Banz. R. W. 198 1. The relationship between return and market value of common 
stocks. Journal of Financial Economics. 9.3-18. 
Barclay. M. I and C. W Smith 1988. Corporate payout policy: cash dividends verses 
open market repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics. 22.61-82. 
Barclay. M. J. and J. B. Warner. 1993. Stealth trading and volatility: Which trades 
move prices? Journal of Financial Economics. 34.281-306. 
Barry. C. B. and S. J. Brown. 1984. Differential Information and the Small Firm 
Effect. Journal of Financial Economics. 13.283-294. 
Beneish. M. D. 1991. Stock Prices and the Dissemination of Analysts' 
Recommendations. Journal of Business. 64.393-416. 
Beneish. M. D. and J. C. Gardner. 1995. Information Costs and Liquidity 
Effects from 
Changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis. 30.135-157. 
141 
Benston. G. J. and R. L. Hagerman. 1974. Determinants of the bid-ask spreads in the 
over-the counter market. Journal of Financial Economics. 1.353-364. 
Bhide. A. 1993. The hidden costs of stock market liquidity. Joumal of Financial 
Economics. 34.31-5 1. 
Biddle. G. and F. Lindahl. 1982. Stock Price Reactions to LIFO Adoptions: The 
Association Between Excess Returns and LIFO Tax Savings. Joumal of Accounting 
Research. Part 2.551-588 
Black. F. 1972. Capital market equilibrium with restricted borrowing. Journal of 
Business. 45.444-455. 
Black. F. and M. Scholes. 1973. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. 
Journal of Political Economy. 637-654. 
Blume. M. E. and M. A. Goldstein. 1992. Displayed and effective spreads by market. 
Unpublished working paper. University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia. PA. 
Blume. M. E. and R. Stambaugh. 1983. Biases in Computed Returns: An Application 
to the Size Effect. Journal of Financial Economics. 12.387-404. 
Bollerslev. T. and M. Wooldridge. 1992. Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inference in Dynamic Models with Time Varying Covariances. Econometric Reviews. 
11.143-172. 
Branch. B. and W. Freed. 1977. Bid-ask spreads on the AMEX and 
the big board. 
Journal of Finance. 32.159-164. 
142 
Brealey. R. and S. Mayers. 1984. Principles of Corporate Finance. Second Edition. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Breeden. D. T. 1978. An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic 
consumption and investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Economics. 7.265- 
296. 
Brockett. P. L. and J. R. Garven. 1998. A Reexamination of the Relationship between 
Preferences and Moment Orderings by Rational Risk Averse Investors. Getieva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory. Vol 23. No 2.127-137. 
Brooks. R. and. J. Masson. 1996. Performance of Stoll's spread component estimator: 
Evidence from simulations, time-series, and cross-sectional data. The Journal of 
Financial Research. 14.459-476. 
Brown. S. and M. Gibbons. 1985. A simple econometric approach for testing utility 
based asset pricing models. Journal of Finance. 359-381. 
Brown. B. C, C. Murray. and D. A. Chapman. 1999. Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund 
Manager? University of Texas Working Paper. 
Brown L. D. and M. S. Rozeff. 1978. The Superiority of Analyst Forecasts as 
Measure of Expectations: Evidence from Earnings, Journal of Finance, March 1- 16 
Campbell J. Y, A. Lo. and A. C. Mackinlay. 1997. The Econometrics of Financial 
Markets. Princeton University Press. 
Campbell. J. Y. and R. J. Shiller. 1987. Cointegration and test of present value models. 
Journal of Political Economy. 95.1062-1088. 
143 
Campbell. J. Y. and R. J. Shiller. 1988a. The dividend-price ratio and expectations of 
future dividends and discount factors. Review of Financial Studies. 1988.1.195-228. 
Chalmers J. R and Kadlec G. B. 1998. An empirical examination of the amortized 
spread. Journal offinancial Economics. 159-188. 
Chen. N. and R. Kan. 1989. Expected return and the bid-ask spread. Working paper. 
University of Chicago. 
Chikan. A. 1991. Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Chow. G. 1960. Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions. Econometrica. 28.591-605. 
Christie. W. and P. Schultz. 1994. Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid 
Odd-Eighth Quotes? Journal of Finance. 49.1813-1840. 
Constantinindes. G. 1986. Capital market equilibrium with transactions costs. Journal 
of Political Economy. 94.842-862. 
Copeland. T. E. and Weston. J. F. 1988. Financial Theory and Corporate Policy. Third 
Edition. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
Cox. J. C, J. E. Ingersoll. and. S. A. Ross. 1985. An intetemporal general equi i rium 
model of asset prices. Econometrica. 53.363-384. 
Daley. L. A, D. W. Senkow. and R. L. Vigeland. 1988. Analysts' Forecasts, Earnings 
.0 
Variability and Option Pricing: Empirical Evidence. The Accounting 
Review. Vol 
LXIII. No 4.563-585. 
144 
Davidson. R. and MacKinnon. J. G. 1993. estimation and inference in econometrics. 
Oxford. 
Deechow. P. 1990. Post earnings announcement drift and the bid-ask spread. 
Unpublished manuscript. Universirty of Rochester. 
Demsetz. H. 1968. The cost of transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 82.33-53. 
Dhillon. U. and H. Johnson. 199 1. Changes in the Standard and Poor's 500 List. 
Journal of Business. 64.75-85. 
Dickey. D. and. W. A. Fuller. 1979. Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive 
Time Series with a Unit Root. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 74.427- 
431. 
Dickey. D. and. W. A. Fuller. 1981. Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time 
Series with a Unit Root. Econometrica. 49.1057-1072. 
Dimson E. and P. Marsh 1984. An Analysis of Brokers' and analysts' Unpublished 
Forecasts of UK Stock Returns, Joumal of Finance, Vol XXXIX. No 5.1257-1292. 
Driscoll. J. A. and. A. C. Kraay. 1998. Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation With 
Spatially Dependent Panel Data. The Review of Economics and Statistics. November. 
549-560. 
Durbin J. and. G. S. Watson. 1950. Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares 
Regression 1. Biometrika. 37.409-428. 
Durbin J. and. G. S. Watson. 195 1. Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares 
Regression 11. Biometrika. 38.159-178. 
145 
Eikebroom. A. 1993. The Dynamics of the Bid-Ask Spread. Working Paper. Sloan 
School of Management. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge. MA. 
Elsewarapu. V. and M. R. Reinganum. 1993. The seasonal behavior of the liquidity 
premium in asset pricing. Journal of Financial Economics. 34.373-386. 
Enders. W. 1995. Applied Econometric Time Series. John Wiley and Sons: New York. 
Enders. W. 1996. Rats Handbook For Econometric Time Series. John Wiley and Sons: 
New York. 
Engle. R. F. 1982. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity with Estimates of 
the Variance of U. K. Inflation. Econometrica. 50.987-1008. 
Epps. T. W. 1976. The demand for brokerage services: The relation between security 
trading volume and transactions costs. Bell Journal of Economics. 7.163-195. 
Fisher. S. J. 1994. Asset Trading, Transactions Costs and the Equity Premium. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics. 9. S7 1 -S94. 
Foley. D. K. 1970. Economic Equilibrium with Costly Marketing. Joumal of Economic 
Theory. 2.276-291. 
Fortin. R. D, R. C. Grube. and. 0. M. Joy. 1989. Seasonality in Nasdaq dealer spreads. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 24.395-407. 
Garbade. K. 1982. Securities markets. (McGraw-Hill, New York). 
Garman. M. 1976. Market Microstructure. Journal of Financial economics. 3.257-275. 
146 
George. T. J, G. Kaul. and. A Nimalendran. 1991. Estimation of the bid-ask spreads 
and its components: a new approach. The Review of Financial Studies. 4.623-656. 
Glosten. L. 1987. Components of the Bid-Ask Spread and the Statistical Properties of 
Transaction Prices. Journal of Finance. 42.1293-1307. 
Glosten. L. and. L. Harris. 1988. Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread. 
Journal of Financial Economics. 21.123-142. 
Glosten. L. and P. Milgrom. 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market 
with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics. 14.7 1- 100. 
Godfrey. L. G. 1978a. Testing Against General Autoregressive and Moving Average 
Error Models when the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent Variables. 
Econometrica. 46.1293-1301. 
Godfrey. L. G. 1978b. Testing for Higher Order Serial Correlation in Regression 
Equations when the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent Variables. Econometrica. 
46.1303-1310. 
Goldstein. M. 1993. Bid-Ask Spreads on US Equity Markets. Unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation. Wharton School. University of Pennsylvania. 
Granger. C. W. J. 1969. Investigating casual relations in econometric models and 
cross-spectral models. Econometrica. 37.424-438. 
Green. C. J, P. Maggioni. and V. Murinde. 2000. Regulatory lessons in emerging stock 
markets from a century of evidence on transactions costs and share price volatility 
in 
the London Stock exchange. Journal of Banking and Finance. 24.577-60 1. 
147 
Greene. W. H. 1999. Econometrics Analysis. Fourth edition. Prentice Hall International 
Editions. 
Grundfest. J. A. and. J. B. Shoven. 1991. Adverse implications of a securities 
transactions excise tax. Joumal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance. 6.409-442. 
Hamilton. J. D. 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press. 
Hamilton. J. L. 1976. Competition, scale economies, and transaction cost in the stock 
market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 9.779-802. 
Hansch. 0. N, Y. Naik, and. S. Viswanathan. 1998. Do inventories matter in dealership 
markets? Evidence from the London Stock Exchange. Journal of Finance. 53.1623- 
1656. 
Hansch. 0. N, Y. Naik, and. S. Viswanathan. 1999. Preferencing internalization best 
excution and dealer profits. Journal of Finance. 54.1799-1828. 
Hansen. L. 1982. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments 
estimators. Econometrica. 50.1029-1054. 
Hansen. L. and K. Singleton. 1982. Generalized instrumental variable estimation of 
0 non-linear rational expectations models. Econometrica. 50.1269-1286. 
Harris. L. and E. Gurel. 1986. Price and Volume Effects Associated with 
Changes in the 
S&P 500 List: New Evidence for the Existence of Price Pressures. Journal of Finance. 
41.815-829. 
148 
Harris. M. and A. Raviv. 1993. Differences in Opinion Make a Horse Race. Review of 
Financial Studies. 6.473-506. 
Hasbrouck. J. 1988. Trades, quotes, inventories, and information. Journal of Financial 
L, - 
Economics. 2.2.229-252. 
Hausmann. J. A. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica. 46.1251- 
1271. 
Hausmann. J. A. 1983. Specification and Estimation of Simultaneous Equations 
Models. Handbook of Econometrics. Amsterdam: North Holland. 1983. 
Hausmann. J. A. and. W. E. Taylor 198 1. Panel data and unobservable individual 
effects. Econometrica. 49.1377-1398. 
Hess. A. C. and P. A. Frost. 1982. Tests for Price Effects of New Issues of Seasoned 
Securities. Journal of Finance. 36.11-25. 
Ho. T. and H. Stoll. 198 1. Optimal dealer pricing under transaction cost and return 
uncertainty. Journal of Financial Economics. 9.47-73. 
Hong. H, L. Terence. and. J. C. Stein. 2000. Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst 
Coverage and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies. Joumal of Finance. 55.265- 
295. 
Hu. S. 1998. The effects of the stock transaction tax on the stock market- Experiences 
from Asian Markets. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 6.347-364. 
149 
Huang. R. and H. Stoll. 1996. Dealer versus Auction Markets: A Paired Comparison of 
Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE. Journal of Financial Economics. 41.313- 
357. 
Hwang. S, J, L. Knight. and. S. E. Satchell. 1999. Forecasting volatility using LINEX 
loss functions. University of Western Ontario. Working Paper. 
Hylleberg. S. R, E. C. Granger. and. B. Yoo. 1990. Seasonal Integration and 
Cointegration. Journal of Econometrics. 44.215-238. 
Jarque. C. M. and A. K. Bera. 1980. Efficient tests for normality, heteroskedasticity and 
serial independence of regression residuals. 
77- 
Economics Letters. 6.255-259. 
Jarque. C. M. and A. K. Bera. 1987. A Test for Normality of Observations and 
Regression Residuals. Intemational Statistical Review 55,1987, pp. 163-172. 
Jagannathan. R. and Z. Wang. 1996. The Conditional CAPM and the cross-section of 
expected returns. Journal of Finance. 51.3-53. 
Jarrell. G. A. 1984. Changes at the exchange: The causes and the effects of 
deregulation. Journal of Law & Economics. 27.273-312. 
Johnston. J. and J. Dinardo. 1997. Econometric Methods. Fourth Edition. WGRAW-Hill 
International Editions. 
Judge. G. G, Carter Hill, W. E. Griffiths, H. Lutkepohl, and T. C. Lee. 1988. Introduction 
to the theory and practice of econometrics. 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ). 
150 
Kandel. E. and. N. D. Pearson. 1995. Differential Interpretation of Price Signals and 
Trade in Speculative Markets. Journal of Political Economy. 103.831-872. 
Karpoff. J. M 1986. A theory of trading volume. Journal of Finance. 41.1069-1087. 
Karpoff. J. M 1987. The Relation Between Price Change and Trading Volume: A 
Survey. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 22.109-126. 
Keim. D. B. 1983. Size-Related Anomalies and Stock Return Seasonality: Further 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics. 13-32. 
Keim. D. B. 1989. Trading patterns, bid-ask spreads, and estimated security returns: 
The case of common stocks at calendar turning points. Journal of Financial 
Economics. 25.75-98. 
Keim. D. B. and A. Madhaven. 1996. The Upstairs Market for Large-Block 
Transactions: Analysis and Measurement of Price Effects. Review of Financial Studies. 
9.1-36. 
Keim. D. B. and A. Madhaven. 1998. The costs of institutional equity trades. Financial 
Analysts Journal. July-August. 50-70. 
Kim. S. and. J. P. Ogden. 1996. Determinants of the components of bid-ask spreads on 
stocks. European Financial Management. 1.127-145. 
Kim 0. and R. E. Verrecchia 1991. Market Reactions to Anticipated Announcements. 
Journal of Financial Economics. 30.273-3 10. 
Kim 0. and R. E. Verrecchia 1994. Liquidity and volume around earnings 
announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 17 
No 1/2, January, 41-67. 
151 
Kim 0. and RE Verrecchia 2001. The relation among disclosure, returns and trading 
volume information. Accounting Review, October 2001,633-654. 
Kmenta. J. 197 1. Elements of econometrics (Macmillan, New York). 
Kraus. A. and H. R. Stoll. 1972. Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Journal of Finance. 27-569-588. 
Kyle. A. S. 1985. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica. 53.1315- 
1336. 
Labadie. P. 1989. Stochastic inflation and the equity premium. Journal of Monetary 
Economics. 24.277-298. 
Lee. C. M. C, B. Mucklow and M. J. Ready 1991. Spreads, depths, and the impact of 
earnings information: An intraday analysis. Manuscript (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
and the University of Wisconsin. Madision. WI). 
Lee. C. 1993. Market integration and price execution for NYSE-listed securities. 
Journal of Finance. 48.1009-1038. 
Lee. R. 1998. Market making on the UK stock exchange. D. Phil. Thesis. Oxford 
University. 
Lee. C, B. Mucklow. and. M. Ready. 1993. Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings 
information: an intra day analysis. Review of Financial Studies. 6.345-374. 
Leroy. S. 1973. Risk Aversion and the Martingale Property of Stock Returns. 
International Economic Review. 14.436-446. 
15-) 
Lintner. J. 1965. The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky investments in 
stock portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics. 47.13-37. 
Loeb. T. F. 1983. Trading Cost: The Critical Link between Investment Information 
and Results. Financial Analysts Journal. 48.1009-1038. 
Lucas. R. E. 1978. Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica. 46.1429-1445. 
Lund. J. and. T. Engsted. 1996. GMM and present value tests of the C-CAPM: evidence 
from the Danish, German, Swedish and UK stock markets. Journal of International 
Money and Finance. 15.497-52 1. 
Madhaven. A. and M. Cheng. 1997. In Search of Liquidity: Block Trades in the 
Upstairs and Downstairs Markets. Review of Financial Studies. 10.175-204. 
Malinvaud. E. 1970. Statistical methods of econometrics (Elsevier, New York). 
Marsh. T. and K. Rock. 1986. Exchange listing and liquidity: A comparison of the 
American stock exchange with the Nasdaq national market system. American stock 
exchange transactions data research project no. 2. January. 
Mehra. R. and E. Prescott. 1985. The equity premium: a puzzle. Journal of Monetary 
Economics. 15.145-162. 
Menjah. K. and. K. Paudyal. 2000. The components of bid-ask spreads on the London 
Stock Exchange. Journal of Banking and Finance. 24.1767-1785. 
153 
Merton. R. C. 1973. An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econometrica. 4 1. 
867-887. Portfolio frontier. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 7.1851- 
1872. 
Merton. R. C. 1987. A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete 
Information. Journal of Finance. 42.483-5 10. 
Minford. B. and D. Peel. 2002. Advanced Macroeconomics: A Primer. Edward Elgar. 
Mossin. J. 1966. Equilibrium in a capital asset market. Econometrica. 34.261-276. 
Mundlak. Y. 1978. On the pooling of time series and cross-section data. Econometrica. 
46.69-85. 
Newey. W. and K. West. 1987. Hypothesis Testing with Efficient Method of Moments 
Estimation. International Economic Review. 28.777-787. 
Nueberger. A. J. 1992. An empirical examination of market maker profits on the 
London Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial Services Research. 6.343-372. 
Odean. T. 1998a. Volume, Volatility, price and Profit When all Trades Are Above 
Average. Journal of Finance. 53.1887-1934. 
Pagan . A. and Y. Jung. 
1993. Understanding some failures of instrumental variables 
estimators. Unpublished manuscript. University of Rochester and The Australian National 
University. 
Patel S. A. 1991. Intra-day bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements and 
information asymmetry. Ph. D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia. 
PA). 
154 
Patell. J. and M. Wolfson. 1979. Anticipated Information Releases Reflected in Call 
Option Prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 117-140. 
Patell. J. and M. Wolfson. 198 1. The Ex Post Price Effects of Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements Reflected in Options and Stock Prices. Journal of Accounting 
Research. 434-458. 
Petersen. M. and. D. Fialkowski. 1994. Posted verses effective spreads: good prices or 
bad quotes. Journal of Financial Economics. 35.269-292. 
Phillips. P. and P. Peron. 1988. Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression. 
Biometrica. 75.335-346. 
Phillips. S. and C. Smith. 1980. Trading Costs for Listed Options: The Implications for 
Market Efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics. 8.179-20 1. 
Pratt. J. W. 1964. Risk Aversion in the Small and Large. Econometrica. 122-136. 
Pruitt. S. and Wei. K. 1989. Institutional ownership and changes in the S&P 500. 
Journal of Finance. 44.509-513. 
Ramanathan. R. 1992. Introductory Econometrics. 2nd ed. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). 
Ramsey. J. B. 1969. Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least Squares 
Regression Analysis. Joumal of the Royal Statistical Society. 
Series B . 31.350-371. 
Reiss. P. and. 1. M. Wamer. 1998. Does risk-sharing motivate inter-dealing trading? 
Joumal of Finance. 53.1657-1703. 
155 
Rietz. T. 1988. The equity risk premium: A solution. Journal of Monetary Economics. 
117-132. 
Ringwald. A. and F. Schrempp. 1999. QCDINS Computer Package. 
Roll. R. 1984. A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an 
Efficient Market. Journal of Finance. 39.1127-1140. 
Ross. S. 1976. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic 
Theory. 13.341-360. 
Scherbina A. 2001, Stock prices and differences of opinion: empirical evidence that 
prices reflect optimism. Kellogg Graduate School of Management Working Paper, April. 
Schipper. K. and R. Thompson. 1983. The Impact of Merger-Related Regulations on 
the Shareholders of Acquiring Firms. Journal of Accounting Research. 434-458. 
Scholes. M. S. 1972. The Market for Securities: Substitution verses Price Pressure and 
the Effect of Information on Share Prices. Journal of Business. 45.179-211. 
Schwert. G. William. and. P. J. Seguin. 1993. Securities transaction taxes: An overview 
of costs, benefits, and unresolved questions. Financial Analysts Journal. 49.27-35. 
Sharpe. W. F. 1964. Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under 
conditions of risk. Journal of Finance. 19.425-442. 
Shleifer. A. 1986. Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down? Joumal of Finance. 41. 
579-590. 
Sims. C. A. 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica. 48.1-48. 
156 
Snell. A. and. 1. Tonks. 1995. Determinants of price quote revisions on the London 
Stock Exchange. The Economic Journal. 105.77-94. 
Snell. A. and. 1. Tonks. 1998. Testing for asymmetric information and inventory 
control effects in market maker behaviour on the London Stock Exchange. Joumal of 
Empirical Finance. 5.1-25. 
Spencer. D. and. K. Berk. 1981. A Limited Information Specification Test. 
Econometrica. 49.1079-1085. 
Staiger. D. and J. H. Stock. 1993. Instrumental variables regression with weak 
instruments. Mimeo. Harvard University. 
Stickel. S. E. 1989. The Timing of and Incentives for Annual Earnings Forecasts Near 
Interim Earnings Announcements. Joumal of Accounting and Economics. 11.275-292. 
Stickel. S. E. and R. E. Verrecchia. 1993. Evidence that Volume Sustains Price 
Changes. Working paper. The Wharton School. 
Stiglitz. J. E. 1989. Using tax policy to curb speculative short-term trading. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 12.57-80. 
Stoll. H. R. 1978. The pricing of security dealer services: An empirical study of 
Nasdaq stocks. Journal of Finance. 33.1153-1172. 
Stoll. H. 1985. Alternative views of market making, in Y. Amihud. T. Ho and R. 
Schartz. Eds.. Market making and the changing structure of the securities industry. 
(Lexington Heath, Lexington. MA). 67-92. 
157 
Stoll. H. 1989. Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and 
Empirical Tests. Journal of Finance. 44.115-134. 
Stoll. H. R. and R. Whaley. 1983. Transactions costs and the small firm effect. Jounial 
of Financial Economics. 12.57-80. 
Summers. L. H. and V. P. Summers. 1989. When financial markets work too well: A 
cautious case for a securities transactions tax. Journal of Financial Services Research. 
3.261-286. 
G. Tauchen. 1986. Statistical properties of generalized methods of moments estimators 
of structural parameters obtained from financial market data. Journal of Business and 
Ll - Economics Statistics. 4.397-425. 
Tiao. G. C. Box. G. E. P. 198 1. Modelling multiple time series with applications. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association. 76.802-816. 
Tinic. S. M. 1972. The economics of liquidity services. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
86.70-93. 
RL Thomas. 1997. Modern econometrics an introduction. Addison-Wesley. 
Umlauf. S. R. 1993. Transactions taxes and stock market behaviour: The Swedish 
experience. Journal of Financial Economics. 33.227-240. 
Venkatesh. P. C. and R. Chiang. 1986. Information asymmetry and the dealer's bid-ask 
spread: A case study of earnings and dividends announcements. Journal of Finance. 
41.1089-1102. 
158 
Verrecchia. R. E. 1981. On the Relationship Between Volume Reaction and Concensus 
of Investors: Implications For Interpreting Tests of Information Content. Joumal of 
Accounting Research. 19.271-283. 
Wang. J. 1994. A Model of Competitive Stock Trading Volume. Journal of Political 
Economy. 102.127-168. 
Weil. P. 1989. The equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle. Joumal of 
Monetary Economics. 401-421. 
White H. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test of heteroskedasticity, Econometrica, 48,817-838. 
White. H. 1982. Instrumental Variables Regression with Independent Observations. 
Ll - 
Econometrica. 50.2.483-500. 
Whittred G. and 1. Zimmer 1984, Timeliness of Financial Reporting and Financial 
Distress. The Accounting Review. April, 287-295. 
Wilcox. J. W. 1993. Transactions Taxes and Delay on Performance Drag. Financial 
Analysts Journal. March/April. 45-53. 
159 
Fi2ure 
0 Graphical Relationship between the Optimal Holding Period and 
Transactions Costs 
AO=5%, K=0.5 
1.5 
li 4) 0.5 
0. 
Transactions Costs (%) 
AO=2.5%, K=0.5 
CL 
01234 
Transactions Costs (%) 
AO=10%, K=O. 5 
0.8 
U. b 
.2 0.4 - Z 
E 0.2 - 
rZ 0 CL 
003 
Transactions Costs 
I 
160 
AO=5%, K=l 
0 "0 1.9 
.2 " 1.8 
E CL 1.7 -- 
. $a CL 
0012 
Transactions Costs 
AO=5%, K=0.25 
75 -0 3 *-'w r0 2 
,E 
0- 1- 
p0-! II 0. 
001234 
Transactions Costs 
161 
Appendix A 
The Importance of Skewness in the Risk Premium 
The principle of expected utility maximization enables the specification of certain types of 
investor risks. Let the investors' wealth be denoted by W and his income by the random 
variable X. We assume that the investors' utility function, U, is made up of the sum of his 
wealth and income. Therefore, the investors' utility function is 
U =U (x +W) (A. 1) 
Define a new variable r=XIW, where r is the rate of return on an investment W. If this is 
the case then (A. 1) may be written as 
U =U(rW+W) 
I 
Expanding U in a Taylor series about w+E (rW), where E 
(rW) represents the expected 
value of income, taking the expectation of both sides, and assuming that 
W and E (rW) are 
constant gives 
w2 
(A. 2) E(U) =U 
[W + E(rW)]+-U"(W+WPI)P2 2! 
w3 
+ terms involving higher order moments -U (W + WI-11) P3 
3! 
WhereflP92 , and, 43 
denote the first, second, and third moments of r 's probability 
distribution. Equation (A. 2) states that the expected utility is a 
function of those risks 
16 2 
associated with the higher moments of a probability distribution. Note that attention has been 
concentrated on the second and third moments of r's distribution. This has been done due to 
the fact that, the higher moments of r add little, if any, information about the distribution's 
72 
physical features . 
The above relationship has been derived without making any assumptions about the investors' 
attitude to risk. This must now be done to arrive at a testable hypothesis concerning the 
variability and skewness of returns as risk measures and the relation of such measures to the 
expected return. Assume that the typical investor is risk averse. Economic theory describes the 
risk averter as the one whose marginal utility decreases with increasing wealth. That is, 
U"-< 0 (A. 3) 
Condition (A. 3) states that the coefficient ofY2 must be negative. The economic implication 
of this negative sign is direct - the greater the variability of return on an investment, the lower 
the expected utility of the investment. Consequently for the investment to retain its appeal 
under an increase in the variability of returns and no change in the other moments, its expected 
return must increase. 
One implication of the diminishing marginal utility assumption is that the cash equivalent of 
the expected utility is less than the expected utility of the venture. This proposition is true of 
any concave utility function. The amount by which the expected value exceeds the cash 
equivalent of the expected utility is called the risk premium. It can be thought of as the amount 
the investor must be given in order for him to risk a sum equal to his cash equivalent. 
72 For evidence of this see Arditti (1967) page 20. 
163 
According to Pratt (1964), it is possible to define the risk premium mathematically. Let U2 be 
the variance of income and 7r a measure of the local risk premium. Then 
a, u W) 
2 U'(W) (A. 4) 
It can be argued that the investor attaches a smaller risk premium to any given risk the greater 
his wealth. For example, consider the situation where two individuals, one poor and the other 
extremely wealthy, each find themselves in possession of a ticket which entitles the holder to 
partake in the following gamble: 
" If on one toss of a coin a head appears the ticket holder receives F-20,000. On the other hand, 
if a tail appears, the holder must pay F-10,000 ". Who would demand a higher price for the sale 
of the ticket? 
It seems reasonable to assume that the wealthy man would since a loss of F-10,000 to him 
would be trivial while a similar loss to the poor man would render him assetless. But the price 
the seller is willing to accept is the cash equivalent of his expected utility, and the difference 
between the cash equivalent and the expected value of the ticket is by definition the risk 
premium. Since the asking price of the wealthy man is higher than the poor man and each 
ticket has the same expected value, the wealthy individual's risk premium 
is less than that of 
the poor man's. Therefore one can infer that the risk premium decreases with wealth. 
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Mathematically the risk premium can be stated as, 
U" (W) or2 -U' (W) U-(W) +[Uý(W)]2 
dw 
-2 
U'(W) 
_-2 
-e- [U, (W)12 -< 0 (A. 5) 
73 Since U'(W) >- 0, for the above inequality to hold . 
Making use of this result, U'(W) ý- 0, and equation (A. 2), it must be stated that the coefficient 
of the third moment P3 must be positive. This analysis suggests that skewness may be an 
important factor in determining the risk premium of an investor. This could imply that the 
skewness could be an important determinant of the holding period of an investor, since it may 
capture any non-linearity in the specification. 74 
73 For proof of this result see Pratt (1964). 
74 We cannot say that investors prefer positively skewed stocks. This is 
because for this to be the case there must 
be ceteris paribus analysis of preferences and moments. Brockett and 
Garven (1998) found that this was 
impossible since equality of higher order central moments implies the total equality of the 
distributions involved. 
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0 Appendix B 
The Derivation of the Utility Adiusted Return 
Consider the return to holding an asset over the time period t to t+1, say a share. We have 
R, j - +1 
+ D, +, 
pt (A. 6) 
where D,,, is any dividend or payment in the period and P,, P,,, is the price of the asset at 
time t andt+l. 
We assume for simplicity that investors are risk neutral so that via arbitrage expected returns 
are equal to those on a riskless asset with a real interest rate, R, assumed constant, so that 
ERý1 = 
Since P, is part of the current information set, the expectation of (A. 6) when rearranged is 
given by 
I-EP+-IE, Dj pt (I + R-) ' t+l (I + R-) 
(A. 7) 
Assuming rational expectations and solving this model forwards N periods we obtain 
N D, 
+i 
EP, 
+N P, = E, I- .+N 
i=i (I + R-)l (I + R-) 
(A. 8) 
In the absence of speculative bubbles we assume that the last term goes to zero as we let N go 
to infinity. In this case the current asset price is equal to the expected value of the stream of 
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dividends into the indefinite future. This term is the fundamental of the process which we can 
call F, 
Under these assumptions we have that: 
(K 
(I+ R-)' 
We can write (A. 9) in the equivalent form 
(A. 9) 
D,, i + 
ED, 
+, 
ED, 
+2 (A. 10) 
j=l , (I + R)' 1+R 1+R (1+R) 
2 (1 + R- 
)2 (, 
+ R 
)3 (, 
+ R 
)3 
Rearranging (A. 10) we have that 
AD D ED ED t+i +t+t t+l +t t+2 P =Et 23 (A. 11) 
i=i (I+ R)' I+R (1+R) (I + R) 
So by using (A. 9) we can rewrite (A. 11) as 
AD Dp 
P, = E, t+i + t- + t- 
(A. 12) 
i=i (I+ R)' I+R I+R 
Multiplying through by I+R and re-arranging we obtain the alternative form 
ADj 
(I+R) 
167 
Equation (A. 8) shows that the current price of the stock is equal to the dividend divided by R 
plus a term in the discounted stream of expected future changes in dividends. In this form the 
model is amenable to empirical testing in the form of cointegration analysis. If dividends are a 
non stationary process but the changes in dividends are stationary then the stock price is 
cointegrated with coefficient I R 
An insightful special case of the above model arises when dividends are expected to grow at a 
constant rate 
For this case 
E, D, 
+i = 
(I + g) ED, +i-l = 
(I + g)'D, (A. 14) 
Substituting (A. 14) in (A. 9) we obtain 
_(I+g)D, 
(I+g) 2 D, 
+ 
(I + g)'D, 
+ 
(I + g)4 D, 
(A. 15) pt (1 +R+ R)2 R)3 R 
)4 
We can rewrite (A. 15) as 
pt - 
(I + g) D, 
_ + 
(I + g) 
+- 
(I+g)2 (, +g)3 
+... (A. 16) 
(1 + R) (I +R 
)2 (, + R )3 
Recalling that 
1 
=I+X+X2+X3+... for IxI -< I and assuming that g --< R (as it must 
be 
I-x 
since the stock price is not infinite) we can rewrite (A. 16) as 
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pt g) 
D, (I+ g) Dt 
(I + R-) 
_(1+9) 
R-g 
rl + R) 
(A. 17) 
This form is the Gordon growth model. It demonstrates the important point that if R- is close 
to g then small permanent changes in R can have a major impact on the stock price. 
The assumption made in the derivation of the asset price (A. 9) is that expected stock returns 
are equal to a constant risk-free real rate of interest (in the context of CAPM say a constant 
real rate plus a constant risk premium). Relaxing this assumption in the above framework 
results in the loss of analytic tractability since expectations would be of a non-linear form. 
It is interesting to note an approximation for the case of a variable return that preserves 
tractability, which was initially employed by Campbell and Shiller (1988a). 
Take logarithms of (A. 6) we have that 
log(l+R, 
+, 
)=Iog(P,,, +D,,, )-log(P, )=Iog(P,,, )-log(P, )+109 1+Rt-+-' pt 
+I 
(A. 18) 
If we define 4, as the logarithm of the utility adjusted return, we can re-write (A. 18) as 
kt = log 
P,, D, +, 
Pt 
(A. 19) 
If we include in the utility adjusted return, the effect of consumption 
(A. 19) becomes 
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log 
Pj + D, 
-,, 
Pt a 
log Ct+l 
Ct (A. 
20) 
If we adjust the utility adjusted return displayed in (A. 20) to include the effect of transactions 
costs (i. e. the effect of changes in the bid-ask spread), then we obtain the following utility 
adjusted retum. 
75 
log 
Pt+, + Dt+j S, +, +a 
C'+1 
pt st Ct 
75 The Derivation of the Utility Adjusted Return was obtained from Minford and 
Peel (2002). 
(A. 21) 
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Apvendix C 
The Estimation of Eguation (3.35) 
TABLE 3.3. Present value Tests of the CCAPM including Transactions Costs, estimated 
for the UK stock market for the period 1980-2000. 
Lag Ad AS Ac -2 ttIR 
1 239 0.423 -0.029 0.343 0.372 
(2.21)* (-2.89)* (2.45)* 
2 238 0.315 -0.026 0.294 0.351 
(2.54)* (-2.72)* (2.36)* 
Notes: 
The t statistics are shown in brackets and * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
All the variables in the above equation are expressed as natural logarithms. 
Diagnostic Results 
Period Serial Correlation Heteroscedasticity 
Normality Functional Form 
Test Test Test Test 
1980-2000 0.48 0.27 0.35 0.75 
Notes: 
All the diagnostic statistics that are reported are based on the F statistic. 
The heteroscedasticity test is based on the test proposed by White (1980). 
The serial correlation test is based on the test proposed by Godfrey (1978a, 1978b). 
The normality test is based on the test proposed by Jacque and Bera (1987). 
The functional form test is based on the Ramsey (1969) test. 
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0 Avvendix D 
0 The sample of companies used in the Information Asymmetry Chapter 
The 26 companies and the years for which data are available are: 
Company Name Year 
ABBEY NATIONAL 90-98 
ALLIED DOMECQ 90-98 
PRUDENTIAL 96-98 
SCHRODERS 91-98 
ARM HOLDINGS 90-98 
POWERGEN 90-98 
BAA 90-99 
SAFEWAY (UK) 91-98 
BOOTS 90-99 
BP 90-99 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 90-99 
TESCO 91-98 
BRITISH TELECOM 97-98 
CAPITA GROUP 90-98 
SAINSBURY (J) 91-98 
CENTRICA 90-98 
COMPASS GROUP 90-99 
DAILY MAIL'A' 90-99 
HSBC HOLDINGS 90-99 
DIXONS GP. 90-98 
ELECTROCOMP. 97-98 
EMIGROUP 90-98 
VODAFONE GROUP 90-98 
SAGE GROUP 94 
HANSON 94-95 
GRANADA 90-98 
No. of companies Year 
17 90 
22 91 
21 92 
21 93 
22 94 
22 95 
23 96 
24 97 
24 98 
7 99 
203 
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0 Appendix E 
Dates of Changes in the FTSE 100 List over the time period 1984-2001 
Date of Chan 
19/01/84 
02/04/84 
02/07/84 
19/07/84 
01/10/84 
04/12/84 
02/01/85 
01/02/85 
01/04/85 
01/07/85 
06/08/85 
01/10/85 
02/01/86 
08/01/86 
01/04/86 
21/04/86 
22/04/86 
01/07/86 
01/10/86 
09/12/86 
02/01/87 
01/04/87 
27/04/87 
01/07/87 
01/10/87 
04/01/88 
25/02/88 
05/04/88 
01/07/88 
07/07/88 
03/10/88 
21/12/88 
03/01/89 
03/04/89 
17/07/89 
27/07/89 
08/08/89 
11/09/89 
02/11/89 
02/01/90 
02/04/90 
02/07/90 
13/07/90 
01/10/90 
Firms Added 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
Firms Deleted 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
Sam k Total 
2 
2 
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02/11/90 1 1 2 
02/01/91 2 2 4 
23/01/91 1 1 2 
02/04/91 3 3 6 
01/07/91 3 3 6 
16/09/91 1 2 
01/10/91 1 2 
26/11/91 1 2 
04/12/91 1 2 
02/01/92 3 3 6 
01/04/92 4 4 8 
22/06/92 3 3 6 
13/07/92 1 1 2 
21/09/92 6 6 12 
21/12/92 2 2 4 
22/03/93 1 1 2 
01/06/93 1 1 2 
21/06/93 4 4 8 
20/09/93 3 3 6 
25/10/93 1 1 2 
05/11/93 1 1 2 
20/12/93 2 2 4 
21/03/94 3 3 6 
20/06/94 1 1 2 
19/09/94 2 2 4 
17/03/95 1 1 2 
26/07/95 1 1 2 
18/09/95 3 3 6 
19/09/95 1 1 2 
23/10/95 1 1 2 
11/12/95 1 1 2 
18/12/95 5 5 10 
28/12/95 2 2 4 
31/01/96 1 1 2 
24/06/96 3 3 6 
19/07/96 1 2 
17/08/96 1 2 
23/09/96 1 2 
30/09/96 1 2 
23/12/96 2 2 4 
14/02/97 1 1 2 
24/02/97 1 1 2 
24/03/97 1 1 2 
23/06/97 2 2 4 
22/09/97 5 5 10 
17/12/97 2 2 4 
22/12/97 4 4 8 
24/12/97 1 1 2 
23/03/98 1 1 2 
21/05/98 1 1 2 
02/06/98 1 1 2 
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22/06/98 2 2 4 
08/09/98 1 1 2 
21/09/98 5 5 10 
16/12/98 1 1 2 
21/12/98 4 4 8 
04/02/99 2 2 4 
22/03/99 4 4 8 
29/03/99 1 1 2 
10/05/99 1 1 2 
21/06/99 2 2 4 
28/07/99 1 1 2 
20/09/99 3 3 6 
11/11/99 1 1 2 
24/11/99 1 1 2 
20/12/99 2 2 4 
07/03/00 1 1 2 
20/03/00 9 9 18 
12/05/00 1 1 2 
30/05/00 1 1 2 
19/06/00 4 4 8 
27/07/00 1 1 2 
18/09/00 5 5 10 
17/10/00 1 1 2 
18/12/00 5 5 10 
27/12/00 2 2 4 
02/02/01 2 2 4 
19/03/01 2 2 4 
10/04/01 1 1 2 
18/06/01 1 1 2 
12/07/01 1 1 2 
07/08/01 1 1 2 
10/09/01 2 2 4 
24/09/01 8 8 16 
19/11/01 2 2 4 
12/12/01 1 1 
..... ....................................... 
2 
Total 1 258 1 258 1 516 
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Avvendix F 
Portfolio Estimations of Stock Price Reactions to FTSE 100 Change 
TABLE 5.1A Portfolio Estimations of Stock Price Reaction to Announcement of 
Changes in the FTSE 100 List, between the time period of 1984-2001. Cumulative 
Average Prediction Errors (CAPE) and t-statistics are reported 
Panel A. Additions Panel B. Deletions 
Days Relative to CAPE (%) t-statistic 
Days Relative to CAPE t-statistic Event 
I 
Event 
-60, -2 1.34 0.37 -60, -2 -3.49 -0.71 
-60, -41 1.43 0.34 -60,41 -2.69 -0.45 
-40, -21 -2.26 -0.69 -40, -21 -1.84 -0.98 
-20, -ll 1.94 0.46 -20, -Il -2.62 -1.26 
-10 -0.71 -0.97 -10 -0.76 -0.62 
-9 0.52 0.34 -9 1.34 1.09 
-8 2.18 1.20 -8 0.93 0.98 
-7 0.17 0.50 -7 1.35 0.83 
-6 -1.36 -1.34 -6 0.98 0.93 
-5 1.05 0.24 -5 0.65 0.59 
-4 2.72 1.18 -4 -0.43 -1.28 
-3 2.59 1.08 3 -1.64 1.09 
-2 3.49 2.27* -2 -1.21 -2.11 
-1 2.87 2.41 * -1 -1.84 -2.79* 
0 1.29 2.58* 0 -2.55 -3.58* 
1 2.43 2.94* 1 -1.32 -2.35* 
2 1.12 2.26* 2 -1.38 -2.47* 
3 -0.54 -0.72 3 -0.76 -1.26 
4 2.14 1.46 4 -1.38 -1.12 
5 1.46 0.56 5 -1.21 -1.39 
6 -0.99 -0.17 6 -0.13 -1.55 
7 0.63 0.51 7 1.39 1.41 
8 -0.89 -1.24 8 -0.86 -1.23 
9 -0.32 -1.38 9 -. 
1.08 -1.31 
10 -1.99 -1.27 10 -0.35 -1.37 
+11, +20 -2.34 -1.21 +11, +20 -1.78 -0.83 
+21, +40 -3.84 -1.42 +21, +40 
1.53 1.39 
+41, +60 -3.97 -1.64 +41, +60 -3.92 -1.48 
+2, +60 -4.56 -1.67 +2, +60 -4.49 -1.64 
CAPE(- 1, + 1) 6.59 2.63* CAPE(-1, +1) -5.71 -2.87* 
Notes: 
Day 0 is the day on which the changes in the FrSE 100 list are announced on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
* Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
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